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Abstract 
 Transparent User Authentication for Mobile Applications 
Saud Nejr S Alotaibi 
 
The use of smartphones in our daily lives has grown steadily, due to the 
combination of mobility and round-the-clock multi-connectivity. In particular, 
smartphones are used to perform activities, such as sending emails, transferring 
money via mobile Internet banking, making calls, texting, surfing the Internet, 
viewing documents, storing medical, confidential and personal information, 
shopping online and playing games. Some active applications are considered 
sensitive and confidential and the risks are high in the event of the loss of any 
sensitive data or privacy breaches. In addition, after the point of entry, using 
techniques such as a PIN or password, the user of the device can perform almost 
all tasks, of different risk levels, without having to re-authenticate periodically to 
re-validate the user’s identity. Furthermore, the current point-of-entry 
authentication mechanisms consider all the applications on a mobile device to 
have the same level of importance and so do not apply any further access control 
rules. As a result, with the rapid growth of smartphones for use in daily life, 
securing the sensitive data stored upon them makes authentication of paramount 
importance.   
In this research, it is argued that within a single mobile application there are 
different processes operating on the same data but with differing risks attached. 
The unauthorised disclosure or modification of mobile data has the potential to 
lead to a number of undesirable consequences for the user. Thus, there is no 
IV 
single level of risk associated with a given application and the risk level changes 
during use. In this context, a novel mobile applications data risk assessment 
model is proposed to appreciate the risk involved within an application (intra-
process security). Accordingly, there is a need to suggest a method to be applied 
continuously and transparently (i.e., without obstructing the user’s activities) to 
authenticate legitimate users, which is maintained beyond point of entry, without 
the explicit involvement of the user. To this end, a transparent and continuous 
authentication mechanism provides a basis for convenient and secure re-
authentication of the user. The mechanism is used to gather user data in the 
background without requiring any dedicated activity, by regularly and periodically 
checking user behaviour to provide continuous monitoring for the protection of 
the smartphone.  
In order to investigate the feasibility of the proposed system, a study involving 
data collected from 76 participants over a one-month period using 12 mobile 
applications was undertaken. A series of four experiments were conducted based 
upon data from one month of normal device usage. The first experiment sought 
to explore the intra-process (i.e., within-app) and inter-process (i.e., access-only 
app) access levels across different time windows. The experimental results show 
that this approach achieved desirable outcomes for applying a transparent 
authentication system at an intra-process level, with an average of 6% intrusive 
authentication requests. Having achieved promising experimental results, it was 
identified that there were some users who undertook an insufficient number of 
activities on the device and, therefore, achieved a high level of intrusive 
authentication requests. As a result, there was a need to investigate whether a 
specific combination of time windows would perform better with a specific type of 
user. To do this, the numbers of intrusive authentication requests were computed 
V 
based on three usage levels (high, medium and low) at both the intra- and inter-
process access levels. This approach achieved better results when compared 
with the first set of results: the average percentage of intrusive authentication 
requests was 3%, which indicates a clear enhancement. The second and third 
experiments investigated only the intra-process and inter-process, respectively, 
to examine the effect of the access level. Finally, the fourth experiment 
investigated the impact of specific biometric modalities on overall system 
performance. In this research study, a Non-Intrusive Continuous Authentication 
(NICA) framework was applied by utilising two security mechanisms: Alert Level 
(AL) and Integrity Level (IL). During specific time windows, the AL process is used 
to seek valid samples. If there are no samples, the identity confidence is 
periodically reduced by a degradation function, which is 10% of current 
confidence in order to save power while the mobile device is inactive. In the case 
of the mobile user requesting to perform a task, the IL is applied to check the 
legitimacy of that user. If the identity confidence level is equal to or greater than 
the specified risk action level, transparent access is allowed. Otherwise, an 
intrusive authentication request is required in order to proceed with the service. 
In summary, the experimental results show that this approach achieved 
sufficiently high results to fulfil the security obligations. The shortest time window 
of AL= 2 min / IL = 5 min produced an average intrusive authentication request 
rate of 18%, whereas the largest time window (AL= 20 min / IL = 20 min) provided 
6%. Interestingly, when the participants were divided into three levels of usage, 
the average intrusive authentication request rate was 12% and 3% for the 
shortest time window (AL = 2 min / IL = 5 min) and the largest time window (AL= 
20 min / IL = 20), respectively. Therefore, this approach has been demonstrated 
VI 
to provide transparent and continuous protection to ensure the validity of the 
current user by understanding the risk involved within a given application.   
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
Mobile phones are used to perform activities such as sending emails, transferring 
money via mobile Internet banking, making calls, texting, surfing the Internet, viewing 
documents, storing medical, confidential and personal information, shopping online 
and playing games. Some of these active applications are considered sensitive and 
confidential and are becoming an ever more pressing concern, as the risks are high 
for users in the event of the loss of sensitive data or a privacy breach (Tam et al., 2015; 
Patel et al., 2016). In addition, with the rapid growth of mobile devices for use in our 
daily life, securing the sensitive data stored upon them makes authentication of 
paramount importance. Interestingly, 36% of mobile phone users have reported not 
safeguarding their mobile phones by applying a personal identification number (PIN) 
or password approach (Siciliano, 2013) and 44% of the surveyed respondents 
changed their password only once a year or less (CSID, 2012).  Furthermore, Gartner 
(2013) forecasted that, in 2017, the main breaches would be of mobile devices and 
tablets. In particular, mobile application misconfigurations would be the most common, 
accounting for approximately 75% of all mobile security breaches. 
Furthermore, after the point-of-entry authentication stage at the beginning of a session, 
by using a PIN or password, the user of the device can perform almost all tasks, 
regardless of the different risk levels, without periodically having to re-authenticate to 
re-validate the user’s identity. Current point-of-entry authentication mechanisms also 
consider all applications on the mobile device to have the same level of importance 
and keep a single level of security for all applications, thereby not applying any further 
access control rules (Clarke et al., 2009). As a result, it is argued that different 
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applications require different security provision; for instance, a bank account requires 
a different level of protection compared with a short message service (SMS) message. 
Consequently, each application has a particular level of risk which might be a feature 
that defines a suitable level of security (Ledermuller and Clarke, 2011). In their 
research, it is argued that, on a single mobile application, different processes operate 
on the same data with a different social risk based on the user action. More specifically, 
the unauthorised disclosure or modification of mobile applications data has the 
potential to lead to a number of undesirable consequences for the user. Thus, there is 
no single category of risk in using a single application; applications have a different 
level of risk that changes within the application.  
Accordingly, there is a need to suggest a method that could be applied continuously 
and transparently, without obstructing users’ activities, to authenticate legitimate users, 
which is maintained beyond the point of entry, without the explicit involvement of the 
user. To this end, a transparent and continuous authentication mechanism would 
provide a basis for the convenient and secure re-authentication of the user and thereby 
gather user data in the background without requiring any dedicated activity (Clarke et 
al., 2009; Chuang et al., 2018), by regularly and periodically checking user behaviour 
to enable the continuous monitoring of the protection of the mobile device. 
To conclude, this research project mainly investigates the following research question: 
Are we able to apply transparent authentication systems based on the risk level 
by utilising a combination of the device owner’s biometrics? 
Two tasks were undertaken to address the above research question fully: firstly, an 
investigation of the risk level for each service within a given application was conducted 
by classifying the mobile application’s data and then suggesting a risk matrix to 
calculate the risk level for each service; and secondly, the impact of the inter- and intra-
Chapter 1- 1.Introduction 
 
4 
 
processes on the overall transparent user authentication approach for mobile 
applications was tested through a series of experimental analysis studies. These 
experiments aimed to compute the total number of intrusive user authentication 
requests by collecting log data from a total of 76 participants over one month of normal 
device usage. 
To test the concept, the proposed framework is based on Clarke and Furnell (2007) 
and adjusted the biometric modalities, feature extraction, authentication manager and 
intrusive algorithm, as shown in Figure 1-1. The proposed framework consists of a 
number of key components, including a Data Collection Engine, a Biometric Profile 
Engine, and an Authentication Engine. These engines perform various tasks, such as 
collecting biometric data, generating user profiles, and verifying a user’s identity, 
respectively. There are two further main system components: the Authentication 
Manager, which controls the three previously mentioned engines; and the Intra-
Process Determination System, which observes the user action on a specific 
application. 
Chapter 1- 1.Introduction 
 
5 
 
 
Figure 1-1: Framework for mobile application security (based on Clarke et al, 2009) 
 Authentication Manager: The main functionality of the Authentication Manager 
is to observe the current security level and make authentication decisions if the 
user requests access to a service within the application (intra-process). For the 
purpose of checking whether the user is allowed to access this service within 
the application, the Authentication Manager compares the risk level value for 
this intra-process, which is retrieved from the Risk Database, with the 
confidence level value calculated by the Authentication Engine. If the process 
risk value exceeds the threshold (confidence level), the user will be allowed 
access. Otherwise, if the process risk value is less than the threshold, the user 
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will be denied access to the service. In this context, the risk level value will be 
one of the following: no risk, low risk, medium risk, and high risk, each of which 
has a predefined value. 
 User Action Determination System (new component): The previous stage (i.e. 
Authentication Manager) involved collecting real biometric sample data from the 
user and comparing them with a biometric template in order to generate a 
confidence level. Then, this value is passed to the Authentication Manager for 
comparison with the risk value for the process. The risk value is based on this 
new component. The novel elements are the ability to determine and identify 
the current user’s action on the application (intra-process), which is the key task 
of the Intra-Process Determination system. The outputs from this component 
are an application name and the intra-process name within this application, both 
of which will be sent to the Authentication Manager in order to decide the 
legitimacy of the user and whether the action can be accomplished. Figure 1-1 
demonstrates the framework architecture for the intra-process security system.  
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this research is to propose and develop an intelligent transparent 
authentication framework for the intra-process security of mobile applications that 
fulfils the security obligations and provides continuous protection to ensure the validity 
of the current user. In order to achieve this aim, the research project is divided into five 
distinct objectives:  
 Objective 1: To produce a novel mobile applications data taxonomy by 
investigating the risk for each process within an application in order to explore 
user action risk. 
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 Objective 2: To propose an innovative risk assessment model for mobile 
applications data, called MORI (Mobile Risk), which can be used to determine 
the risk level for each action on a single application. 
 Objective 3: To develop user action determination software in order to create a 
real dataset to utilise in the study experiments. 
 Objective 4: Investigating the potential for applying a transparent authentication 
system to intra-process security for mobile applications by conducting a series 
of experiments. 
 Objective 5: To investigate the impact of specific biometric modalities on the 
overall system performance in three types of modality: single, two, and multi 
modalities. 
1.3 Novel Research Contributions 
This research is suitable for mobile application developers due to there is a clear need 
to ensure the validity of the current user and provides continuous protection after the 
point of entry authentication phase. Likewise, this approach would achieve good levels 
of usability by utilizing a combination of the device owner’s biometrics in the 
background without being prompted to authenticate again and without interrupting the 
user from their typical interaction with the mobile. 
The research programme has accomplished the aforementioned objectives, 
contributed new knowledge and improved the field of user authentication for 
smartphones in general and mobile application security and usability in particular. 
The key novel contributions of this research project are briefly listed below: 
 Producing comprehensive analysis and a systematic literature review of 
transparent authentication systems for mobile device security which indicate 
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there is a clear need to investigate when to authenticate a mobile user by 
focusing on the sensitivity level of the application and understanding whether a 
certain application may require protection. 
 Drawing attention to studying the risk for each process within an application and 
introducing a novel taxonomy of mobile applications data by studying the risk 
for each process within the given application. 
 Introducing a new risk assessment model for mobile applications data, called 
MORI (Mobile Risk), which determines the risk level for each process on a 
single application. The risk matrix could, in future, assist research activities that 
investigate the risks within an application and might help to move the access 
control system from the application level to the intra-process application level, 
based on the level of risk of the user action being performed. 
 Conducting a set of experiments aimed at better understanding and 
investigating the potential for applying a transparent authentication system to 
intra-process security for mobile applications.  
 Studying the impact of each individual modality on overall system performance 
by creating a series of experiments to investigate this. 
 
A number of scientific papers relevant to this research project have been 
published and presented in refereed journals and conferences and several 
papers have been prepared for publication. The outcomes of this research 
study are listed below: 
Alotaibi, S., Furnell, S., & Clarke, N. (2015, December). Transparent 
authentication systems for mobile device security: A review. In Internet 
Technology and Secured Transactions (ICITST), 2015 10th International 
Conference for (pp. 406-413). IEEE. London, UK. 
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Alotaibi, S., Furnell S., and Clarke N., (2016). A Novel Taxonomy for Mobile 
Applications Data. In the International Journal of Cyber-Security and Digital 
Forensics (IJCSDF), Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 115-121. 
Alotaibi, S., Furnell, S., & Clarke, N. (2016). MORI: An Innovative Mobile 
Applications Data Risk Assessment Model. In the Journal of Internet 
Technology and Secured Transactions (JITST), Vol. 5, Iss. 3/4, 
September/December 2016. 
Alotaibi, S., Furnell, S., & Clarke, N. (2018). A Novel Transparent User 
Authentication Approach for Mobile Applications. Submitted to Information 
Security Journal: a Global Perspective. 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
This research project is organised into seven chapters in order to present the 
achievements relating to the above-mentioned objectives. The first chapter identifies 
the research problem and highlights the research study aim and objectives, its novel 
research contributions and, finally, the structure of the thesis. 
The second chapter, mobile device authentication, provides background information 
about mobile and biometric authentication. Firstly, it reviews the popularity of mobile 
devices, the increasing reliance upon them and establishes the importance of security 
for these devices. The chapter continues by providing an overview of some of the 
currently provided authentication technologies and reviews biometric authentication 
from a number of perspectives, including its system components, requirements, 
techniques, performance measures and fusion. The chapter ends with an account of 
the current authentication mechanisms for mobile devices.  
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The third chapter, a systemic review of continuous and transparent authentication 
systems for mobile devices, briefly outlines the concept of a transparent authentication 
system and why it is needed. This is followed by a literature review of the existing 
research in this domain on continuous and transparent authentication systems for 
mobile devices and provides a comparative summary of each category. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion and identifies a gap that exists in the literature by 
highlighting the need for a new security mechanism that can provide continuous and 
transparent protection for mobile devices. 
The fourth chapter introduces a novel mobile applications data risk assessment model. 
The chapter explains the need for intra-process security for mobile devices through 
examples of different types of applications. Then, a taxonomy of mobile applications 
data is presented, with justifications. Finally, the chapter presents a generic risk 
assessment model for mobile applications data with a particular focus on analysing 
and producing a risk matrix. 
The fifth chapter, a transparent, intra-process user authentication approach for mobile 
applications, presents the experimental methodologies, analysis and results regarding 
the novelty of the proposed model. After presenting the data collection methodology 
and the software generated to collect user interactions with a smartphone in a real 
data environment, three types of experiment are presented in great detail. The first 
experiment sought to explore the intra-process (i.e., within-app) and inter-process (i.e., 
only-app) access levels across different time windows and achieved promising 
experimental results when the 76 participants were also classified into three groups 
according to their level of mobile usage. The second experiment was conducted to 
provide further insight into whether applying a transparent authentication system to the 
intra-process only would enhance security and usability. Finally, to prove the research 
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concept, it was deemed useful to conduct an evaluation using the same real-world 
dataset. To achieve this goal, the average intrusive authentication requests were 
calculated and presented for the inter-process (application access only) without taking 
the actions that happened within an application into account. This is followed by a table 
summary of all the experiments with more detail and discussion.  
The sixth chapter, investigating the impact of each simulated modality on the overall 
system performance, seeks to test the effect of biometrics on the system results. This 
investigation conducted three types of experiment employed without the selected 
modality, calculated the total intrusive authentication requests and compared these 
with the overall system performance. The chapter then presents examples of different 
participants in each experiment. 
The seventh chapter, conclusions and future work, is the final chapter and highlights 
the main contributions and achievements of this research project in relation to the field 
of user authentication for smartphones in general and mobile applications security and 
usability in particular. The limitations of the research project, suggestions and scope 
for future work, and the future for user authentication on mobile devices are explored 
and discussed at the end of the chapter. 
At the end of this thesis report, there are a number of appendices that support the main 
aim of this research project, such as confirmation of the ethical approval for the 
experiments, the consent forms given to the participants, programming scripts, and a 
series of peer-reviewed publications resulting from this research study. 
  
Chapter 1- 1.Introduction 
 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two    
Mobile Device Authentication 
  
Chapter 2- 1.Mobile Device Authentication 
 
13 
 
2 Mobile Device Authentication  
2.1 Importance of Mobile Devices 
The use of mobile devices in our daily lives has grown steadily, due to the combination 
of mobility and 24/7 multi-connectivity (Spaccapetra et al., 2005). As a result, mobile 
devices have overtaken desktop computers (Miles, 2015). Figure 2-1 shows the total 
number of smartphone users worldwide from 2014 to projections for 2022. The number 
of smartphone users in 2019 is forecast to pass 5 billion. For example, in the USA, the 
number is forecast to grow to 247.5 million by 2019. In addition, 80% of Internet users 
own a smartphone (Smart Insights, 2015) and over 50% of smartphone users pick up 
their smartphone immediately after waking up (ExpressPigeon, 2014). Globally, there 
are 3.419 billion people connected to the Internet (equating to 46% global penetration), 
while 2.307 billion users are actively involved in social media. In addition, 3.790 billion 
people are unique mobile users (representing 51% global penetration), whereas 1.968 
billion users utilise social media on a mobile device (we are social, 2016).  
Furthermore, the size of the mobile market has increased significantly each year, while 
mobile phone users’ subscriptions reached an estimated 7 billion by 2015, according 
to one report (ITU, 2015). Statistics also show the number of smartphone users in the 
UK from 2011 to 2014 and provide a forecast through 2018; the forecast estimated 
that the number of smartphone users would reach about 44.9 million by 2017 (Statista, 
2016). 
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Figure 2-1: Number of smartphone users worldwide (Statista, 2018) 
2.2  Mobile Applications Evolution 
The global mobile applications market was forecast to reach $25 billion by the end of 
2015 (ABI Research, 2010). Statista (2016 b) predicted that, in 2020, the expected 
growth of mobile app revenue would be $101 billion, from $41.1 billion in 2015. It was 
expected that revenue from mobile apps would grow at a steady rate in the coming 
years. Moreover, mobile web traffic was expected to exceed 10 exabyte by 2017 
(Nicolaou, 2013). Regarding the digital marketing review (comScore, 2018), mobile 
devices achieve 75% of all adults’ time online with smartphones. On the other hand, 
80% of female spend their time on mobile devices compare with only 69% for males 
and 30% of online adults are now mobile only as well. Based on audience, over 90% 
of time online is spent on smartphones for Spotify and Snapchat whereas tablets 
account for over a third of time spent on the BBC as illustrated in  Figure 2-2. In 
addition, YouTube increased both its mobile app audience (about 5%) and time spent 
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(about 22%) compared to 2017. Interestingly, Snap is the only mobile app in the top 
10 which is not owned by Google or Facebook. Furthermore, Spotify, Netflix and eBay 
feature in the top 10 mobile apps for time spent (comscore, 2018). 
 
 Figure 2-2: UK digital marketing review (comscore, 2018)  
In this context, Android was the fastest-growing operating system (OS) in terms of 
popularity, as well as the most widespread mobile OS (IDC, 2014; Statista, 2016 e). 
Statista (2016c) shows the number of apps available in the Google Play Store (Android 
Market) from December 2009 to February 2016. The number of apps available in the 
Google Play Store exceeded 1 million in July 2013 and was recently placed at 2 million 
in February 2016. In comparison, the Apple App Store offers 1.4 million apps (Statista, 
2015). Furthermore, Android and iOS devices accounted for 97.5% of global 
smartphone sales (Statista, 2016e), as shown in Figure 2-3, from just 38% in 2010 
(Chrome Info Technologies, 2016). As a result, by 2017, 50% of online transactions 
were conducted by mobile app. There are approximately 1 billion Android-activated 
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devices (King, 2013) and more than 1 billion monthly-active Android users (Fiegerman, 
2014). 
In the UK, Statista (2016d) presented a forecast of the number of mobile app users 
from the third quarter of 2013 to the second quarter of 2016. By the second quarter of 
2016, it was forecast that there would be 43.2 million mobile app users in the UK.  
 
Figure 2-3: Android and iOS market share (Statista, 2016 e) 
 
2.3 User Authentication Approaches 
User authentication is a vital concept for achieving a high level of security in an 
information technology (IT) system to protect it from unauthorised user actions. ISO 
27000 (2016) define the authentication as: “Authentication is a process that is used to 
confirm that a claimed characteristic of an entity is actually correct. To authenticate is 
to verify that a characteristic or attribute that appears to be true is in fact true”. In order 
to grant access to a certain system, user authentication is the first phase of the access 
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control process to decide whether access can be allowed. Traditionally, authentication 
could be achieved by utilising one or more of the three following approaches (Wood, 
1977): 
1. Something you know, such as a password, PIN, or answer to a challenged 
cognitive question. This approach is known as secret knowledge-based 
authentication.  
2. Something you have, such as a Smart/ATM card, radio-frequency 
identification (RFID) chip, keyfob or hardware/software one-time password 
(OTP) token. This is known as token-based authentication. 
3. Something you are, such as biometrics, including physiological, such as 
fingerprints, iris and retina scans and facial recognition, and behavioural 
(referred to as something you do), for instance, typing, voice, and device use 
patterns. 
As secret knowledge can be easy to share and to guess, this type of authentication 
can be combined with token-based authentication to increase the security provided, 
known as “two-factor authentication”. On the other hand, while biometrics can be more 
difficult to mimic or forge compared with knowledge or tokens, they are computationally 
more difficult to process (Crawford et al., 2013). Biometrics can require more hardware 
than other methods, although behavioural biometrics often do not. Therefore, 
combining multiple authentication methods, a process known as “multi-factor 
authentication”, tends to provide a better authentication mechanism and thereby 
enhances system security, but also complicates the process of authentication. 
Nowadays, a new technology has been emerged called blockchain. Blockchain is a 
sequence of blocks which holds a complete list of transaction records. Each block 
contains a cryptographic hash of the previous block, a timestamp, and transaction data 
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(Xiong et al, 2018). Although blockchain has been widely adopted in many applications, 
there is a lack of the mechanism of identity binding (Gao et al, 2018:  Lu, Y. 2018).  In 
addition, this study is focus on gathering user data in the background without requiring 
any dedicated activity, by regularly and periodically checking user behaviour to provide 
continuous monitoring for the protection of the smartphone. 
2.4 Secret Knowledge-based Authentication 
Knowledge-based authentication methods, such as passwords and PINs in particular, 
are the most widely used authentication techniques, due to being easy to implement 
and not requiring additional hardware, despite there being significant issues involved 
in their use (Crawford et al., 2013). In this method, the user has to remember a secret 
PIN or password, an answer to a predefined question, or images. 
A PIN is considered the simplest knowledge-based authentication technique due to its 
ease of recall, its perceived convenience, and its inexpensive implementation. For this 
reason, it is commonly used for authenticating a user’s access to a mobile device and 
is widely used for ATMs with credit cards as a two-factor authentication scheme, 
although PINs are easier to guess and steal. On the other hand, passwords contain 
numbers, letters, and symbols, which reduces the possibility of being breached. In 
practice, the use of a password demonstrates that the person knows the secret for 
accessing an account, but not that he/she is the rightful owner. In addition, because a 
PIN has the same characteristics as a password, it faces the same issues of spying, 
guessing, and eavesdropping (Verizon, 2012; Patel et al., 2016). Clarke and Furnell 
(2005) show that 45% of the participants in their survey never change their PIN. 
Moreover, 71% of the participants of another survey did not even use a PIN or any 
other authentication method to safeguard their mobile phone (Kurkovsky and Syta, 
2010). For example, 61% of users have reported reusing the same password on 
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multiple websites and 44% change their password once a year (CSID, 2012). As a 
result of having to create passwords for multiple accounts, users tend to write them 
down and/or select weak passwords that may be more easily remembered (O’Gorman, 
2003). 
A cognitive knowledge question seeks to mitigate the load on users having to 
memorise passwords by deploying associative question(s). These questions usually 
concern personal information, such as date of birth, mother’s maiden name, and 
favourite colour. However, there is still a need to recall answers and the possibility of 
using social engineering or conducting online searches in order to obtain a user’s 
answers. Therefore, this method would not be dependable as a stand-alone 
authentication approach.  
 
On the other hand, with the aim of improving the usability of knowledge-based 
methods, graphical passwords are used and suggested to be alternatives to PIN, 
(Gyorffy, Tappenden & Miller, 2011)  and improve password usage and are likely to 
overcome memorability problems. Humans also find it easy to recognise images, even 
after a period of time (Chiasson et al., 2007). A graphical password is an authentication 
system that works by having the user select from images, in a specific order, presented 
in a graphical user interface Instead of remembering characters (Katsini et al, 2016). 
Graphical password authentication techniques may be classified into four main 
categories (khan et al, 2019):  
 Recognition-based system: users are permitted to choose an image from a 
given set of images during authentication and compared with they select the 
images at the registration phase.  
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 Pure-recall-based system: users set an image of their own choice and then they 
have to reproduce the same image during authentication.  
 Cued-recall-based system: This technique is the same as Pure-recall but the 
only difference is that during authentication it provides users with clues to get 
authenticated.  
 Hybrid system: This technique is usually a combination of two methods to 
overcome the vulnerability of a single technique. 
2.5 Token-based Authentication 
Token-based authentication is based on the use of something you have, such as a 
Universal Serial Bus (USB) token device, smart card, ID card, driving licence, or active 
password-generating security token to prove identity or eligibility in order to access a 
system. The advantage of this approach is that, rather than depending on human 
memory, it relies mainly on carrying a token and proving its ownership as an essential 
part of the entire authentication process. Therefore, it overcomes some of the 
weaknesses of a secret knowledge-based approach. Token-based authentication can 
be classified based on external appearance and the need for additional devices into 
two types: Hardware Tokens (token-based OTP) and Software Tokens (tokenless) 
(Aloul et al., 2009).  A Hardware Token is a single-token physical device created and 
delivered by the service provider, for instance, the HSBC Secure Key OTP token; 
whereas, with Software Tokens, there is no need to carry a device due to the service 
provider sending the OTP via SMS to the user’s registered mobile phone and requiring 
the user to enter the password generated to access a service.  
Although token-based authentication is difficult to duplicate and manipulate, it is more 
expensive to implement (Tanvi et al., 2011) and presents possible inconveniences for 
the user, such as the need for additional hardware readers and having to carry a token 
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around. Thus, the use of tokens does not solve the problems faced when using 
knowledge-based authentication because a USB token can be stolen or attacked. User 
convenience is an issue, particularly when users need to carry a variety of tokens for 
different accounts and services from various providers (Al Abdulwahid et al., 2013). 
Moreover, it is apparent that the cost of issuing, maintaining and recovering tokens is 
higher. In addition, time synchronisation between a token and a system might be 
difficult with time-synchronous tokens (Furnell et al., 2008), especially in out-of-
coverage areas. 
Unlike biometric-based Authentication, secret knowledge based are vulnerable to be 
sharable, forgotten, and easy to guess (Ratha et al, 2011). Furthermore, secret 
knowledge based becomes quite difficult to remember and manage a big number of 
different accounts. In addition, token are vulnerable to be shared, can be duplicated, 
lost or stolen. On the other hand, biometric-based authentication is a unique feature 
which cannot be stolen, difficult to duplicate and nearly impossible to share. In this 
research study, security and usability can be increased by using transparent 
authentication due to the mobile device having a great source of data in terms of user 
biometrics and due to the weaknesses of secret knowledge based and token as well 
(Mahfouz et al, 2017). 
2.6 Biometric-based Authentication 
Biometrics are defined by the International Biometrics Group (IBG) as “the automated 
use of physiological or behavioural characteristics to determine or verify identity” (IBG, 
2010). Biometrics are used for two purposes (Jain et al., 2008): 
 Verification: in this type, the system matches the captured biometric 
characteristics of the claimed person with the stored template of that person in 
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a database. Therefore, the verification process checks whether the newly 
acquired sample matches the original sample’s template by performing a one-
to-one comparison. In this way, the system either rejects or accepts the 
submitted claim of identity. The verification process answers the following 
question: does this identity belong to you? 
 Identification:  In this mode, the system will verify the user by capturing a sample 
from the user and matching it against all the biometric reference templates 
stored in a database of registered users. In the identification process, the user 
has no need to claim an identity and the system performs a one-to-many 
comparison. Finally, this system is looking to find an identity, rather than verify 
a claimed identity. The identification process answers the following question: 
whose identity is this? 
 
2.6.1 Biometric System Requirements 
Jain et al. (2004) have recommended that a biometric characteristic should meet the 
following criteria in order to be utilised for an authentication system: 
 Universality: Every user should have the characteristic being used as a biometric. 
For example, the user needs to have fingers for the fingerprint technique to be 
used as a biometric identifier. 
 Uniqueness: The selected characteristics of a biometric should be sufficiently 
different in order to discriminate between them. 
 Permanence: The biometric characteristic should not change over time; for 
instance, a person’s fingerprints tend not to change over time, whereas the way 
in which a person types tends to alter. As a result, “the more the frequent changing 
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of a biometric, the more the need to update the biometrics template and therefore 
the higher the cost of maintenance“ (Clarke, 2011). 
 Collectability: The biometric samples should be easy to capture, such as face 
images using a normal camera and capturing voice samples during a telephone 
call. In contrast, the user has to position the eye to a special infrared camera for 
a much longer time to obtain an iris image, a method that is considered intrusive. 
 Performance: The proposed system should meet the requirements of accuracy, 
speed of matching, robustness and scalability of technologies. 
 Acceptability: This refers to the level to which users prefer and accept the use of 
biometrics as an authentication scheme in their lives, such as a fingerprint scan 
compared with an iris scan. 
 Circumvention: This means that the system should be adequately robust and 
stand up against various techniques, such as sample forgery. For instance, an iris 
scan is almost impossible to imitate. On the other hand, a fingerprint scan system 
can be fooled using a fake finger, while it is difficult to fake a facial thermograph-
based authentication system with a replicated face, as the system has the ability 
to detect whether the face is alive. 
2.6.2 Generic Biometric System  
A biometric system consists of five incorporated generic components, as depicted in 
Figure 2-4 (Clarke, 2011): 
 Capture component (data collection): The main aim of this component is to 
capture (the acquisition process) a biometric sample from a user by utilising a 
specific sensor. For instance, a camera could be used for capturing images of 
a face for facial recognition. 
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 Feature extraction component (processing): The main purpose of this 
component is to extract a set of unique biometric data, known as a feature 
vector, after the sample is acquired using a number of algorithms, depending 
upon the biometric technique, to generate the biometric template (reference). 
 Storage component (template database): The main goal of this database is to 
store the extracted unique features (biometric template) from the previous step 
to be used as a reference template for future comparison in the matching 
process. In addition, the templates in the database can be updated over time.   
 Classification component (matching): The main objective of this component is 
to compare the biometric sample template (capture) with the stored template 
(reference) using a matching algorithm to generate a level of similarity or a 
matching score. Accordingly, the higher the value of the matching score, the 
more likely it is that the two biometric measurements originate from the same 
person. This matching process is applied either in the verification or 
identification stage.    
 Decision component: This is the final component of a biometric system. The 
main aim of this component is to enable a decision by comparing the matching 
score that is produced from a classification process with the set threshold. 
Accordingly, the decision threshold is designated to permit the user access to 
the system in the case of verification or to identify the identity in the case of 
identification. 
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Figure 2-4: Components of a biometric system (Clarke, 2011) 
In general, a biometric-based system consists of two stages: the enrolment process 
and the authentication process (Woodward et al., 2003; Jain et al., 2004), as shown in 
Figure 2-5. 
 Enrolment process (registration): For the first step, an individual user needs to 
enrol on a biometric system. The user provides biometric information via a 
suitable sensor, then unique biometric characteristics are extracted, used to 
create a reference template, and stored in a database. The reference template 
is considered the main key to the success of a biometric system. 
 Authentication process (verification): This process represents the steps taken 
when a user demands access to a service to determine whether the claimed 
identity matches the reference template. Firstly, a new biometric sample is 
acquired from the sensor, and then the features are extracted from the sample 
to generate the sample template, which is subsequently compared with the 
reference template (one-to-one for verification, one-to-N for identification). This 
comparison process generates a match score using a pattern classification 
method (e.g., a neural network). Finally, the match score value is compared 
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with a predefined threshold. If the match score value falls above the predefined 
threshold, system access will be permitted; otherwise, access is refused. 
Therefore, it is imperative to choose a discriminatory system threshold in order 
not to allow imposters to enter the system too easily, but that does not refuse 
legitimate users access to the system. 
 
Figure 2-5: Generic biometric authentication system (Saevanee, 2014) 
2.6.3 Biometric Performance Metrics 
The performance of a typical biometric technique is measured by comparing a 
biometric sample from the current user with the existing reference template. These 
means of measurement are called the false acceptance rate (FAR), the false rejection 
rate (FRR) and the equal error rate (EER), as shown in Figure 2-6.  
 The FAR refers to the percentage of access attempts by imposters that have 
been accepted by the system (i.e., incorrectly accepted). This is also called a 
type I error or false positive (sometimes referred to as the impostor pass rate). 
In this context, high FAR values are often seen as a significant problem because 
they represent an intrusion into a protected system. 
 The FRR refers to the percentage of access attempts by legitimate users that 
have been rejected by the system (i.e., incorrectly rejected). This is also called 
a type II error or false negative (sometimes referred to as the false alarm rate). 
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 The true acceptance rate (TAR) is the rate at which the system correctly verifies 
the claimed individual. 
 The true rejection rate (TRR) is the rate at which the system correctly rejects a 
false claim. 
Generally, a low FAR indicates that the system is secure and a low FRR means the 
system is usable. The point at which the FAR and FRR are equal is called the EER, 
which means that a system is accurate. For a system to be considered accurate and 
to have performed well, it needs a low EER.  
 
Figure 2-6: Biometric performance metrics factors (Crawford et al., 2013) 
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2.6.4 Biometric Techniques 
Biometric authentication systems can be divided into two types: physiological or 
behavioural. Physiological biometric methods use a part of the human body to 
distinguish an individual based upon specific physical characteristics, such as the face, 
fingerprint, and iris. These physical features are more likely to remain constant over 
time and under different conditions. Furthermore, physiological biometrics naturally 
contain high levels of discriminative information and hence show a high degree of 
recognition performance. In comparison, behavioural biometrics refers to something 
the user does, such as typing, gait, application usage, voice, or signature (Woodward 
et al., 2003). Human behaviour is likely to change over time for several reasons, such 
as aging, fitness level, mood, and weather conditions; therefore, this might result in 
lower performance rates than physiological biometrics. However, this effect can be 
minimised if the template is regularly updated. To collect behavioural-based methods 
data, there is no need for special hardware and hence this may be cost effective. As a 
result, behavioural-based techniques are less unique but more flexible and convenient 
(Clarke, 2011). Furthermore, behavioural-based approaches perform better in the 
verification mode than they do in the identification mode.   
2.6.4.1 Physiological Biometrics  
A physiological biometric is one that is measured by gathering data from part of the 
user’s body, such as by fingerprinting, iris and retina scans and facial recognition. 
Generally, these biometrics need a method for obtaining the data, such as the use of 
a scanner or camera. 
 Fingerprint recognition: As a result of the uniqueness and permanency of 
human fingerprints, fingerprint recognition is one of the most accurate and 
commonly used biometric technologies (Jain et al., 2002; Woodward et al., 
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2003). Furthermore, by 2015, fingerprint biometrics market revenue was 
expected to reach $3.28 billion (MarketsandMarkets, 2011). For instance, the 
Apple iPhone 5 added a Touch ID sensor to authenticate the user when trying 
to use the phone through the Home key. Unfortunately, fingerprints are 
sensitive to environmental conditions, such as age, dirt, and lost and therefore 
the performance of fingerprint recognition might be reduced (Jain et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, during the taking of user samples, there are a number of factors 
that might affect the surface of the fingertip, such as the positioning of the finger 
on the sensor and the amount of pressure exerted (Nanavati et al., 2002). The 
newer fingerprint readers are also boosted by a liveness sensor to decide 
whether the sample is taken from a living person or is fake (Clarke and Furnell, 
2005).   
 Facial recognition: Facial recognition is a method for identifying and verifying 
users by their face without any user interaction. This method is considered the 
second most popular after fingerprinting due to user adoption and the sale rate 
(Biometrics Institute 2013). The facial recognition approach is non-intrusive 
because user authentication could be performed without the user’s knowledge 
by taking an image of the face from a distance. There are, however, some 
factors that might affect the system performance, such as the fact that the 
human face shape may change over time, lighting, and the possibility that a 
user may be too far away from the camera or his/her face obscured by glasses.  
 Iris recognition: Iris recognition identifies a person using unique iris patterns by 
asking users to align their eyes with a camera, which may cause a certain level 
of inconvenience. However, an iris can be scanned through glasses and contact 
lenses (Woodward et al., 2003) and this procedure is 10 times more accurate 
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than fingerprint recognition (EPIC, 2005). Therefore, iris recognition is now 
considered the most secure and reliable biometric method (Jain et al., 2007).  
 Ear recognition:  Ear recognition is used to identify a user by the shape of the 
outer human ear while the user is making a telephone call, which is considered 
to be user-convenient because the ear image can be taken from a distance. 
Unfortunately, there are factors, such as when an ear is covered by an object 
(e.g., earrings), inconsistent lighting, accessories, and pose, that could affect 
the performance of the system. There is presently no commercial ear biometry 
product (Ross, 2011).    
2.6.4.2 Behavioural Biometrics 
Behavioural biometrics rely on a user’s distinctive behaviours, such as typing, gait, 
touch screen interaction patterns, device use patterns and voice (Gupta et al., 2018). 
In this context, there is no need to use a device to collect the user data. 
 Keystroke analysis (typing): Keystroke dynamics is a behavioural biometric that 
is based on each person’s individual typing style on a keyboard. It is taken by 
the measurement of such factors as the speed, frequency of characters, and 
the pressure with which keys are pressed (Karnan et al., 2011). When extracting 
keystroke activities, there are two main features that provide the most 
discriminative information (Clarke and Furnell, 2007): inter-keystroke latency 
(the time that elapses between releasing the first key and pressing the second) 
and hold time (the time interval between pressing and releasing a key), as 
shown in Figure 2-7.  
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Figure 2-7: Example of keystroke analysis  
 
The keystroke approach can be performed in two modes: 
 Static (text-dependent): A user’s typing pattern is examined when certain keys 
are pressed, such as when entering a password. 
 Dynamic (text-independent): There is no predetermined text (i.e., free text). 
Users are verified based upon their overall typing pattern, for instance, the 
typing rhythm speed. In this context, the resulting keystroke dynamic is likely to 
be more variable than a static keystroke. 
 Gait authentication: Gait-based biometric authentication methods validate the 
user of a phone while walking, based on the person’s gait, in a transparent and 
continuous manner, as shown in Figure 2-8. In this context, three types of gait 
recognition systems have been identified: machine vision-based, floor sensor- 
based, and wearable sensor-based techniques (Muaaz and Mayrhofer, 2013). 
The machine vision-based technique uses cameras from various distances to 
gather the user’s gait data, whereas the floor sensor-based technique collects 
gait data from several sensors placed on floor mats, measuring aspects such 
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as pressure and force. Today, wearable sensor-based techniques are also 
identified as a new method for obtaining a user’s gait data taking advantage of 
sensors built into mobile phones, such as accelerometers, gyroscopes, and 
force sensors. 
 
 
Figure 2-8: Gait cycle (Queen’s University, 2011) 
 
 Voice verification (speaker recognition): The way users speak can be used to 
verify their identity. Voice verification can, similar to keystroke dynamics, also 
operate in two modes: static (word-dependent, which requires a user to speak 
a predefined phrase) and dynamic (word-independent, which does not require 
any predefined phrases). There are some issues related to using a voice 
biometric to verify a user’s identity, such as any changes in the human voice, 
surrounding temperature, mood, medication, and physical changes in the vocal 
tract. Therefore, voice biometrics are not suitable for large-scale deployment 
due to issues with contamination from other noise during recording. 
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 Behavioural profiling (service utilisation) attempts to identify and discriminate 
users based upon the way each user interacts with applications and/or services 
(Furnell et al., 2001); specifically, which applications they access, at what time 
of the day, and for how long. However, this technique is not expected to be 
unique and distinct enough to use as an identification system. Furthermore, it 
suffers from privacy issues during the behaviour monitoring, thereby affecting 
the level of user acceptance.   
2.6.5 Multi-modal Biometrics 
Uni-modal biometrics suffer from certain issues, such as noisy data, non-universality, 
spoof attacks, and unacceptable error rates (Ross and Jain, 2004). These weaknesses 
might be mitigated by multiple biometrics sources (Jain et al., 2005). Furthermore, if a 
user is not able to provide all the biometric samples required, multi-modal biometrics 
offer an opportunity to increase population coverage and, therefore, enhance overall 
system performance, reliability, and robustness (Jain et al., 2004). Typically, 
multibiometric systems can be classified into one of the following categories, as 
illustrated in Figure 2-9: 
 Multi-modal biometrics: The multi-modal biometrics approach requires a 
combination of two or more biometric techniques, such as fingerprint and face 
recognition, or keystroke dynamics and behavioural profiling. 
 Multi-sample: The multi-sample biometrics approach captures more than one 
sample of the same biometric trait, such as the frontal and side image of an 
individual face. 
 Multi-sensor: The multi-sensor biometrics approach utilises more than one 
sensor to capture a single biometric modality of the user. 
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 Multi-instance: The multi-instance biometrics approach uses more than one 
subtype of the same biometric, such as the left index finger and the right index 
finger. 
 Multi-algorithm: The multi-algorithm biometrics approach utilises more than one 
matcher algorithm in the classification process on a single biometric modality. 
 Hybrid: In this approach, a subset of the above-mentioned categories is applied 
in order to optimise accuracy. For example, this could involve combining multi-
modal and multi-algorithm systems (e.g., two voice recognition algorithms 
integrated with three face recognition algorithms). 
Generally, there are some aspects to be considered when applying a multi-modal 
biometrics system, such as the number of traits, fusion level, the method of integration, 
and the data capture mode (Ross and Jain, 2004).   
 
Figure 2-9: Sources of information for multibiometric systems (Ross 2006)  
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2.6.6 Fusion Biometrics 
Biometric fusion refers to the combination of information from different sources, such 
as multi-modal, multi-instance, multi-sample, multi-sensor, multi-algorithmic, and 
hybrid approaches, in order to enhance the authentication decision and improve 
performance in a biometric system. As biometric systems are created from four main 
elements, namely, capturing the sample, feature extraction, template matching, and 
decision, biometric fusion could be implemented at the previous levels of the biometric 
process, including the feature level, matching level, or decision level (Ross and 
Govindarajan, 2005), as follows: 
 Sensor-level fusion: Raw biometrics data are captured by multiple sensors and 
fused before being passed to the feature extraction phase. For example, fusing 
different face images from one or different cameras.  
 Feature-level fusion: After capturing samples from one or more biometrics 
modalities, the feature vector is extracted from each sample and then these 
vectors are fused together. For example, fusing the feature vectors of the face 
and iris.  
 Matching score-level fusion: The outputs of multiple biometrics classifiers are 
linked at this level to provide a new match score.  
 Decision fusion: This level of fusion occurs when each biometric system has 
produced its own decision in order to enable the final decision. 
2.7 Current Mobile Authentication Mechanisms 
The most common form of mobile device security is based upon secret knowledge 
approaches, such as the use of passwords or PINs, although these are considered 
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inconvenient (Rodwell et al., 2007). This method is a point-of-entry technique, which 
means that the user has only to be verified at the beginning of a session. An imposter 
is then able to access all services, applications, and information without authentication. 
Furthermore, McAfee (2013) shows that the vast majority of respondents to their 
survey did not change the default password after purchasing a mobile device, the 
same passwords had been shared by one half of the users with others, and 15% saved 
their password on the mobile device itself. As a result, this technique is considered 
insufficient for safeguarding mobile devices (Kurkovsky and Syta, 2010). Similarly, 
with the Android password pattern, as demonstrated in Figure 2-10, the user is 
required to drag his/her finger across a touch screen on the three-by-three adjacent 
contact dots (i.e., make a connecting pattern rather than remembering a sequence of 
characters) to access the mobile device. The points can never be used as a 
combination again, thus producing fewer password combinations than the traditional 
PIN-based password technique. As a result, this method is vulnerable to a brute force 
attack (Aviv et al., 2010). 
 
Figure 2-10: Android pattern lock (Meitiv, 2010) 
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With the evolution of mobile devices has come the introduction of a number of built-in 
features capable of sensing a variety of user biometric traits. These include features 
such as fingerprint readers or face recognition technology and are intended to provide 
a more secure authentication mechanism. Apple has presented a type of fingerprint 
technology to permit users to employ a fingerprint scan as a secure method of 
protecting their mobile device (Apple, 2014). In Touch ID, the user places the 
fingerprints (enrolling one or more fingers) onto the Home key and the system scans 
them in order to build a template, as demonstrated in Figure 2-11; later, in the 
authentication process, the user swipes his/her finger across the scanner to capture 
the fingerprint and authenticate it (Drummond, 2014). This approach is quick (it takes 
30 seconds to enrol five fingers) and fairly reliable (Furnell and Clarke, 2014). 
Therefore, this approach has served to make the presence of Touch ID transparent 
and non-intrusive as a physiological technique (Juniper, 2018).  
 
 
Figure 2-11. Fingerprint enrolment for iOS 7 
Chapter 2- 1.Mobile Device Authentication 
 
38 
 
Another example, as highlighted in Figure 2-12, is that Google presents face 
recognition technology (O’Boyle, 2014) by requiring the user to raise the phone and 
align his/her face to the camera until a match is made, which is considered an intrusive 
method compared with Touch ID. 
 
 
Figure 2-12: Android’s face unlock feature (Wollaston, 2013) 
 
Apple (2017) recently introduced a new technology to protect user information and 
securely and instantly unlock an iPhone X, called Face ID as shown in Figure 2-13, 
which has revolutionised authentication using facial recognition. This technology 
applies a TrueDepth Camera system to capture accurate face data and map the 
geometry of the user’s face. Interestingly, this also enables payment approaches with 
Apple Pay. This technology also gives developers the opportunity to sign into their 
apps by utilising Face ID. 
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Figure 2-13: Face ID on iPhone X 
Furthermore, Samsung has produced a new feature that the company calls Intelligent 
Scan, which can operate even in low light (Figure 2-14). This technology allows users 
to access their phone easily using convenient technology and makes unlocking simple 
by combining face recognition and iris scans (Samsung, 2017; CNET, 2018). 
 
Figure 2-14: Iris scan on the Galaxy S9 
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Apple (2018) introduce an innovative dual-camera system (Dual 12MP rear cameras, 
7MP TrueDepth front camera). The innovative technologies in the TrueDepth camera 
system work together in real time to recognise you in an instant. For instance, the 
Neural Engine uses machine learning to analyse data from the camera sensor, quickly 
distinguishing faces in the frame to detect the user face.  The TrueDepth camera 
captures accurate face data by projecting and analysing over 30,000 invisible dots to 
create a depth map of your face and also captures an infrared image of your face. 
Once a face is detected, facial land marking allows iPhone to apply creative Portrait 
Lighting effects to your subject. Then, the ISP’s advanced depth engine, combined 
with segmentation data from the Neural Engine, accurately separates your subject 
from the background.  
On the other hand, Samsung (2018) produce a rear camera (12-MP Super Speed Dual 
Pixel) and front camera (8-MP). It's able to automatically switch between various 
lighting conditions with ease, making your photos look great whether it's bright or dark, 
day or night. For instance, On Galaxy S9 and Galaxy Note8, the available biometric 
authentication features are fingerprint scanning, face recognition, and iris scanning 
(Samsung 2018). In this approach, fingerprint scanning and face recognition are two 
quick and convenient unlock methods for your phone. In addition, there is also the 
option of a new fusion biometric authentication method called Intelligent Scan. By 
combining face recognition and iris scanning, it utilizes each to bolster the other 
depending on the environment—so in low light or broad daylight, you can unlock easily 
and securely. Intelligent Scan keeps your phone from prying eyes, while making it 
convenient for you to access it when you want. 
Generally, in order for an authentication method to be considered an ideal alternative, 
it is important that it meets the following essential criteria (Elftmann, 2006): the 
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elimination of the need for additional hardware, a higher level of security, better 
memorability, simplicity and ease of use, and compatibility/applicability in various 
areas. 
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Chapter Three   
Transparent Authentication Systems for 
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3 Transparent Authentication Systems for Mobile Devices 
3.1 Introduction 
There is a high risk that, when a device is left on after the point-of-entry authentication 
stage (at login), requiring, for example, a PIN and password, an imposter can use the 
device to perform almost all tasks once successfully authenticated at the beginning of 
a session, without having to re-authenticate to validate the user’s identity again 
periodically (Crawford et al., 2013). Furthermore, the current point-of-entry 
authentication mechanisms consider all activities on a mobile device to have the same 
level of importance and so maintain a single level of security for those activities, as 
illustrated in Figure 3-1, and do not apply any further access control rules (Clarke et 
al., 2009). Therefore, there is an urgent need to increase the level of authentication 
beyond the point-of-entry stage to verify the identity of the current mobile user in order 
to authenticate legitimate users in a continuous and transparent manner without the 
explicit involvement of the user or compromising convenience.  
For the above reason, biometrics are considered a more usable approach that allows 
samples to be collected in the background without requiring deliberate actions from 
the user, in order to fulfil the need for an continuous authentication system. 
Accordingly, the use of biometrics to authenticate users transparently would improve 
the level of security and enhance usability (Clarke and Furnell, 2005). Therefore, 
Clarke and Furnell (2007) introduced a transparent and continuous authentication 
mechanism by gathering information from the owner of a device in an implicit manner 
to authenticate the user, as illustrated in Figure 3-2. In this approach, with each user 
contact with the mobile device, the system is able to collect user samples to gain a 
realistic measure of confidence regarding the identity of the user. Thus, this 
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transparent authentication method might be considered a remarkable solution to 
validating user identity with a higher level of security. However, although transparent 
authentication has a significant role to play in solving the flaw in verifying, there are a 
number of new problems, such as the cost and complexity of the system (Clarke, 
2011), which need to be considered. 
 
Figure 3-1: Traditional authentication security (Clarke, 2011) 
 
Figure 3-2: Model of continuous authentication confidence (Clarke, 2011) 
Furthermore, 90% of the participants of one survey would have considered using 
transparent authentication on their mobile device if it were available to them, and 73% 
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considered transparent authentication a more secure approach than other traditional 
authentication methods (Crawford and Renaud,  2014). In this context, transparent 
authentication systems (TAS) have been described in various ways, such as implicit, 
passive, non-intrusive, unobtrusive, unobservable, active, and silent.  
3.2 Uni-modal Transparent Authentication Systems for Mobile Devices  
Transparent authentication systems for mobile devices can be classified by their use 
of physiological biometrics, such as fingerprint scanning or face recognition, or of 
behavioural biometrics, such as keystrokes or touch (Clarke et al., 2009; Chuang et 
al., 2018). Physiological biometrics are commonly considered useful for one-off 
authentication (Crawford and Renaud, 2014) because they require considerable 
computing power and high-quality images, which are not easy to obtain. Many efforts 
have been conducted in the literature to investigate the feasibility of using physiological 
biometrics to secure a mobile device without taking TAS into account (Tanviruzzaman 
and Ahamed, 2014). For instance, iris recognition needs the user to face the camera, 
takes more time for authentication and requires high-cost additional hardware (De 
Marsico et al., 2015). Moreover, there are still challenges for iris recognition, such as 
detection, segmentation, coding and matching and, therefore, iris scanning is 
considered an intrusive approach (De Marsico et al., 2014). Although fingerprint 
recognition suffers in the presence of poor conditions, such as cuts and dirt (Tang et 
al., 2010), modern mobile phones have embedded a fingerprint sensor to capture user 
samples transparently. Apple also introduced a new patent, called “Fingerprint Sensor 
in an Electronic Device”, in order to move the sensor from the Home key to a new 
location below the touch screen (Yousefpor et al., 2014). This will allow the reading of 
fingerprints from any point on the touch screen’s surface (Jakobsson et al., 2009). 
However, although face recognition suffers from some problems, such as being hard 
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to authenticate in the dark and changes over time (Tresadern et al., 2013), it is valid to 
apply it in a transparent authentication system because it could collect a sample 
without any effort from the user. 
In contrast, behavioural biometrics refers to something you do, such as typing, gait, 
application usage, voice and signature, which is considered to be less sensitive to, for 
example, darkness or noise (Tanviruzzaman and Ahamed, 2014). In addition, user 
behaviour is gathered in the background without requiring dedicated activity from the 
user and by regularly and periodically checking user behaviour in order to monitor the 
protection of mobile devices continuously (Traoré and Ahmed, 2012). As a result, 
behavioural biometrics is presented as a suitable method, is more commonly used for 
transparent and continuous authentication, and provides usability (De Luca et al., 
2012).  
A mobile phone is able to provide the user’s behavioural data, such as location, typing 
patterns, voice data and browsing patterns, without requiring deliberate actions from 
the user and without additional hardware. During the literature review, various 
behaviour-based authentications were presented as being able to verify the rightful 
owner of a device, such as touch screen input behaviour and keystroke, physical 
location, application usage, call and text, voice patterns, as well as micro-movement 
patterns due to the user’s actions and gait patterns ( Khan and Hengartner, 2014).  
As highlighted in Table 3-1, it is clear that behavioural biometrics seems to be more 
transparent, with a lower authentication performance when compared with other, 
intrusive biometric approaches, such as iris and retina recognition, providing very high 
levels of performance. 
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Type Technique      Transparent Performance 
P
h
y
s
io
lo
g
ic
a
l 
 
Ear geometry 
 
* Yes 
 
 
High 
 
Facial recognition 
 
 
Yes 
 
High 
 
Fingerprint recognition 
 
 
Yes 
 
Very High 
 
Iris recognition 
 
 
No 
 
Very High 
 
Retina recognition 
 
 
No 
 
Very High 
B
e
h
a
v
io
u
ra
l 
 
Behavioural profiling 
 
 
Yes 
 
Low 
 
Speaker recognition 
 
 
Yes 
 
High 
 
Keystroke analysis 
 
 
Yes 
 
Low 
 
Gait recognition 
 
 
Yes 
 
Low 
 
Handwriting recognition 
 
 
Yes 
 
Medium 
 
 * Modified by the author : it means ear geometry has been considered transparent authentication recently   
Table 3-1: Transparency of authentication approaches (Clarke, 2011) 
A number of studies have been reported in the literature that investigate the feasibility 
of using behavioural biometrics to secure a mobile device. In this review, TAS for 
mobile devices have been summarised and classified into the following (Clarke et al., 
2009; Chuang et al., 2018): 
o Keystroke-based authentication 
o Gait-based authentication 
o Touch-based authentication 
o Device sensor-based authentication 
o Behavioural profiling-based authentication 
Chapter 3- 1.Transparent Authentication Systems for Mobile Devices 
 
48 
 
3.2.1 Keystroke-based Authentication 
Keystroke dynamics or typing rhythm has been used in the transparent authentication 
of the original user when typing characters on a keyboard, by utilising features such 
as key-hold time, latency, horizontal digraph, or vertical digraph. Considerable 
research has been undertaken of this approach. For example, Clarke et al. (2003) used 
a neural network classifier to study the feasibility of using keystroke dynamics to verify 
users’ identity on mobile phones. The results of this work show that an FRR of 9.8% 
and a FAR of 11% can be achieved. As a follow-up study, Clarke and Furnell (2007) 
asked 30 participants to type telephone numbers and text messages to validate 
themselves as the mobile user, focusing on their typing characteristics – in particular, 
key-hold time and the number of times the backspace key was pressed. The authors 
reported that the average EER was 12.8%. In addition, Karatzouni and Clarke (2007) 
suggested applying a thumb-based keyboard approach on a mobile phone to 
authenticate 50 participants. Their findings demonstrated an average EER of 12.2% 
based on inter-keystroke latency, which is the interval between two successive 
keystrokes, using a feed forward multilayer perceptron neural network (FF-MLP). 
Later, Zahid et al. (2009) selected six characteristic keystroke features: key-hold time, 
error rate, horizontal digraph, vertical digraph, non-adjacent horizontal digraph and 
non-adjacent vertical digraph. The results showed a best FAR of 2.07% and an FRR 
of 1.73%. However, the consequent degradation of response time in a mobile phone 
might negatively affect user acceptance. More recently, Burgbacher and Hinrichs 
(2014) suggested a classification framework for mobile phones via finger movement 
behaviour and typing on gesture keyboards, in order to decide whether a text message 
was written by the original user. Meanwhile, Draffin et al. (2014) focused on the specific 
location touched on each key, the drift from finger down to finger up, the force of touch, 
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and the area of press (i.e., based on how the user types). Using keystroke dynamics 
is a transparent approach for authenticating a mobile user, and there is no need to use 
specific hardware to capture the data. However, it is difficult for a keystroke dynamics 
system to achieve authentication in a consistent way if the user types unusually and 
this could be replaced by touch screen mobile phones (De Marsico et al., 2015). 
Recently, Xiaofeng et al. (2019) employs a model of a Convolutional Neural Network 
(CNN) and a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) to learn the keystroke data of free texts 
to carry on continuous authentication. In this study, the authors divide the user 
keystroke data into a fixed-length keystroke sequence, and convert the keystroke 
sequence into a keystroke vector sequence according to the time feature of the 
keystroke (Xiaofeng et al, 2019). The Buffalo dataset (sun et al, 2016) is used in this 
research study. This dataset contains 157 participants' long fixed text and free text 
keystroke data. According to (Xiaofeng et al. 2019), the participants completed 
inputting through 3 sessions, and each participant has an average of 5,700 keystrokes 
in each session. The average of total 3 sessions have exceeded 17,000 keystrokes. A 
model of a recursive neural network plus a convolutional neural network is used to 
learn a sequence of individual keystroke vectors to obtain individual keystroke features 
for identity authentication. The findings of this study were Equal Error Rate (EER) was 
3.04%, False Acceptance Rate (FAR) was 4.12%, and False Rejection Rate (FRR) 
was 1.95%. 
3.2.2 Gait-based Authentication 
Gait-based biometric authentication methods validate, in a transparent and continuous 
manner, the user of a phone while walking based on his/her gait. In this context, three 
types of gait recognition systems have been identified: machine vision-based, floor 
sensor-based, and wearable sensor-based techniques (Muaaz and Mayrhofer, 2013). 
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The machine vision-based technique uses cameras from various distances to gather 
the user’s gait data, whereas the floor sensor-based technique collects gait data from 
several sensors placed on floor mats, measuring aspects such as pressure and force. 
Today, wearable sensor-based techniques are also identified as a new method to 
obtain a user’s gait data, taking advantage of sensors built into mobile phones such as 
accelerometers, gyroscopes, and force sensors. 
Some investigation efforts have been made in the literature to introduce gait 
recognition as a behavioural biometrics authentication approach. For example, Derawi 
et al. (2010) conducted two short sessions to authenticate a mobile user by asking 51 
users to walk up and down with a mobile device placed at the hip, in order to gather 
user data. This achieved an EER of 20%. In addition, Gafurov (2004) pointed out some 
issues facing gait authentication as a robust modality, such as clothing, shoes, sensor 
sampling rate, phone placement and orientation. To solve orientation error, which is 
caused by the mobile phone vibrating inside the pocket, and the noise cancellation 
issue, Muaaz and Mayrhofer (2014) asked 35 participants to place their mobile phone 
inside their right front trouser pocket in a realistic scenario and walk 68 meters along 
a straight corridor with no stairs. In previous studies, acceleration data were collected 
in the same location (i.e., in a pocket in a fixed manner, or on the hip, ankle, or arm). 
In practice, a mobile phone may be held in a variety of ways; for example, a user may 
be calling or touching the screen while walking. Therefore, the direction of the mobile 
phone should be taken into account in these situations (Muaaz and Mayrhofer, 2014). 
Unlike previous work, Hoang and Choi (2014) asked a total of 34 volunteers to 
complete around 18 laps, change their footwear and clothes, and wear trousers with 
narrow pockets in order to prevent the mobile phone changing position and orientation, 
which is not practical. The FAR was 35%, which is considered a drawback of this work. 
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Using gait authentication to identify the user in a usable way by means of an 
accelerometer sensor, which can deliver data along three axes (x, y, z), may have 
some advantages. However, it is still under development, needs more investigation 
and must address some of the challenges which may affect performance, such as 
when the user is not walking, terrain, injury, footwear, fatigue, and personal 
idiosyncrasies (De Marsico et al., 2015). It is reasonable, therefore, to combine this 
approach with another modality to increase accuracy and performance. 
Al-Obaidi et al. (2018) investigate the performance of gait recognition across a wider 
range of activities and upon 60 participants across a multi-day.  In this study, each 
participant was asked to walk normally, fast with a bag on flat ground for three minutes 
for each activity, and then to walk down stairs for three levels and upstairs for three 
levels on a predefined route and stop for 15 to 20 seconds between activities. 
According to Al-Obaidi et al. (2018), 10 sessions of user’s activities were collected per 
user: 5 sessions were from one day and the other 5 sessions were collected a week 
later. Finally, five datasets collected to each activity (normal walk, fast walk, and walk 
with a bag, downstairs walking, and upstairs walking). Totally, 68 samples were 
collected for each user per day; and in total 8,160 samples were collected for the entire 
dataset Al-Obaidi et al. (2018). Two experiments were be done by the authors. Firstly, 
the first experiment explores the classification performance of individual activities in 
order to understand whether a single classifier or multi-algorithmic approach would 
provide a better level of performance. The results from the experimentation was shown 
an EER of 12.2 % for a single classifier. On the other hand, the second experiment 
was a multi-algorithmic approach where different classifiers are used based upon the 
nature of the activity (Al-Obaidi et al, 2018). In this context, the multi-algorithmic 
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approach achieved EERs of 6.3% (normal), 12.68% (fast) and 6.46% (a bag walk) 
using both accelerometer and gyroscope-based features. 
3.2.3 Touch-based Authentication 
A variety of studies have been proposed in this domain. For example, Zheng et al. 
(2014) used a combination of acceleration, pressure, size and time, which could be 
collected from sensors in touch screen mobile phones. They claim this approach is a 
non-intrusive authentication method, in contrast with asking the user to insert a 4-digit 
or 8-digit PIN. This does not provide a complete transparent authentication system. 
Two similar research projects, Frank et al. (2013) and Li et al. (2013), also examined 
user authentication on a mobile phone by continuously observing finger movements 
on a touch screen. The latter work focused on sliding behaviour in gestures (left, right, 
up, and down) without requiring any deliberate action from the user. However, this 
employs a two-class classifier, which is considered an unrealistic method, since it 
requires input data from non-owner users at the training phase. In comparison, the 
classification framework used by Frank et al. (2013) (called Touchalytics) had EERs 
between 0 and 4% from 41 participants. 
In a comparable setting, the FAST (Finger gestures Authentication System using 
Touchscreen) system gathers information about multi-touch user gestures (i.e., flick, 
pinch, spread, drag, rotate) using a sensor in a post-login setting (Frank et al., 2013). 
The authors selected a total of 53 features for each touch gesture, and FAST 
accomplished an FAR of 4.66% and an FRR of 0.13%, although utilising the 
associated digital glove might be impractical. Unlike the previous work, Feng et al. 
(2014) studied touch screen gestures in the context of running an application in a 
transparent fashion and presented a novel Touch-Based Identity Protection Service 
(called TIPS). TIPS achieved up to 90% accuracy and battery usage of 6% in 
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authenticating a user, without employing motion sensor data, in order to reduce power 
consumption. In this context, some prior researchers, such as Frank et al. (2013), 
required users to accomplish predefined touch gestures, or collected data in controlled 
environments which do not represent natural user interactions. However, the TIPS 
framework carries out implicit real-time user identification (Feng et al., 2014). 
Similarly, in line with providing touch-based behavioural authentication, Shahzad et al. 
(2013) presented a gesture-based authentication scheme called GEAT, based on how 
multi-touch gestures are input, for a secure unlocking mechanism on the login screen, 
which is unsuitable for a transparent authentication system. Later, Draffin et al. (2014) 
focused on the specific location touched on each key, the drift from finger down to 
finger up, the force of touch, and the area of press (i.e., the way the user types). To 
evaluate this, they envisioned an application called KeySens, which develops a model 
of a user’s micro-behaviour and can detect when the phone is in a different person’s 
hands. However, they performed this experiment for three weeks without declaring the 
performance.  
Concurrent work conducted by Xu et al. (2014) showed that the slide gesture was 
considered the best technique, achieving an EER of less than 1% compared with other 
touch operations, such as pinch, handwriting and keystroke. Cheng et al. (2013) 
claimed that touch-based biometrics are ineffective due to the micro-movement of 
mobile devices caused by touch when the user is mobile. 
Filippov et al. (2018) suggest a Continuous user authentication based on the features 
of their interaction with the device's touch screen. The research study was collected 
the data from twenty-one users upon the features of interaction with a touch screen. 
After the feature extraction and the Isolation Forest method training the values of FAR 
and FRR equal to 7.5% and 6.4%, respectively, were obtained. Similarly, Alghamdi 
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and Elrefaei (2018) proposes a dynamic authentication of mobile phone users based 
on their gestures on touchscreen for of twenty participants. In this study, tapping, 
scrolling, dragging and zooming gestures’ data were acquired using a developed 
android application. Each participant is required to be familiar with a mobile that is 
equipped with a touchscreen. Five sessions were recorded for every participant. For 
each user, forty-two features, eleven features from tap gesture, sixteen features from 
both scroll and drag gestures, and fifteen features from zoom gesture were extracted 
from the collected touch gestures. Three different Classifiers namely medians vector 
proximity (MVP), k-nearest neighbour (k-NN) and random forest (RF), were applied to 
the extracted features. The experimental results demonstrate that MVP classifier 
achieves the best results when using single gestures and achieve EER 5.25%.  The 
k-NN gives the best results when two gestures are combined together, finally the k-NN 
classifier using only three gestures. 
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Table 3-2: Uni-modal transparent authentication systems for mobile devices 
Modality No Reference (Year) 
Performance (%) 
# User Time 
EER FAR FRR 
 
 
Keystroke 
 
1  Clarke and Furnell (2007) 5 n/a
 i 32 3 sessions 
2  Karatzouni and Clarke (2007) 12.2 n/a 50 n/a 
3 Zahid et al. (2009) 2 2.07 1.73 25 n/a 
4 Maiorana et al. (2011) 4.4 n/a 40 n/a 
5 Trojahn and Ortmeier (2013) 2 11 16 18 n/a  
6 Burgbacher and Hinrichs (2014) 0 n/a 16 4 weeks 
7  Draffin et al. (2014) n/a 14 2.2 13 3 weeks 
8 Xiaofeng et al. (2019) 3.04 4.12 1.95 157 28 days  
 
 
Gait 
9 Derawi et al. (2010) 20 n/a 51 2 sessions 
10 Nickel et al. (2012) 8.24 n/a 36 n/a 
11 Muaaz and Mayrhofer (2014) 7.051 n/a 35 n/a 
12 Hoang and Choi (2014) 3.5 16.2 3.5 34 n/a 
13 Al-Obaidi et al, (2018) 0.7 n/a 60  2 days(10session) 
 
 
Touch 
14 Feng et al. (2012) n/a 4.66 n/a 40 n/a 
15  Frank et al. (2013) < 4 n/a 41 1 week 
16 Shahzad et al. (2013) 0.5 n/a 50 n/a 
17 Li et al. (2013) 3 3 3   75 n/a 
18 Cai et al. (2013) 4 4.05 3.27 20 n/a 
19  Xu et al. (2014) < 10 n/a  31 1 month 
20 Zheng et al. (2014) 3.65 n/a 80 n/a 
21 Feng et al. (2014) 10 n/a 23 n/a 
22 Shen et al. (2014)  < 8 4.68 1.17 51 n/a 
23 Filippov et al, 2018 n/a 7.5 6.4 21 1 month 
24 Alghamdi and Elrefaei (2018) 5.2 n/a 20 n/a 
25 Yang  et al, (2019) 4.15 n/a 45 2 weeks 
 
 
Device 
sensors 
26 Conti et al. (2011) n/a 4.44 9.33 10 n/a 
27 Lin et al. (2012) 6.85 n/a 20 n/a 
28 Zhu et al. (2013) 25 n/a 20 n/a 
29 Lee and Lee (2015) 10 n/a 4 3 weeks 
30 Hong et al. (2015) n/a 7.17 3.67 8 8 weeks 
31 Wang et al. (2015) n/a < 2.5   < 2.5 50 30 mins / user 
 32 Sitova et al. (2015) 6.92 n/a 100 n/a 
33 Yang et al. (2015) n/a 15 10 200 10 sec * 3 times 
34 Neverova et al. (2016) 20 n/a n/a 
35 Zhu et al. (2017) 1.2 n/a 20 months 
36 Buriro et al. (2017) 4 n/a 53 n/a 
37 Ehatisham et al. (2018) 2.05 n/a 4 n/a 
38 Shen  et al. (2019) n/a 5.03 3.98 102 n/a 
 
Behavioural 
profiling 
39 Shi et al. (2011)  n/a 50 12 days 
40 Hayashi et al. (2012) structured interviews 20 Each interview 90 
minutes 
41 Khan and Hengartner (2014) application-centric  30 4 different dataset 
42 Li et al. (2014) n/a 4.17 11.45 76 n/a 
43 Kayacık et al  )2014) n/a 3 different dataset 
44 Ryu et al (2018) 2.41 n/a 22 42 days 
45 Zhao et al (2018) 15 n/a 130 n/a 
46 Alotaibi et al (2019) 26.9 n/a 76 1 month 
 
Note: n/a = not applicable 
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3.2.4 Device Sensor-based Authentication 
A number of studies have investigated the leveraging of multiple sensors on 
smartphones. For example, Conti et al. (2011) utilised the accelerometers and 
gyroscopes in a smartphone to verify the user while the user is making a phone call. 
From this perspective, it is inconvenient to authenticate users when they want to use 
their mobile phone and need to perform specific movements. Yang et al. (2015) focus 
on arm length and wrist size and propose a hand-waving biometric-based 
authentication method, developing a prototype called Open Sesame to utilise users’ 
waving patterns for locking and unlocking using the accelerometer sensor. The 
findings demonstrate an average FAR of 15% and an FRR of less than 8%, which are 
considered higher than the results achieved by Conti et al. (2011). Later, combining 
touch, accelerometer, and gyroscope sensor data, Wang et al. (2015) suggested that 
sensor fingerprints could be a feasible solution for user verification and introduced two 
new unlocking gestures for sensor-based user authentication based on a sensor 
fingerprint. The authors show an FAR and FRR of less than 2.5%.  
Further studies in a similar context, relying only on a multi-sensor approach, were 
separately introduced by Lin et al. (2012), Lee and Lee (2015), and Sitova et al. (2015). 
The first study argues that multiple sensor inputs could improve accuracy over that of 
a single sensor and present a non-intrusive authentication approach based on 
orientation sensor (i.e., gyroscope sensor) data taken from the pitch, roll, and heading, 
based on how users holds their phone. Zhu et al. (2013) propose SenSec, an implicit 
authentication framework that captures passive sensory data from a mobile device; 
namely, an accelerometer, orientation, compass, and gyroscope, which determine 
where the user is and what he/she is doing. The researchers asked users to perform 
specific tasks in a sequential order, which was considered impractical. SenSec is a 
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similar system to SenGuard (Shi et al., 2011), which is a non-intrusive authentication 
system based on four sensors: accelerometer, location, multi-touch screen, and voice. 
SenGuard obtained very good user authentication results with an average error rate 
of 3.6% (Shi et al., 2011). Nonetheless, the power consumption of the system may be 
one of the major issues for this work. In the same context, the Global Positioning 
System (GPS) could cause the quick draining of a battery but gait recognition has a 
reasonable cost, which means that not all sensors cause battery drainage, with an 
EER of 10% (Yousefpor et al., 2014). 
Using deep neural networks, Neverova et al. (2016) proposed a scheme for learning 
human identity based on their motion patterns and achieved an EER of 20%. Zhu et 
al. (2017) introduce a novel user authentication scheme called ShakeIn. This approach 
is a handy user authentication scheme for secure unlocking of a smartphone by simply 
shaking the phone. The experiments were performed on 20 participants with 530,555 
shaking samples in total collected over multiple months. The results show that ShakeIn 
achieves an EER of 1.2% on average. Similarly, Buriro et al. (2017) collects data from 
multiple 3-dimensional smartphone sensors in the background for a specific period of 
time and profiles a user based on the collected hand movement patterns for 
authentication purpose. The data were collected from multiple sensors, namely, 
accelerometer, gravity, gyroscope, magnetometer, and orientation of 53 participants. 
The Random Forest classifier was used for evaluating the results which was An EER 
of 4%. 
In the same context, Ehatisham et al. (2018) propose a novel continuous 
authentication scheme to recognize smartphone users on the basis of their physical 
activity patterns using accelerometer, gyroscope, and magnetometer sensors of 
smartphone. In this study, identifies the users based on the way they perform certain 
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activities using mobile sensing. According to Ehatisham et al. (2018), six activities of 
daily life such as walking, running, sitting, standing, walking upstairs, and walking 
downstairs, are used to distinguish between different users based on sixteen different 
features extracted from the time domain. Five different positions are employed for 
keeping a smartphone on the user's body and the user recognition results are analysed 
for all these positions (Ehatisham et al. 2018). Three different classifiers namely 
Support Vector Machine (SVM), Decision Tree (DT), and K-Nearest Neighbours (K-
NN), are performed for user recognition. SVM classifier achieved the best results for 
user recognition with an overall average accuracy of 97.95%. Likewise, Shen et al. 
(2019) develop a Markov-based classifier to model motion-sensor data sequences for 
active smartphone authentication. The findings show that the system achieve a false-
rejection rate of 5.03% and a false-acceptance rate of 3.98%. 
3.2.5 Behavioural Profiling-based Authentication 
Studies have proposed application usage aimed at providing transparent 
authentication. For example, Hayashi et al. (2012) argue that device-centric 
continuous authentication cannot discriminate between data from different 
applications. More broadly, the authors argue that this method cannot make any 
assumptions in terms of the importance of the application currently being used. More 
specifically, the lack of a device-centric approach, and being unaware of the task that 
the user is performing within an application, can lead to not delivering authentication 
control at the task level (De Luca et al., 2014). This will lead to a higher authentication 
overhead. Hayashi et al. (2012) argue the inefficiency of the all-or-nothing access 
model and suggest that a mobile user should be authenticated only when a sensitive 
application is begun, since most applications do not require explicit authentication. In 
the context of a sensitive application concept, the authors created paper prototypes 
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(i.e., a theoretical method) of two alternative access mechanisms: group accounts and 
an activity lock. The group account would provide access to some of the functionality 
that is normally available only when the phone is unlocked and is thus for sharing non-
sensitive information or applications; whereas an activity lock can be activated by the 
device owner before handing the device to another user to share specific screens in 
an application. Conversely, configuring a group account on a device enables a 
device’s owner to share a specific set of applications with other users. 
In the same context, the work of Riva et al. (2012) is based on when the user should 
authenticate (as opposed to how) and for which application. The authentication 
decision depends on the confidence and sensitivity levels relating to each application, 
which are stated by the user to protect sensitive applications from unauthorised use. 
The result of this prototype was a 42% reduction in requested explicit authentication, 
but was only conducted with nine users. A similar but more extensive study was 
conducted on positive habits (i.e., familiar events) and negative habits (i.e., 
unexpected changes of predictable places). Shi et al. (2011b) recorded a user’s 
routine, such as location, phone calls, and application usage, in order to build a profile 
and assign a positive or negative score for each user’s routine. 
Among further studies in a similar context, Li et al. (2011) introduced a behaviour 
profiling approach to identify mobile device misuse by focusing on the mobile user’s 
application usage; namely, general application use, voice calls, and text messaging. 
The total EER was 7.03%. Later, the authors (Li et al., 2014) presented a novel 
behaviour profiling framework able to collect user behaviour to evaluate the system 
security status of a device in a continuous manner before accessing sensitive services. 
They investigated the sensitivity of the application concept, which is mapped to high-
risk levels, to render the framework more secure and transparent when the user 
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requires access to high-value applications. This in turn means that the system will 
reject user access after several attempts at using different applications, rather than a 
single attempted application use. The authors conclude that the system seems to be 
able to distinguish mobile users through their application usage; in particular, by 
focusing on the names of applications and the location of usage, which are considered 
valuable features. However, the MIT Reality dataset was created in 2004 with a small 
number of mobile applications, causing difficulty in discriminating between users. This 
is considered the main limitation of this dataset. 
Zhao et al. (2018) propose an improved Bayesian network model and linear model to 
predict what application to use next time only consider time and latest used application 
on text to study the user behaviour. The evaluation results show that the accuracy of 
this model can be achieved 85%. Likewise, Alotaibi et al. (2019) presents a novel 
behavioural profiling approach to user identity verification as part of mobile application 
security. Using a machine learning classifier, the predictable model created is able to 
authenticate the mobile user based on his/her behaviour. Supervised learning 
methods were chosen in this experiment due to the labelled known data and known 
responses. Three classifiers were selected in this research study: a support vector 
machine (SVM), random forest (RF), and gradient boosting (GB), to identify the most 
efficient machine learning classifier based on the classifier output. The experimental 
results show that users could be distinguished via their behavioural profiling upon each 
action within the application, with an average equal error rate of 26.98% and the (GB) 
gradient boosting classifier results prove quite compelling. 
3.3 Multi-modal Transparent Authentication Systems for Mobile Devices 
Investigations have been conducted in the literature into the feasibility of combining 
biometric modalities to authenticate the mobile user, as shown in Table 3-3. Clarke 
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and Furnell (2007) offered a mobile-based system, the Intelligent Authentication 
Management System (IAMS), by means of grouping together a secret knowledge-
based method and available biometrics modalities. As a follow-up study, Clarke et al. 
(2009) proposed a framework called Non-Intrusive Continuous Authentication (NICA) 
to provide secure, transparent and continuous authentication. NICA uses keystroke 
dynamics, facial recognition and voice patterns to inform an Alert Level while the user 
interacts with the mobile device. NICA is based on ‘authentication confidence’, which 
is mapped to each service in order to allow the user to access a service if confidence 
levels are higher than the alert level. To evaluate this framework, the authors 
conducted an experiment with a NICA prototype, in which 27 participants were asked 
to perform specific tasks for 45 minutes; the result was an EER under 0.01%. In this 
work, the authors considered the hypothesis that different services require different 
levels of security and protection by understanding the risks associated with specific 
user actions and services, such as transferring money from an online banking 
application. 
Building upon the work by Clarke and Furnell (2007), Crawford et al. (2013) introduced 
a transparent authentication framework utilising a combination of behavioural 
biometrics: keystroke dynamics and voice recognition, based on device confidence 
level. In this research, each task on the device was assigned a particular device 
confidence level as the minimum threshold for access to the task, either explicitly by 
the owner or by default. As a result, private or sensitive information could be accessed 
only at the highest device confidence levels. This method is similar to online banking 
systems for which the user needs to perform a task that might have side effects; the 
bank system requires a further authentication step from the user before the user can 
be authorised (Crawford et al., 2013). The authors did not, however, show the total 
Chapter 3- 1.Transparent Authentication Systems for Mobile Devices 
 
62 
 
EER performance for this multi-modal behavioural biometric. However, if the device 
confidence level is less than the required task confidence level, the user must try to 
raise the level of the device confidence in order to be authorised. Therefore, this step 
will lead the user to use a second authentication action in an explicit manner, such as 
a password or physiological biometric. The authors also assume there is one mobile 
device for each user, which might not be the case. 
Similarly, Saevanee et al. (2012) examine a combination of three diverse biometric 
methods: keystroke dynamics, behavioural profiling and linguistic profiling. By using 
this multi-modality, they achieved a total EER of 3.3% from 30 virtual users (this 
dataset was not real and was gathered from different datasets). To continue their work, 
Saevanee et al. (2014) presented a text-based authentication framework utilising the 
modalities and introduced a security level by allowing the user to set security levels for 
access to different applications. The authors claim that this approach would reduce 
the number of intrusive authentication requests for high security applications by 91%. 
Likewise, Fridman et al. (2015) propose a parallel binary decision-level fusion 
architecture for active authentication. The fusion is used for classifiers based on four 
biometric modalities: text analysis, application usage patterns, web browsing 
behaviour, and the physical location of the device by computing GPS (outdoors) or Wi-
Fi (indoors). To evaluate this framework, the authors collected a dataset from 200 
users’ Android mobile devices for 30 days, which is considered a large dataset in the 
transparent authentication literature. After 1 minute of the user using the device, the 
ERR was 5%, whereas after 30 minutes the EER was 1%. Despite the promising 
results in this work, battery consumption was a major issue.  
From a different perspective, there are some frameworks that aim to facilitate users 
moving from one device to another without asking them to authenticate. In this context, 
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Hocking et al. (2011) introduced the Authentication Aura concept, which is based on 
the enabling of cooperative and distributive authentication between devices owned by 
a single user. The results suggest that this concept could reduce the number of 
intrusive authentication requests by up to 74%.  
Building upon the concept of an Authentication Aura, Al Abdulwahid et al. (2013) 
suggest a conceptual authentication model hosted in the cloud, called Federated 
Authentication, which would act as a centralised Managed Authentication Service 
Provider (MASP). The main principle of this model is to take advantage of cloud 
computing features, such as scalability, universality and adaptability, as a means to 
reduce the need for logging onto and authenticating on each device in a transparent 
and continuous manner. However, certain aspects need to be considered, such as 
privacy, trust, and response time, in order to make this model more secure and 
practicable.  
Recently, Lamiche et al (2018) propose a new multimodal authentication method able 
to strengthen the smartphone authentication system based on gait patterns and 
keystroke dynamics without user intervention through simultaneous walk and text 
input. In order to build a multimodal biometrics profile for the user, a feature level fusion 
method is applied. According to Lamiche et al (2018), the data was collected from 20 
participants in a single session under a controlled environment and about 63,500 
samples from the accelerometer sensor and 8600 keystrokes were collected from all 
20participants. Using different machine learning classifiers namely, support vector 
machines (SVM), random forest (RF), random tree (RT), Naïve Bayes (NB) and 
multilayer perceptron (MLP), the proposed method is examined. The experimental 
results achieved a promising EER of 1% when using (MLP) multilayer perceptron 
classifier with the average false acceptance rate, and false rejection rate values of 1.7 
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%, 7%, respectively. Likewise, Acien et al (2019) propose MultiLock (Mobile Active 
Authentication based on Multiple Biometric and Behavioral Patterns) by considering 
seven different data channels and their combination. These modalities were Touch 
dynamics (touch gestures and keystroking), accelerometer, gyroscope, WiFi, GPS 
location and app usage were all collected during human-mobile interaction to 
authenticate the users. This study used UMDAA-02 database which Comprises 141.14 
GB of smartphone sensor signals collected from 48 Maryland University students over 
a period of 2 months in unsupervised scenario. According to Acien et al (2019), the 
sensors captured are touchscreen, gyroscope, accelerometer, magnetometer, light 
sensor, GPS, and WiFi, among others. Information related to mobile user´s behavior 
like lock and unlock time events, start and end time stamps of calls and app usage are 
also stored. The result was achieved 3% of EER. 
Table 3-3: Multi-modal transparent authentication systems for mobile devices 
N
o 
Reference (Year) Multi-modality Performance 
EER (%) 
# 
Users 
Time 
1 Clarke et al. (2009) Face Voice Keystroke Total: 0.01 27 45 minutes 
2 Shi et al. (2011) Accelerometer   GPS location Average: 3.6 50 2 weeks 
Touch screen Microphone 
3 Ketabdar et al. (2011) Movement  Audio 2.5 9 2 minutes / user 
4  Crouse et al. (2013) Face capture  Gyroscope n/a* 24 n/a 
Accelerometer Magnetometer 
5 Crawford et al. (2013) Keystroke Voice pattern 10 30 n/a 
6 Bo et al. (2014) Touch Accelerometer   < 1 100 n/a 
Gyroscope  
7 Saevanee et al. (2012) 
Saevanee et al. (2014) 
Behavioural profiling 9.2 30 n/a 
Linguistic profiling 12.8 
Keystroke 20.8 
Overall 3.3 
8 Tanviruzzaman and 
Ahamed (2014) 
Gait Location 
tracks 
10 13 1 week for gait 
2 weeks for 
location 
9  Fridman et al. (2015) Linguistic analysis Behaviour 
profiling 
1 after 30 
minutes 
200 30 days 
10 Lamiche et al (2018) Gait  Keystroke (FAR =1.7 
,FRR= 7) 
20 n/a 
11 Acien et al (2019) Touch GPS Keystroke 3 48 2  months 
App usage Wi-Fi Accelerometer 
   Note: n/a = not applicable 
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3.4  Discussion 
According to the above comprehensive analysis of a review of the literature on 
transparent authentication systems for mobile device security, some physiological 
biometrics suffer from issues such as poor image quality, usually requiring additional 
hardware, and consuming a great deal of power. However, studies have found that 
behavioural biometrics can operate transparent and continuous authentication by 
constructing a user behavioural profile while the user is using the device, without 
requiring deliberate actions from the legitimate user. In addition, the majority of recent 
research in this domain has focused on finding appropriate behaviour-based 
classifiers for a transparent authentication approach, such as the use of keystroke, 
gait, touch, and sensors. However, issues with these methods, such as energy 
consumption, mean that it is considered a great challenge to use multiple sensors to 
verify a user’s identity. Choosing suitable sensors to collect behavioural data using this 
method would lessen further costs in terms of the device’s central processing unit 
(CPU) and battery life. Moreover, when the user is mobile, the micro-movement of the 
mobile device could affect the performance of touch-based biometrics and cause a 
high error rate. As such, a touch approach might be vulnerable to shoulder-surfing 
attacks. As shown in Table 3-2, although many studies have investigated utilising 
touch and sensor approaches in order to authenticate whether a user is the owner of 
the smartphone, a number of further issues need to be considered. For instance, 
various studies had a small number of participants and no general security 
performance results were declared for some of the studies, which makes comparison 
difficult.  
In addition, there is a lack of investigation and study of behavioural profiling and, in 
particular, application usage for transparent authentication systems on mobile devices, 
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as Table 3-2 illustrates. Furthermore, today, many applications have been produced 
whose properties could be beneficial, such as online social networks. A great deal of 
information could usefully be collected from user behaviour; specifically, by focusing 
on the sensitivity level of the application, understanding whether a certain application 
may require protection, and studying user behaviour and interaction with each 
application. On the other hand, this technique is not expected to be unique or distinct 
enough to fulfil the need for a continuous authentication system. It also suffers from 
privacy issues during behaviour monitoring, thereby affecting the level of user 
acceptance. Likewise, device-centric behavioural biometric authentication 
approaches apply a specific classifier without taking into account the nature of the 
applications currently being used to verify user identity. More specifically, gate 
authentication is not suitable for authenticating a mobile user when the text message 
application is being used, whereas keystroke is suitable for authentication. Even if a 
multi-classifier system were employed for collecting user behaviour data from different 
applications, this would lead to a higher authentication overhead.  
As mentioned previously, the current point-of-entry authentication mechanisms 
consider all applications on a mobile device to have the same level of importance and 
maintain a single level of security for all applications, thereby not applying any further 
access control rules. Moreover, only a few studies have investigated when to 
authenticate a mobile user. For instance, it is unnecessary to authenticate a user when 
reading the news or checking the weather forecast through a browser application. 
However, those studies used an old dataset, which might not resemble the real use of 
such a system. Therefore, this approach could result in reducing unnecessary 
authentication overhead by focusing on the sensitivity of the process within the 
application. Consequently, a smarter biometric approach that is able to categorise data 
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from different applications and knows what interactions the user is performing within 
the application will reduce the authentication overhead. 
Unlike previous works, this research argues that, on a single mobile application, 
different processes operate on the same data with a different social risk based on the 
user action. More specifically, the unauthorised disclosure or modification of mobile 
applications data has the potential to lead to a number of undesirable consequences 
for the user, which, in turn, means that the risk changes within the application. Thus, 
there is no single risk to using a single application. This work also suggests there is a 
need to move an access control system from a position on the application to within the 
application based on the risk for each user action. Therefore, there is a need to suggest 
a method that can be applied continuously without obstructing the user’s activities. For 
this reason, a transparent and continuous authentication mechanism provides a basis 
for convenient and secure re-authentication of the user. 
3.5  Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that current security provision seems to lack the required 
strength to match the respective security requirements. As presented in this chapter, 
biometric techniques have been identified that are applicable for deployment on mobile 
devices to provide continuous and transparent authentication. However, the utilisation 
of these techniques requires a number of considerations with regard to user 
acceptance, the storage of biometric information, as well as issues of performance 
relating to their operation in a mobile device. Furthermore, behavioural biometric 
authentication approaches apply a specific classifier without taking into account the 
nature of the applications currently being used to verify user identity. 
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Although several methods and systems from different perspectives have been 
proposed for solving the problem of mobile device security, none of the current 
research in this domain has investigated the risk level for each process within an 
application. Therefore, the next chapter presents and explores a novel taxonomy for 
mobile applications data in order to generalise a risk assessment model for mobile 
applications to identify the risk level for each process on a single application. As a 
result, the user’s identity could be continuously verified while interacting with the 
mobile device by taking advantage of an intra-process security approach. 
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4 A Novel Mobile Applications Data Risk Assessment 
Model 
4.1 Risk Assessment for Mobile Devices 
Research has already been undertaken to establish how threats to mobile 
devices should be assessed. In their study, Ledermüller and Clarke (2011) 
present a mechanism to assess the risk level associated with particular apps and 
services. In the context of this research, applications or services that are 
associated with non-public information, such as emails and e-banking, would 
require a high level of security, whereas normal applications would require a low 
level of security. Consequently, each application has a particular level of risk 
which might be an indicator of a suitable level of security.  
Similarly, Theoharidou et al. (2012) propose a risk assessment method for 
smartphones by identifying assets and applicable threats. The method applies 
user input with respect to impact valuation, coupled with statistics for calculating 
the likelihood of threats. The authors refined their previous work on smartphone 
risk assessment by proposing an approach for assessing the privacy risk of 
Android users (Mylonas et al., 2013). Although several methods and systems 
have been proposed from different perspectives for solving the problem of mobile 
security, none has explored the risk level for each of the processes within mobile 
applications.  
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4.2 Need for Intra-process Security 
Mobile devices contain SMS, photos, calendars, notes, device settings, and apps. 
These data are becoming an increasingly pressing concern and the risks are high 
for users, such as the possibility of losing sensitive data. In addition, as stated 
previously, the current point-of-entry authentication mechanisms consider all 
applications on a mobile device to have the same level of importance and 
maintain a single level of security for all applications, thus not applying any further 
access control rules (Clarke et al., 2009). However, different applications require 
different security provision; for instance, a bank account requires a different level 
of protection compared with an SMS message. In order to access a specific 
service, each application needs a definite level of authentication applied in an 
independent manner. In particular, a high level of protection would be mapped to 
the riskier operations and a lower level of protection assigned to those that are 
less risky. Although Clarke et al. (2009) argue that the level of security within an 
application is likely to change during the process, they only address the issue of 
inter-process security by establishing appropriate levels of security for each 
application, rather than for the whole mobile device. 
Each application has different processes, which have an impact on data and 
involve different levels of risk. For instance, the unauthorised disclosure of mobile 
applications data has the potential to lead to a number of undesirable 
consequences for the user. A simple example is given in Figure 4-1, which 
illustrates this notion in the procedure of checking the balance of a bank account 
without logging in. In this example, the HSBC Mobile Banking App allows the user 
to log on quickly and easily through the Fast Balance feature, by simply swiping 
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downwards on the HSBC Mobile Banking App home screen to view the balance 
(HSBC, 2016). This process could, however, affect confidentiality and user 
privacy if an impostor reads them. On the other hand, no additional risk exists for 
some of the processes on the HSBC Mobile Banking App, such as reading about 
offers, finding an HSBC branch, reading about products/services, and contacting 
the bank, as illustrated in Figure 4-1. The process contains public data and there 
is, therefore, no impact on the user if someone accesses these services. 
Furthermore, the level of risk will change within the mobile application and will be 
different from one user's perspective to another, such as the processes for 
reading balances and transactions. 
 
Figure 4-1: Fast Balance feature 
Chapter 4-A Novel Mobile Applications Data Risk Assessment Model 
 
73 
 
In the Facebook mobile application, for instance, there are different processes 
which have an impact on data and involve different levels of risk, such as posting 
on a wall, sharing, sending a message and adding a photo/link. More specifically, 
different processes operate on the same application with different social risks, 
thus there is no single risk when using the Facebook application. As a result, 
different levels of security controls should be applied to data based on risk level 
in order to deny unauthorised access to the content of the application. The 
diagram below in Figure 4-2 indicates the threat derived from each process and 
the different level of risk for the various application processes. In this figure, the 
risk level for each process has been selected randomly to show the concept as 
an example. 
 C
o
n
fi
d
en
ce
TimeAction 1 Action 2 Action 3
Application 1 Application 2 Application 3
Action 1 Action 2 Action 3Action 1 Action 2 Action 3 Action 4
90 %
30 %
60 %
10 %
High Risk Medium Risk No RiskLow Risk
Accept “ Non-Intrusive ” Reject “ Intrusive ”
 
Figure 4-2: Confidence and risk action processes timeline examples 
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In comparison, reading news, looking at weather forecasts, watching BBC News 
and listening to BBC Radio 5 using the BBC mobile application are considered 
general data and there will be no impact on the user, just as when searching on 
Amazon, watching YouTube or using Google Maps. Therefore, there is no risk 
from accessing these services. The security implications actually start when the 
user is sharing public data if these data are not correct. Generally, it can be 
appreciated that each process on each application has a particular level of risk, 
which might be a feature for defining a suitable level of security by enabling intra-
process security that would permit a far more robust approach to ensuring 
commensurate authenticity of the user.  
It is important to ensure that the right person is allowed to access the right 
information at the right time. Any threat to data (i.e., action) may lead to a number 
of undesirable consequences, such as embarrassment, financial loss, threat to 
personal safety, and breach of personal privacy or commercial confidentiality 
(Davey, 1991). It is, therefore, important to classify data in order to strengthen the 
control of those data and apply risk analysis to each process. Furthermore, 
determining the importance of a system could be achieved by conducting risk 
analysis. It is also necessary to understand the nature of the risk to which the data 
could be exposed in order to apply the appropriate protection.  
There are several and widely deployed models used for evaluating security risk 
such as, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), CCTA Risk 
Analysis and Management Method (CRAMM), the ISO/IEC 27005 for Information 
security risk management, Operationally Critically Threat, Asset and Vulnerability 
Evaluation (OCTAVE), Control Objectives for Information and related Technology 
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(COBIT), and MEthod for Harmonized Analysis of Risk (MEHARI) (ENISA 2006; 
Gritzalis et al, 2018). Each one of these approaches has a different technique to 
assess information security risks.  
•NIST SP 800-30 is a risk management guide for information technology systems 
which describes the risk management process based on three phases (NIST, 
2012). The first phase of this method contains nine steps which would increase 
the complexity and the time (Gritzalis et al., 2018). This method mainly uses a 
scale with values Low, Medium, and High to evaluate risk (NIST, 2012). NIST SP 
800-30 risk assessment model focuses on the importance of the vulnerability 
assessment and might be used in any kind of organization, business branch or 
industry area (Sepczuk and Kotulski, 2018). 
•CRAMM was created in 1987 by the Central Computer and Telecommunications 
Agency (CCTA) subsumed in 2000 into the Office of Government Commerce 
(OGC) of the UK government in order to provide security evaluation of information 
systems in government departments. Later, CRAMM provides a commercial tool 
to the public through Insight Consulting (Wangen et al., 2017). The CRAMM 
method consists of three stages, each supported by objective questionnaires and 
guidelines (Shoniregun, 2006). To calculate the risk of each asset group, CRAMM 
uses predefined tables and comparing the value of assets, the impact and levels 
of threats and vulnerabilities (Gritzalis et al., 2018). In addition, CRAMM gives 
guidelines for each criterion on how to measure the described consequence on a 
scale from 1 to 10. Furthermore, CRAMM calculates the levels of threat to assets 
on a five-point scale of “Very Low, Low, Medium, High or Very High”, as well as 
levels of vulnerability to threats on a scale of “Low, Medium or High”.  Each 
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possible answer carries a numerical weighting which reflects the relative 
importance of its contribution to the total threat or vulnerability rating. As each 
questionnaire is completed, CRAMM sums the weighting and categorises the 
total as “High, Medium, or Low”. CRAAM emphasis on data itself. 
•OCTAVE was developed by the Software Engineering Institute of the Carnegie 
Mellon University’s computer emergency response team in order to define a risk-
based strategic assessment and planning technique to understand and address 
its information security risks (Sepczuk and Kotulski, 2018). OCTAVE is a self-
directed approach which that in turn meaning employees from an organization 
might be able to set the organization’s security strategy without the need for 
security experts (ENISA, 2006). This method has three main phases, 
organizational view, technological view and strategy and plan development.  
•COBIT was created by international professional association ISACA for 
information technology management and IT governance to make better decisions 
regarding their information and technology assets by implementation a set of 
controls over information technology and organises them around a logical 
framework of IT-related processes and enablers (Haes and Grembergen, 2016). 
This method contains four areas namely plan and organize; acquire and 
implement; deliver and support; and monitor and evaluate. In addition, there are 
34 processes in line with the four areas.  
•ISO/ IEC 27005 comprises information security standards which published jointly 
by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International 
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Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) to provides best practice recommendations 
on information security management.  
•MEHARI was developed in 1996 in order to assist operating managers, CISO, 
CIO, and risk manager o manage the security of Information and IT resources 
and to thereby reducing the associated risks.  In order to achieve a continuous 
improvement cycle, MEHARI work on a list of vulnerability control points and an 
accurate monitoring process. In addition, MAGERIT can use either qualitative or 
quantitative calculations of risk and conducts risk calculation via predefined tables 
or algorithmic analysis (Gritzalis et al., 2018).  
In the earlier literature review, studies have used CRAMM in the context of other 
applications. For instance, Josang et al. (2004) describe a method for belief-
based risk analysis based on the approach used in CRAMM by quantifying threats 
and vulnerabilities as beliefs and impact costs in dollars and cents. In addition, 
Maglogiannis and Zafiropoulos (2006) present a modeling approach for achieving 
a risk analysis study of networked healthcare information systems based on 
CRAMM. Afterwards, Maglogiannis et al. (2006) suggest an improved 
methodology by combining basic features of the CRAMM risk analysis method 
with the Bayesian Network modeling technique in order to identify assets, threats 
and vulnerabilities of patient systems. On the other hand, El Fray (2012) presents 
a comparative study of a developed new formal mathematical model of risk 
assessment (FoMRA) with expert methods of risk assessment in the information 
systems (MEHARI and CRAMM). Furthermore, Ghazouani et al. (2014) propose 
a practical approach with a mathematical formulation of risk by analysing the 
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studied methodology of CRAMM, NIST SP 800-30, OCTAVE, and ISO 27005 to 
propose a qualitative approach for assessing information security risks.  
 Moreover, acknowledging that while NIST SP 800-30 is a more recent approach 
and still being maintained/revised, it has a different focus that research felt was 
less suited to research needs. Therefore, it seemed a reasonable basis to use in 
this case as well rather than creating a different approach for the sake of it. More 
specifically, the proposed risk method is only adopting the impact rating approach 
(i.e. rather its approach to impact classification in relation to data) and not using 
the entire CRAMM aspects. 
Impact types represent the way in which data are affected if Confidentiality, 
Integrity and Availability (CIA) security is breached. In CRAMM, there are four 
main types of impact (Davey, 1991): 
 Disclosure: Unauthorised disclosure of data. 
 Modification: Accidental or deliberate alteration of data. 
 Denial: Denial of access to data. 
 Destruction: Destruction of the system or data. 
4.3 Taxonomy of Mobile Applications Data  
To the best of this author’s knowledge, the risk for each process within the 
application has not been investigated. The first step to take in exploring risk is to 
propose a taxonomy of mobile applications data. In this context, destruction 
impact type not fit due to it related to the total loss of data rather than the partial 
loss of some records and still the same risk of modification impact. Likewise, 
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denial would be work with a higher level for application instead of a specific 
process because the application has not stopped in practical way. Int this context, 
availability was not used due to there is possibility to access the mobile 
application and our approach behind this step. In this methodology, there were 
three types of mobile applications data taxonomy, as shown in Figure 4-3: 
1. Based on impact type (disclosure, modification). 
2. Based on information type (public, non-public).   
3. Based on impact consequences. 
 
The impact consequences have been adopted from CRAMM (Davey, 1991) as 
follows: 
 Embarrassment: “thing causing feelings of embarrassment for a person”. 
 Financial loss: “loss of money”. 
 Breach of personal privacy: “when there is unauthorised access or 
disclosure of personal information”. 
 Breach of commercial confidentiality: “business information between the 
user and organisation”. 
 Legal liability: “concerns both civil law and criminal law when the user is 
financially and legally responsible for something”. 
 Threat to personal safety: “a situation which may be in the form of 
harassment, an assault, or sexual assault”. 
 Disruption: “inconvenience and annoyance”. 
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Figure 4-3: Taxonomy of mobile applications data 
 
1- Based on impact type 
Data sensitivity has been considered in terms of the potential impact in the event 
of a breach of security that may result from lack of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. These factors are thus the basis for classifying data. In this stage, 
only two impact types have been identified based on CRAMM: disclosure and 
modification, as shown in Table 4-1. In this context, destruction impact type does 
not fit, as it is related to the total loss of data rather than the partial loss of some 
records, but still has the same risk of modification impact. Likewise, denial would 
work with a higher level for an application instead of a specific process because 
the application has not been stopped in a practical sense. 
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2- Based on information type 
These data can be classified based on the type of information (public or non-
public). In the public data type of disclosure impact, there is no need to require 
verification of the user’s identity due to there being no risk or impact on the 
owner’s privacy, such as when reading the news, accessing weather forecasts or 
opening maps. As a result, no controls are required to protect the confidentiality 
of public data when a non-owner tries to access a public application in terms of a 
disclosure impact. However, if public data were modified incorrectly, this could 
have an impact in terms of disruption or personal safety if an incorrect decision is 
made based on the modified public data and might cause embarrassment for an 
organisation. In contrast, loss, misuse, modification, or unauthorised access to 
non-public data type can adversely affect an individual and may cause financial 
loss, as well as the leak of personal information such as credit card numbers, 
bank account details, and health data. As a result, the highest level of security 
control should be applied to sensitive data in order to deny unauthorised access 
to the content of the application. 
 
3- Based on impact consequences 
Definition  Security breach 
Unauthorised disclosure may result in 
embarrassment.  
Confidentiality 
Unauthorised disclosure may result in legal 
liability. 
Confidentiality 
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Definition  Security breach 
Unauthorised disclosure may have an impact 
on personal privacy. 
Confidentiality 
Unauthorised disclosure may result in data 
corruption. 
Confidentiality 
Unauthorised disclosure may result in financial 
loss. 
Confidentiality, Integrity 
Unauthorised disclosure may result in a breach 
of commercial confidentiality. 
Confidentiality 
Unauthorised disclosure may threaten 
personal safety.    
Confidentiality 
Unauthorised modification may result in 
embarrassment. 
Confidentiality, Integrity 
Unauthorised modification may result in legal 
liability.  
Integrity 
Unauthorised modification may have an impact 
on personal privacy. 
Integrity  
Unauthorised modification may result in 
financial loss. 
Integrity 
Unauthorised modification may result in data 
corruption. 
Integrity 
Unauthorised modification may result in  a 
breach of commercial confidentiality.   
Confidentiality  
Unauthorised modification may result in 
disruption.   
Integrity 
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Definition  Security breach 
Unauthorised modification may threaten 
personal safety.    
Confidentiality  
Table 4-1: Definition of types of impact on data and consequences 
In this research project, the 10 most popular mobile categories were selected and 
the most-used application for each category was chosen based upon Google Play 
ranking (Nielsen, 2015). Table 4-2 presents a more detailed analysis of these 
applications and considers the processes that a mobile user performs most 
regularly on each one. More specifically, there are different processes that 
operate on the same data and might pose different levels of social risk. This 
analysis was done by investigation the entire function inside the selected 
application. For instance, adding photos on Facebook might be considered a 
sensitive process that affects the user’s privacy, while reading the text on the BBC 
News application does not. Based on the first level of the novel proposed 
taxonomy, these processes can be classified into public or non-public, in order to 
identify the impact consequence at the second level of the proposed taxonomy. 
After the analysis of user actions (processes) on each application, a total of 115 
actions were identified (97 non-public and 18 public actions). The results show 
that 81% of the actions involve non-public data and 19% public data. Therefore, 
the majority of actions involve sensitive data, which might affect user privacy and 
confidentiality based on the second level of the taxonomy. The results suggest 
there is a need to verify the user’s identity after point-of-entry authentication. 
Traditionally, all processes within a typical mobile application are assumed to 
have the same level of risk. However, the analysis carried out for this thesis 
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suggests that this assumption is not always true. For instance, in the HSBC 
Mobile Banking application, paying bills and reading about products/services are 
not considered by the researcher having the same level of risk. Furthermore, 
sharing a video in a YouTube application does not carry the same level of risk as 
watching on a YouTube process. Accordingly, it is worth noting that the different 
processes on a single application have different levels of risk and thus there is 
clearly a different level of risk within the application. 
App No. User action Information type Impact type 
F
a
c
e
b
o
o
k
 
1 Search on Facebook   Public No Impact 
2 Read news feed Non-public Disclosure  
3 Read user profile Non-public Disclosure  
4 Post on a wall  Non-public Disclosure, Modification 
5 Add photo/link Non-public Disclosure, Modification 
6 Tag friends/check in Non-public Disclosure  
7 Like  Non-public Disclosure, Modification 
8 Comment Non-public Disclosure, Modification 
9 Share Non-public Disclosure  
10 Read notifications Non-public Disclosure  
11 Send message  Non-public Disclosure, Modification 
12 Read message Non-public Disclosure  
13 Delete message Non-public Disclosure, Modification 
14 Join group Non-public Modification 
15 Voice call/video call Non-public Modification 
16 Change settings Non-public Modification 
17 Update information Non-public Disclosure, Modification 
18 Add friend Non-public Modification 
19 Remove friend Non-public Modification 
Y
o
u
T
u
b
e
 
1 Search on YouTube Public No Impact 
2 Watch on YouTube Public No Impact 
3 Upload Non-public Modification 
4 Share Non-public Disclosure  
5 Like/dislike  Non-public Disclosure, Modification 
6 Add a comment Non-public Disclosure, Modification 
Chapter 4-A Novel Mobile Applications Data Risk Assessment Model 
 
85 
 
App No. User action Information type Impact type 
7 Search history Non-public Disclosure  
8 Add to watch later  Non-public Modification 
9 Subscribe Non-public Modification 
10 Unsubscribe Non-public Modification 
11 Read subscriptions  Non-public Disclosure  
12 Read created playlists Non-public Disclosure  
13 Create a new playlist Non-public Modification 
14 Browse channels Non-public Disclosure  
G
m
a
il 
1 Search on Gmail Non-public Disclosure  
2 Send an email Non-public Disclosure, Modification 
3 Read a new email Non-public Disclosure  
4 Read an old email Non-public Disclosure  
5 Reply to/forward  Non-public Disclosure, Modification 
6 Delete an email Non-public Disclosure, Modification 
7 Chat on Gmail Non-public Disclosure, Modification 
8 Make a call Non-public Disclosure, Modification 
9 Change settings Non-public Modification 
10 Read user’s contact  Non-public Disclosure  
11 Read sent mail Non-public Disclosure  
12 Read important email Non-public Disclosure  
13 Read user’s note Non-public Disclosure  
G
o
o
g
le
 D
ri
v
e
 
1 Search on drive Non-public Disclosure  
2 Read file Non-public Disclosure  
3 Share file Non-public Disclosure  
4 Delete file Non-public Disclosure, Modification 
5 Upload file Non-public Modification 
6 Download drive Non-public Disclosure  
7 Show recent file Non-public Disclosure  
8 Upgrade storage Non-public Modification 
9 Change settings Non-public Modification 
Table 4-2: Mobile applications analysis 
Figure 4-4 shows that Gmail, Google Drive and Google Photos are considered 
sensitive applications because 100% of what they include is sensitive personal 
user data. On the other hand, BBC News tends not to be a sensitive application 
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because the majority of its processes (83%) contain public data, such as reading 
the news and searching on BBC News. In the absence of a potential impact, no 
risk is considered to exist. However, if an adversary maliciously manipulates 
someone else’s public data and shares or publishes them publicly, this could have 
a negative impact on the individual’s personal safety or cause embarrassment for 
an organisation if an incorrect decision is made based on the manipulated data. 
Furthermore, Google Maps contains only 36% public data, such as searching on 
Google Maps, getting directions, and showing traffic. Similarly, only 13% of the 
Gumtree application and 7% of the Amazon app are considered to be public data. 
Interestingly, HSBC Mobile Banking contains about 33% public data, such as 
reading about products, finding an HSBC branch and reading about offers, while 
there are about 67% non-public processes which need more protection. However, 
the majority of user actions on Facebook (95%) are deemed risky processes, 
such as posting on the wall, sharing, and adding photos. YouTube is also 
classified as a sensitive application because nearly 86% of its process involves 
non-public data. However, the user could use the YouTube application to search 
for or watch a video and, therefore, such processes are considered to involve 
public data, which represent only 14% of YouTube processes. 
Considering the aforementioned findings, this investigation demonstrates that 
there is no single risk to using a given application, since the risk changes within 
the application from one process to another. More specifically, the unauthorised 
disclosure or modification of mobile applications data has the potential to lead to 
a number of undesirable consequences for the user.   
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Figure 4-4. Percentages of actions involving public and non-public data 
4.4 Generic Risk Assessment Model for Mobile Applications 
When exploring the consequences of a security breach, it can be seen that the 
level of risk changes within an application (intra-process). More specifically, 
different processes operate on the same application with different social risks, 
thereby there is no single risk for a single application. Furthermore, there is a 
degree of complexity and a number of aspects on a personal level that need to 
be calculated from one person to another due to differences in culture and 
education types between users.  
Types of impacts are a relevant set of consequences worthy of consideration in 
the context of mobile apps. For example, loss, modification, or unauthorised 
access to non-public data can adversely affect an individual and may cause 
financial loss from the user’s bank account or the leaking of personal information, 
such as credit card numbers, bank account details, and health data. Similarly, 
unauthorised disclosure, such as access to images and messages, may result in 
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embarrassment if shared by others. More specifically, different processes operate 
on the same application, with different levels of social risk involved, so there is no 
single risk for a single application. Furthermore, there are complex personal 
aspects that need to be calculated: users may belong to different cultures and 
have received different levels of education. Traditionally, risk calculation is related 
to a combination of impact and likelihood (i.e., probability of occurrence), as in 
the following equation: 
Risk = Impact consequence x likelihood                                                  (1) 
Each specific impact type has its own specific set of consequences. Each of these 
consequences could be assessed using a 1-10 rating scale, based on CRAMM, 
but this would make the methodology far too complex for the user. For the sake 
of simplicity, the impact consequences are rated at different levels (low impact, 
medium impact, and high impact), which provides a component of the measure 
of risk. Furthermore, it is possible to find disclosure and modification impact types 
on specific data, such as posting on a wall in a Facebook application. Thus, this 
research uses a 3-dimensional risk matrix containing the impact type (disclosure 
or modification or both), information type (public or non-public) and impact 
consequences (embarrassment, financial loss, data corruption, disruption, legal 
liability, threat to personal safety, breach of commercial confidentiality, and 
breach of personal privacy). This risk model is applied to each action data on 
each application in order to investigate the risk. 
 
To calculate the risk level based on the suggested risk model, there is a need to 
identify a process value (the degree of importance) and the maximum 
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consequences of this action. In addition, the users are not in a position to make 
meaningful/informed decisions about the importance of the action to them and, 
therefore, their perceptions are likely to be invalid. In this context, the process 
value (P) is the level of importance of the action:  
 0: not important 
 1: low importance 
 2: medium importance 
 3: high importance 
 4: very important 
Risk=Process value,max{d(c_max),m(c_max)}                          (2) 
Where d is impact disclosure; m is impact modification, and c is consequence. 
The process value is identified on the basis of the following equation: 
 
Process Value = Application Rank x Process Weight                                      (3) 
 
In Table 4-3, the application categories have been collected on the basis of the 
Google Play classification of application type and ranked on a scale from 1 to 3. 
The intention of this scale is to show the diversity between the levels of 
importance of the actions within applications regarding the user’s privacy and in 
order to attribute sensitivity levels. Towards this goal, three numbers were used 
to determine the level of importance of user data privacy: ‘1’ means the 
application category is not important because it does not contain any user data 
(such as BBC Weather); ‘2’ means a category of medium importance because it 
contains user data; and ‘3’ is an application category of high importance because 
it includes sensitive user data and any possible action on these data might 
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concern, for example, the user’s bank details. These application categories have 
been predefined to illustrate the idea behind the suggested risk model: 
Risk = Max {Impact Disclosure (Max consequence), Impact Modification (Max 
consequence)} 
To assess the level of potential impact of each process (i.e., threat), the ‘worst-
case scenario’ principle was adopted by answering the following questions 
(Theoharidou et al., 2012), the answers to which are used to calculate the impact 
for each process: 
 Which are the worst consequences if your data are disclosed to 
unauthorised users? 
 Which are the worst consequences if your data are modified or damaged? 
 
Category Rank Example Category Rank Example 
Business 2 PDF Reader Shopping 3 Amazon 
Books and Reference 2 Kindle Social 3 Facebook 
Comics 1 Draw Cartoons Sports 1 Sky Sports 
Communication 3 WhatsApp Medical 2 myGP 
Education 2 TED Music and Audio 1 SoundCloud 
Entertainment 2 BBC iPlayer News and Magazines 1 BBC News 
Finance 3 HSBC Bank Personalisation 2 File Manager 
Food and Drink 2 Just Eat Photography 3 Google Photos 
Health and Fitness 1 Google Fit Productivity 3 Google Drive 
Games 1 Pokémon Lifestyle 2 IKEA Cat. 
Maps 2 Google Maps Tools 1 Alarm Clock 
Weather 1 BBC Weather Travel and Local 2 Booking 
Table 4-3 : Application categories ranking 
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The process weight is given on the basis of the process type rankings shown in 
Table 4-4. These numbers are for illustration purposes and have been predefined 
by experts. For example, reading news is considered a very low-risk action due 
to this involving public data (disclosure public type), whereas sharing a user photo 
might be a high-risk action (modification non-public type). 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 4-4: Process weighting 
Furthermore, risk levels might increase differently in relation to various 
consequences and a weight for each impact consequence is given, as shown in 
Table 4-5. In this context, the weight value will be one of three (0, 1, and 2) to 
differentiate between impact consequences. Embarrassment, for example, is 
higher than financial loss in the process type “disclosure non-public”. The weight 
values for disclosure public will be 0 for all consequences because there is no 
impact effect on the user. Therefore, there is no risk involved in the disclosure 
public type. Whereas, the weight value for modification non-public is 2 for all 
consequences. The reason for rating all consequences as 2 is that disclosure 
non-public happens before the modification step and, therefore, the rate for all 
Process Type  Process Weight 
Disclosure Public                 (DP) 
 
0 
Modification Public             (MP) 
 
1 
Disclosure Non-public         (DN) 
 
2 
Modification Non-public     (MN)  
 
2 
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consequences should be higher than the rate for all consequences in disclosure 
non-public type. In the “modification public” type, the weight values differ from one 
impact consequence to another. In practice, at the point of installation or at any 
time subsequently, users have the opportunity/ability to set their own preferred 
rank based on how important they believe it to be and these weights have been 
predefined by experts to illustrate the idea of the suggested risk model. 
In Table 4-5, due to space limitations, the following notation is used to show the 
impact consequences:  
 
 E = Embarrassment   
 F = Financial loss      
 PP = Breach of personal privacy    
 CC = Breach of commercial confidentiality 
 LL = Legal liability    
 PS =Threat to personal safety    
 D = Disruption 
Each consequence has three values: 
 0 = Low 
 1 = Medium 
 2 = High  
The resulting risk is measured on a scale from 0 to 5 as per the following criteria:  
 0-2 = Low risk  
 3 = Medium risk  
 4-6 = High risk  
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PT 
C 
DP  DN MN MP 
E 0 2 2 2 
F 0 1 2 1 
PP 0 2 2 1 
L 0 1 2 1 
PS 0 2 2 1 
D 0 2 2 1 
C 0 1 2 2 
Table 4-5: Consequences weighting 
Each consequence has three values (low, medium, and high) and each action or 
threat is mapped to at least one impact consequence. In cases where there is 
more than one impact consequence, the highest of the values is chosen. The 
resulting risk is measured on a scale from 0 to 6 according to the following criteria: 
0 = No risk; 1 or 2 = low risk; 3 or 4 = medium risk; and 5 or 6 = high risk. To 
assess the level of potential impact of each process (i.e., threat), the ‘worst-case 
scenario’ principle has been adopted to answer the following question (Mylonas, 
2013), the answer to which is used to calculate the impact for each process. The 
question is: Which are the worst consequences if <your data> are disclosed to / 
modified by unauthorised users? 
Table 4-6 shows the results of the multiplications in two scenarios based on 
impact consequences, at weights 1 and 2. 
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Impact Consequences Weighting 
 
 
When impact consequence weight = 1 
 
When impact consequence weight = 2 
 L M H L M H 
P
ro
c
e
s
s
 V
a
lu
e
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 2 3 2 4 6 
2 2 3 4 4 6 6 
3 3 4 5 6 6 6 
4 4 5 6 6 6 6 
Table 4-6: Impact consequences weighting  
Finally, Table 4-7 shows the simplified risk matrix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Impact Consequences Weighting 
 
 
When impact consequence weight = 1 
 
When impact consequence weight = 2 
 L M H L M H 
P
ro
c
e
s
s
 V
a
lu
e
 
0 No Risk No Risk No Risk No Risk No Risk No Risk 
1 Low Low Medium Low Medium High 
2 Low Medium Medium Medium High High 
3 Medium Medium High High High High 
4 Medium High High High High High 
Table 4-7: Simplified risk matrix 
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Let us assume cs is a vector that represents the consequence selection of the 
impact of the consequence c, in which every element in cs is either 0, meaning 
no impact, or 1 has impact, and cs has at most a single 1:  𝑐𝑠 ∈  {0, 1}(𝑚× 𝑜)  
The process risk has been assessed by calculating the maximum vector 
component-wise multiplication vector outcome, denoted by ⊗, between〖RM〗
_adjusted and cs row given by the process and cs vector.  
Process Risk =
𝑀𝐴𝑋([𝑅𝑀𝐸(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)|𝑅𝑀𝐹(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)| ⋯ |𝑅𝑀𝐷(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)] ⊗ 𝑐𝑠 )     
(6)  
Finally, the result of the computation is a scalar value in T. The pseudocode of 
the mobile applications data risk assessment model is illustrated below and is 
summarised in Algorithm 1, as follows. 
 
Algorithm 1. Mobile applications data risk assessment model  
Input:  Application Rank; Process Type; Consequence selection 
Output: Process Risk 
1: if Process Type = “Disclosure Non-public”:       
2:   then Process Weight= 2 and Consequences Weight = (1, 0.5, 1, 0.5, 1, 1, 
0.5)    
3: else if Process Type = “Modification Non-public”: 
4:   then Process Weight= 2 and Consequences Weight = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)             
5: else if Process Type = “Modification Public”:            
6:   then Process Weight= 1 and Consequences Weight = (1, 0.5, 0.5,0.5,0.5, 0.5, 
1)    
7: else Process Risk = 0    
8: end if 
9: Process Value = Application Rank * Process Weight 
10: New Risk Matrix [] = Ceil (Risk Matrix [] * Consequences Weight) 
11: Process Risk = Max (New Risk Matrix [Process Value] * Consequence selection) 
Table 4-8 provides a demonstration of the MORI assessment method with 
different user actions within the application at all possible impact consequence 
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weight scenarios. For further clarification, the following numbers have been 
calculated based on equations 2 and 3 from the above analysis to show the 
proposed risk model approach. In addition, these examples might help the user 
to understand the diversity level of the risk and thereby apply the appropriate level 
of an authentication method in a usable and secure manner. 
App User action   Process Type App Rank Process Weight Process Value Risk 
H
S
B
C
  
Make transfer  MN 3 2 6 ≈ 4 6 
Read offers DP 3 0 0 0 
Find HSBC branch  DP 3 0 0 0 
Read transactions DN 3 2 4 4 
Read balances DN 3 2 4 4 
W
e
a
th
e
r 
 Forecast weather DP 1 0 0 0 
Share with MP 1 1 1 1 
Change setting DN 1 2 2 3 
F
a
c
e
b
o
o
k
 
Search DP 3 0 0 0 
Read news feed DN 3 2 4 4 
Share  MP 3 1 3 6 
Read user profile DN 3 2 4 5 
Post on a wall  MN 3 2 4 6 
Add photo/link MN 3 2 4 6 
B
B
C
 
Search  DP 1 0 0 0 
Watch BBC News DP 1 0 0 0 
Share MP 1 1 1 3 
Y
o
u
T
u
b
e
 
Search on  DP 2 0 0 0 
Watch on YouTube DP 2 0 0 0 
Upload MN 2 2 4 5 
Add a comment MN 2 2 4 5 
Search history DN 2 2 4 4 
Read subscriptions DN 2 2 4 4 
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S
M
S
 
Send a message DN 3 2 4 6 
Read a message DN 3 2 4 5 
Delete a message MN 3 2 4 6 
C
a
lli
n
g
 
Make a call DN 3 2 4 6 
Receive a call DN 3 2 4 4 
Read a history call DN 3 2 4 4 
W
h
a
ts
A
p
p
 
Chat  DN 3 2 4 5 
Send a photo  DN 3 2 4 6 
Share a location DN 3 2 4 5 
Share a document DN 3 2 4 5 
E
m
a
il 
Read an email DN 3 2 4 5 
Send an email DN 3 2 4 6 
Delete an email MN 3 2 4 6 
Table 4-8: Risk assessment examples  
To conclude, this chapter has introduced a new risk assessment model for mobile 
applications data, called MORI (Mobile Risk), which determines the risk level for 
each process on a single application. In particular, the MORI model depends 
upon the value of a user action and the worst consequences if user data are 
disclosed to unauthorised users or modified without permission. Finally, this 
model has introduced a risk matrix which might help move the access control 
system from the application level to the intra-process application level, based on 
the risk for the user action being performed on these processes. The findings 
demonstrate that this model has introduced a risk matrix which helps to move the 
access control system from the application level to the intra-process application 
level, based on the risk for the user action being performed on these processes. 
In the future, this risk matrix could assist research activities that investigate the 
risks within an application. Future research could focus upon suggesting and 
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applying a usable approach to accessing mobile phones by considering the risk 
level for each sensitive process and introducing the level of authentication beyond 
the point-of-entry approach. Furthermore, future work could focus on usability and 
how the user interacts with the proposed risk matrix to ensure that it best fits the 
individual’s favourite settings. 
  
Chapter 4-A Novel Mobile Applications Data Risk Assessment Model 
 
99 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five    
Investigation of Transparent User 
Authentication for Mobile Applications  
Chapter 5-Investigation of Transparent User Authentication for Mobile 
Applications 
 
100 
 
5 Investigation of Transparent User Authentication for 
Mobile Applications 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter proposed a taxonomy for mobile applications data and 
introduced a novel mobile applications data risk assessment model to understand 
the risk involved within an application (intra-process security). Chapter 4 
demonstrates that there is no single risk to using a given application since the risk 
changes within the application from one process to another. This study has also 
indicated the need to move an access control system from a position on an 
application to within the application based on the risk level for each action, which 
means there is a clear need to collect and model real-world data. This, in turn, 
indicates the need to investigate the relationship between the transparent capture 
of biometric samples and the resulting access control decisions (Clarke et al., 
2009; Chuang et al., 2018). As such, this research aims to better understand and 
investigate the potential for applying a transparent authentication system to intra-
process security. This system would, in turn, enable control of the overall 
authentication process and thus a continuous and non-intrusive authentication 
approach. 
This chapter presents the methodical approach used for the data collection and 
experimental methodologies for the proposed biometric transparent 
authentication system at the intra- and inter-process access levels and then 
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presents the experimental results and analysis for three experiments. The three 
experiments, and the main aim of each, are as follows: 
  
 Experiment 1 - A biometric transparent authentication system at the intra- 
and inter-process levels: The average rate of intrusive authentication 
requests was computed and demonstrated for both the intra-process 
(within the application) and inter-process (application access only) levels 
in this experiment. The main aim of this experiment was to test the impact 
of the inter- and intra-process on the overall transparent user 
authentication approach for mobile applications by including the 
application access with other actions within the application for 76 
participants and then to apply the same concept for three types of usage 
(low, medium and high). 
 Experiment 2 - A biometric transparent authentication system at the intra- 
process level:  A set of experiments was conducted to provide further 
insight into whether applying a transparent authentication system to an 
intra-process would enhance security and usability. The experiments were 
applied to each user file to compute the average intrusive authentication 
requests within the application only for 76 participants and the same 
concept was then applied to three types of usage (low, medium and high). 
The primary aim of considering participant categories was to gain greater 
insight into how low usage would affect the total average intrusive 
authentication requests for the entire dataset. 
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 Experiment 3 - A biometric transparent authentication system at the inter–
process level: To test the research concept, it was deemed useful to 
conduct an evaluation using the same real-world dataset. To achieve this 
goal, the average intrusive authentication requests were calculated and 
presented for the inter-process (application access only) without taking the 
actions which were happening within the application into account for 76 
participants. In this experiment, the same concept was also applied to 
three types of usage (low, medium and high). 
5.2 Experimental Methodology 
This section demonstrates how the data were collected and then explains the 
methodical scientific approach of the three experiments outlined above. 
In order to investigate the feasibility of building a transparent and continuous 
biometric-based system, it is necessary to collect samples of genuine user 
interactions with their mobile devices/apps, based upon a substantive period of 
real-world use (noting that such samples would be based upon data that are 
naturally logged by apps on the devices already and so the research would not 
be gathering information that was not already available – it would, however, be 
applying it to an additional purpose). As such, it was proposed to enlist 
participants and collect log data from them after one month of normal device 
usage. It should be noted that the data were anonymous and that participation 
did not require the participants to do anything other than use their devices as 
normal. This experiment collected the sort of data that are logged routinely, such 
as a time stamp of the application used by the participant and the name of the 
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user action (read, send, etc.) but did not collect data such as passwords or 
messages.  
The experiment was carried out on the participants’ Android mobile phone. Ethical 
approval for this research project was obtained from the university’s Research 
Ethics Committee (Appendix A) in order to fulfil University of Plymouth 
requirements. All the participants were 18 years or older and were asked to read 
and sign a consent form (Appendix B) and information sheet regarding data 
collection (Appendix C) before starting the experiment. In addition, the research 
and data were conducted and stored within the Centre for Security, 
Communications and Network Research (CSCAN) at Plymouth University (start 
date: February 2017; end date: July 2017). Although the study was conducted to 
collect app log data, no sensitive material was involved. To facilitate a meaningful 
analysis, at least 100 adult participants (18 years or older) were invited to 
participate in this metadata capture experiment. Participants took at least one 
month to complete their participation in the study, during which time they were 
simply asked to use their device as normal. 
For the purpose of the data collection, a code was developed to extract log files 
from a backup file from the participants’ devices after taking a backup after one 
month on the principal investigator. After one month, each participant’s mobile 
device was connected to the main investigator’s computer. Mobile backup was 
started by utilising Android Debug Bridge (ADB), which is a command line tool 
that allows communication between the connected Android device and a 
computer. This necessitated the participating devices having Android OS version 
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4.1 or above. To access iOS, there is a need to jailbreak the devices to access 
the log files which unlikely for the users to accept that. On the other hand, android 
allow to access to mobile detailed and extract data log files without the need to 
root. Ina addition, to protect the user privacy, ADB was used instead of asking the 
mobile user to download application. 
The backup file was extracted and the participant’s mobile phone was 
disconnected. Then, a code was run on SQLite to extract the log files from the 
extracted backup file. Next, data were generated and the information column was 
exported to a datasheet file (the time stamp, application name and process name) 
and stored in a folder called the "UserActionDataSheet". The data were then 
reviewed by the participant to verify that he/she agreed to share them with the 
investigator. Finally, the backup file was removed at the end of the experiment 
period. Although the study is going to collect app log data, there is no sensitive 
material involved in doing this by writing a code to extract all data automatically 
once connect the mobile device and protect the user privacy. 
During this phase of the data collection, the following applications were selected 
and collected, as shown in Table 5-1, and a package name and database name 
given to each selected application. Some applications, such as Facebook, Online 
Mobile Banking, and Chrome, were fully encrypted and there was no way of 
collecting user data without compromising the user’s privacy by asking the 
participant to root his/her device. For this reason, only 11 applications were 
collected in order to protect the user’s privacy.  
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No. Application  Package name Database 
 
1 
 
Phone Call 
 
om.sec.android.provider.logsprovider 
 
logs 
 
2 
 
SMS 
 
com.sec.android.provider.logsprovider 
 
logs 
 
3 
 
Downloading 
 
com.android.providers.downloads 
 
downloads 
 
4 
 
YouTube 
 
com.google.android.youtube 
 
history 
 
5 
 
WhatsApp 
 
com.whatsapp 
 
msgstore 
 
6 
 
Browser 
 
com.sec.android.app.sbrowser 
 
SBrowser_Tabs 
 
7 
 
Google Play  
 
com.android.vending 
 
localappstate 
 
8 
 
Email 
 
com.android.email 
 
EmailProvider 
 
9 
 
Viber 
 
com.viber.voip 
viber_data; 
viber_messages 
 
10 
 
Google Photo 
 
com.google.android.apps.photos 
 
gphotos0_local_media 
 
11 
 
Camera 
 
com.android.providers.media 
external_Images 
 
external_video 
 
 
12 
 
Yahoo mail 
 
com.yahoo.mobile.client.android.mail 
 
mailsdk_messages 
Table 5-1: Applications collected from users’ mobile phones 
Before starting the data analysis, the risk model (MORI) was used to calculate the 
risk level for each action and applied to the participants’ data to show the diversity 
of the risk level for the different types of actions within each application. Table 5-
2 shows the 12 selected applications for which the risk level was calculated for 
each user action inside the application for the final stage of the risk calculation. 
The action risk level was identified, as shown in Table 5-2, using the following 
range: high risk (6 or 5), medium risk (4 or 3), low risk (2 or 1) and no risk (0). As 
shown in Table 5-2, on a single mobile application, different processes operate 
on the same data with different social risks based on the user action. For instance, 
the WhatsApp application contains different levels of action risk: sending a text 
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message is considered high risk (6), whereas receiving an audio message is 
considered medium risk (4) and receiving a free call (voice/video) is considered 
low risk (2). Finally, each user’s data were updated after applying the risk model 
and stored in an individual text file to calculate the biometric and then identify the 
identity confidence level. 
No. Action Name Application App 
Risk  
Action 
Risk 
1 Make a call Phone Call  3 6 
2 Receive a call Phone Call  3 4 
3 Read an SMS message SMS  3 5 
4 Send an SMS message SMS  3 6 
5 Download a file Downloading  2 3 
6 Search on YouTube YouTube 1 0 
7 Receive a text message WhatsApp  3 5 
8 Receive an image 
message 
WhatsApp  3 3 
9 Receive an audio 
message 
WhatsApp  3 3 
10 Receive a video message WhatsApp  3 3 
11 Receive a contact card WhatsApp  3 3 
12 Receive a location  WhatsApp  3 4 
13 Receive a free call (voice/video) WhatsApp  3 2 
14 Receive a PDF file WhatsApp 3 4 
15 Send a text message WhatsApp 3 6 
16 Send an image message WhatsApp 3 6 
17 Send an audio message WhatsApp 3 6 
18 Send a video message WhatsApp 3 6 
19 Send a contact card WhatsApp 3 4 
20 Send a location WhatsApp 3 6 
21 Make a free call (voice/video) WhatsApp 3 5 
22 Send a PDF file WhatsApp 3 5 
23 Search Browser 1 0 
24 Watch a video Browser 1 1 
25 Download an app  Google Play 2 4 
26 Update an app Google Play 2 2 
27 Send an email Email  3 5 
28 Read an email Email 3 6 
29 Make a free voice call Viber 3 4 
30 Make a free video call Viber  3 4 
31 Receive a free voice call Viber 3 3 
32 Receive a free video call Viber  3 3 
33 Receive a text message Viber  3 4 
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No. Action Name Application App 
Risk  
Action 
Risk 
34 Receive an image 
message 
Viber  3 4 
35 Receive a sound message Viber  3 4 
36 Receive a location Viber  3 3 
37 Send a free text message Viber  3 6 
38 Send a free image 
message 
Viber  3 6 
39 Send a free sound 
message 
Viber  3 3 
40 Send a location Viber  3 5 
41 Delete a message Viber  3 6 
42 Upload an image Google Photo  3 4 
43 Upload a video Google Photo  3 4 
44 Take a photo Camera  1 1 
45 Record a video Camera  1 1 
46 Save a photo Camera 1 2 
47 Save a video Camera 1 2 
Table 5-2: Actions risk 
Regarding the difference between action number 8 (Receive an image message 
_ WhatsApp application) and 34 (Receive an image message_ Viber application), 
there is no difference in the final result which was a medium risk due to the 
medium risk could be (4 or 3). In this context, 3 means low medium risk and 4 
means high medium risk. This depends on the level of impact consequences 
selection which was low, medium, or high. 
Mobile phones can be used to capture multiple biometric modalities, such as face, 
voice and fingerprint recognition, by utilising microphones, cameras, keypads and 
GPS without disturbing legitimate mobile users. In addition, Gartner estimates 
that behavioural biometrics will replace passwords by 2022 (Data Protection 
Centre, 2018). Therefore, biometrics can be employed to substantiate whether 
the authenticated user is the true owner of the smartphone and thus maintain 
security. As a result, a wide range of biometrics were used in this research: facial, 
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voice, iris and fingerprint recognition, and keystroke, behavioural and linguistic 
profiling. EERs published in prior studies in this domain were also used in this 
study.  
Having stated the above, if the user uses a mobile phone for reading a message/ 
email, watching a video, making or receiving a free call or video conference, the 
mobile phone might be able to capture face samples. Face ID was introduced by 
Apple to provide secure authentication for the iPhone X (Apple, 2018; Juniper, 
2018). Apple claims that “the probability that a random person in the population 
could look at your iPhone X and unlock it using Face ID is approximately 1 in 
1,000,000 versus 1 in 50,000 for Touch ID”.  In this research, a simulated scenario 
has been applied for generating biometric samples, a prior EER of 2% was 
selected for facial recognition (Tao and Veldhuis, 2010). Fingerprint profiling will 
also be used as transparent authentication in the near future (Feng et al., 2012; 
Koundinya et al., 2014). If a user uses a mobile phone at the beginning of each 
session, the biometric might be able to capture fingerprint samples and a prior 
EER was selected of 3.74% (Raghavendra et al., 2013). Furthermore, if a user 
uses a mobile phone to write a message or email, the biometric might be able to 
capture keystroke samples (Karim et al., 2018) and a prior EER of 2% was 
selected (Zahid et al., 2009).  
For voice recognition, if a user uses a mobile phone for making/receiving a call or 
a video conference, the biometric might be able to capture a voice sample every 
30 seconds and a prior EER of 7.80% was selected (Woo et al., 2006). Likewise, 
if a user uses a mobile phone for reading a message/email, watching a video, or 
Chapter 5-Investigation of Transparent User Authentication for Mobile 
Applications 
 
109 
 
making or receiving a free call or video conference, the biometric might be able 
to capture iris samples (Du et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2012; Mock et al., 2012). 
Thus, a prior EER of 0.12% was chosen (Chen et al., 2012). Moreover, if a user 
uses more than three applications during a specific time, it might be possible to 
use a behavioural profiling biometric in this research and a prior EER of 7.03% 
was selected (Li et al., 2011). If a user uses a mobile phone for writing a message 
or an email, it might also be possible to capture linguistic profiling samples and a 
prior EER of 12.8% was selected (Saevanee et al., 2015).  
In order to compute the identity confidence level, a weighted majority voting 
formula (Al Abdulwahid, 2017) was utilised. In this approach, for each individual 
biometric technique, weights are assigned that are inversely proportionate to their 
EERs. More specifically, the lower the EER, the higher the weight (Al Abdulwahid, 
2017). Furthermore, the Python programming language was used as a 
processing environment (implemented on a Windows 7 Enterprise 64-bit OS with 
Intel Core™ i5-4310 CPU 2.7 GHz with 16 GB RAM). A number of scripts were 
developed in order to extract the biometric and identity confidence generated for 
each user to compare with the threshold, which in this research is the risk level 
for each action. 
(Al Abdulwahid, 2017) 
Where:   
 1 is the number of the biometric technique; 
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 N is the total number of available biometric techniques within the specified 
time window; 
 x is the number in the sample for the biometric technique; 
 M is the total number of samples for the same biometric technique within 
the specified time window; 
 D is the decision of the biometric sample; and 
 W is the weight of the biometric technique. 
NICA was selected to analyse the data and compute the identity confidence level 
(Clarke et al., 2009). The NICA framework was designed to be a mobile-based 
solution that utilises a combination of secret knowledge authentication and a 
number of biometric techniques, in order to provide transparent and thus 
continuous authentication while the user interacts with the mobile device despite 
the intrusive request at the beginning of the session (Clarke et al., 2009; Al 
Abdulwahid, 2017).  In addition, the main aim of this framework is to observe the 
level of trust for the user in order to allow or restrict access to an application or 
service. Furthermore, based upon the biometric samples captured, the level of 
confidence fluctuates continuously (Clarke et al., 2009), which affects 
permissions to access applications. More specifically, if there are no biometric 
samples captured to cause the confidence level to exceed the threshold value, 
the device will be locked.  
The NICA framework contains three main engines: the Authentication Engine, 
which is responsible for dealing with the authentication of samples and 
authentication decisions; the Biometric Engine, which captures and collects data 
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using biometric techniques; and the Authentication Manager, which is the core 
component of the framework and decides which authentication approach to use 
and manages the functionality of the framework. To provide effective security in 
a NICA system, different types of authentication techniques, such as biometric or 
secret knowledge, were allowed on the user’s mobile. Furthermore, there are two 
security mechanisms that are considered imperative and which define the core 
operation of the framework: the Alert Level (AL) and the Integrity Level (IL). The 
two levels are mapped to confidence levels to maintain security within the system 
as well as usability (Clarke et al., 2009; Al Abdulwahid, 2017). During a specific 
time window, the AL process is used to seek valid samples. If there are no 
samples, the identity confidence level will be periodically reduced by the 
degradation function, which is 10% of current confidence in order to save power 
while the mobile is inactive. In the case of the mobile user requesting to perform 
a task, the IL is applied to check the legitimacy of that individual. If the identity 
confidence level is equal to or greater than the specified risk action level, 
transparent access is allowed. Otherwise, an intrusive authentication request is 
required in order to proceed with the service (see Figure 5-1). In this context, a 
function has been defined in NICA called a degradation function, which decreases 
the value of the IL (-0.5) periodically: every 30 minutes for frequent users and 
every 50 minutes for infrequent ones, as defined by NICA (Clarke et al, 2009), 
when the device is inactive.  
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Figure 5-1: NICA Alert Level algorithm (Clarke et al., 2009)  
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5.2.1 Experiment Scenario 1 
This experiment focuses upon the security and usability of user authentication for 
mobile devices using a large real-world dataset and was conducted to explore the 
feasibility of building a transparent and continuous biometric-based system that 
would provide more secure and user-friendly authentication for mobile 
applications.  The proposed approach is based upon assessing user interactions 
at the intra-process (within the application) and inter-process (application access 
only) levels and determining whether these usage patterns will offer opportunities 
to link into non-intrusive, behaviour-based techniques. A Python code was written 
utilising ADB to collect user interactions with a mobile device. As shown in Figure 
5-2, an action observation (i.e., each user file from the dataset) was produced to 
generate different files. The first file was produced after applying the risk model 
(MORI) and the second after generating possible biometric samples and then 
computing the identity confidence level. Finally, the two files were compared and 
matched at a specific time. If the confidence level is more than the threshold 
(action risk level), the user can access the service (non-intrusive authentication 
request); otherwise, the mobile device is locked (intrusive authentication request).  
The above methodology was applied to each user file in order to compute the 
intrusive authentication requests at the intra-process (within the application) and 
inter-process (application access only) levels to assess the average intrusive 
authentication requests for all 76 users. To achieve this, a number of scripts were 
generated and run with the participants’ data for set combinations of time 
windows: AL = 2 min / IL = 5 min; AL = 5 min / IL = 5 min; AL = 5 min / IL = 10 min; 
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AL = 10 min / IL = 10 min; AL = 20 min / IL = 10 min; and AL = 20 min / IL = 20 
min. The reason for modifying the window each time was to provide further insight 
into whether this would affect the intrusive authentication requests for each user. 
After applying this methodology to 76 participants, there was a clear need to 
investigate how low user usage would affect the total average intrusive 
authentication requests. To do this, the 76 users were categorised into three 
usage groups (low, medium and high). 
Action Observation
Time, Application, Action, Extra Info
MORI
(Risk Model)
Possible Bio. Samples Generation
Confidence 
> = 
Risk
(threshold)
Confidence Computing
Non-Intrusive Intrusive
Yes No
 
Figure 5-2: User file observation methodology 
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5.2.2 Experiment Scenario 2 
To provide further insight into whether applying a transparent authentication 
system at the action level (within the application only) would enhance security 
and usability, the methodology for the second experiment was to compute the 
intra-process only for the same six time windows for the 76 participants. Digging 
deeper to understand how low user usage would affect the total average intrusive 
authentication requests was undertaken. To achieve this goal, all the participants 
were classified into three groups to study the differences between participants’ 
usage, the potential impact of this on the overall performance, and to determine 
whether a particular grouping of time windows would perform better with a 
particular degree of usage.   
5.2.3 Experiment Scenario 3 
Further investigation was then undertaken in the third experiment to compute the 
inter-process (application access only) for the same six time windows for the 76 
participants. The main aim of the third experiment was for evaluation purposes 
and to gain an insight into how useful this may be compared with the previous two 
experiments. All the participants were classified into three groups of usage (low, 
medium and high) to study the differences between participants’ usage and the 
potential impact on overall performance. To achieve this, a code was run to 
calculate the average intrusive authentication requests for inter-process 
(application access only) only to gain greater insight into optimising performance 
results. 
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5.3 Experimental Results and Analysis  
This section presents an overview of the dataset acquired, the experimental 
results and analysis, an investigation of the effect of different time windows on 
each level, and the potential for applying a transparent authentication system to 
intra-process security based on the dataset.  
The 76 users completed the data collection process and then entered the analysis 
phase. Table 5-3 presents an overview of all the users’ data and data collection 
statistics, which are arranged based on the actions per hour for each user. Each 
user’s data were stored in an individual text file and each record contains the 
following fields: a date in two formats: human time and a time stamp (e.g., 2016-
06-28 20:22:30, 1467141750071), application name, action type, and extra 
information, such as message/email length and call duration. As illustrated in 
Table 5-3, a large amount of user actions took place over a small number of days, 
as was the case with User ID (UID) 42, which suggests that this individual might 
be considered a very active user.  
 
UID 
 
Total Actions 
 
 
Total Usage Days 
 
Actions per 
day 
 
Actions per 
hour 
11 327,476 662 494 20 
04 391,479 737 531 22 
42 16,707 40 417 17 
47 265,603 617 430 17 
53 264,999 582 455 18 
03 96,058 284 338 14 
67 120,757 403 299 12 
68 18,340 64 286 12 
26 3,330 14 237 10 
28 194,615 807 241 10 
43 11,136 40 278 11 
52 28,155 102 276 11 
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UID 
 
Total Actions 
 
 
Total Usage Days 
 
Actions per 
day 
 
Actions per 
hour 
71 13,702 51 268 11 
56 10,608 49 216 9 
57 56,348 261 215 9 
09 12,256 62 197 8 
45 12,370 68 181 7 
74 15,842 81 195 8 
34 14,645 85 172 7 
48 5,728 35 163 6 
63 15,725 94 167 7 
76 28,486 165 172 7 
15 16,964 107 158 6 
36 46,917 323 145 6 
39 24,004 160 150 6 
60 22,207 149 149 6 
64 10,822 70 154 6 
12 8,759 62 141 5 
75 5,905 46 128 5 
02 14,412 114 126 5 
13 39,956 319 125 5 
20 21,439 168 127 5 
14 24,140 211 114 4 
54 30,197 262 115 4 
31 20,986 195 107 4 
65 7,081 69 102 4 
27 8,992 91 98 4 
01 29,463 308 95 3 
41 12,325 132 93 3 
51 17,715 187 94 3 
07 14,741 174 84 3 
69 3,832 45 85 3 
06 19,366 236 82 3 
30 33,956 442 76 3 
49 19,757 259 76 3 
10 36,284 487 74 3 
32 17,605 236 74 3 
24 50,297 689 73 3 
62 10,296 143 72 3 
73 5,600 80 70 3 
70 20,860 298 70 3 
19 19,798 346 57 2 
37 21,587 384 56 2 
22 18,457 337 54 2 
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UID 
 
Total Actions 
 
 
Total Usage Days 
 
Actions per 
day 
 
Actions per 
hour 
44 34,202 637 53 2 
55 22,933 424 54 2 
33 29,018 549 52 2 
29 14,254 285 50 2 
05 61,205 1230 49 2 
21 21,880 443 49 2 
50 21,269 431 49 2 
66 47,319 984 48 2 
46 27,576 592 46 1 
38 14,807 333 44 1 
72 15,068 346 43 1 
08 14,986 343 43 1 
61 14,496 361 40 1 
23 6,970 175 39 1 
40 10,314 261 39 1 
59 4,967 138 35 1 
25 4,226 131 32 1 
16 20,378 644 31 1 
35 8,394 271 30 1 
18 8,390 280 29 1 
58 10,079 349 28 1 
17 23,523 818 28 1 
Table 5-3: Data collection statistics 
The overall final captured dataset statistics from the 76 participants are 
summarised and presented in Table 5-4. This amount of information was felt to 
be sufficiently rich to allow meaningful analysis; that is, 22,457 days of mobile 
usage. 
Total Number of All Users 76 
Total Number of Days 22,457 
Average Number of Days per User 136 
Total Number of Voice Calls 101,882 
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Length of Voice Calls 36,566 hours 
Total Number of SMS Messages 2,598,164 SMS messages 
Length of SMS Messages 124,117,633 characters 
Total Number of Email Messages 14,289 email messages 
Length of Email Messages 2,813,960 characters 
Total Number of Actions Accessed  3,006,092 
   Table 5-4: Overall final captured dataset statistics 
Table 5-5 shows how many sample points there were for each application. It is 
clear from the table that WhatsApp was the most frequently accessed application, 
whereas the other applications taken together were accessed a total of 252,770 
times. In this context, the five most commonly used applications among the 
participants were WhatsApp, Google Play, SMS, Email, and Browser. Although 
the Viber app was ranked second to WhatsApp in the application samples, with 
118,426, as shown in Table 5-5, it was not commonly accessed among the 
participants as a whole. 
 
Application Name Total Number of Times Accessed 
WhatsApp  2,753,322 
Viber 118,426 
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Google Photo  49,578 
Camera  25,261 
Email 14,289 
Phone Call 13,808 
Browser 10,785 
SMS 8,459 
Downloading 8,341 
Google Play 3,251 
YouTube 572 
Table 5-5: Total number of applications accessed 
Table 5-6 demonstrates the total number of actions for each user for the selected 
applications in this dataset. It is clear from the table that the top three ranked user 
actions were for WhatsApp. This in turn means that WhatsApp gained the highest 
amount of usage among all the participants.  
Action Name Total Action Name Total 
Receive a text message_ WhatsApp 1,662,768 Send a text message_ WhatsApp 824,207 
Receive image message_ WhatsApp 117,413 Make a free video Call_Viber 58,784 
Send free sound message_ Viber 49,578 Receive a video message_WhatsApp 45,191 
Receive image message_ Viber 43,946 Send an image message_WhatsApp 40,939 
Receive audio message_ WhatsApp 25,753 Send a location_Viber 23,308 
Take a photo_ Camera 23,308 Send an email_Email 13,965 
Receive a free call (voice/video) 12,451 Search_Browser 10,643 
Make free call(voice/video)_WhatsApp 9,751 Download a file_Downloading 8,341 
Make a call_ Phone Call 7,606 Receive a sound message_Viber 6,28 
Receive a call_ Phone Call 6,202 Send a video message_WhatsApp 6,029 
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Send an audio message_WhatsApp 5,970 Receive a free voice call_ Viber 5,144 
Read a SMS message_ SMS 5,101 Send an SMS message_ SMS 3,358 
Download app_Google Play 3,251 Receive a location_ Viber 2,779 
Upload image_ Google Photo 1,130 Save a photo_ Camera 1,130 
Receive a free video call_ Viber 1,066 Receive a PDF file_ WhatsApp 1,016 
Receive a contact card_ WhatsApp 842 Delete a message_ Viber 822 
Record a video_ Camera 822 Search on YouTube_ YouTube 572 
Receive a location _ WhatsApp 517 Read an email_ Email 325 
Update app_ Google Play 324 Send a contact card_ WhatsApp 192 
Send a PDF file_ WhatsApp 162 Watch a video_ Browser 142 
Make a free voice call_ Viber 139 Send a location_ WhatsApp 121 
Send free image message_ Viber 10 Send a free text message_ Viber 4 
Receive a text message_ Viber 1 Upload video_ Google Photo 1 
Save a video_ Camera 1 
 Table 5-6: User action statistics  
Examining the distributions of user hours for all the participants in greater depth, 
as shown in Appendix D, the histogram in Figure 5-3 highlights the differences 
that might be considered significant compared with the total population. For 
instance, the user profile for participant 71 can be differentiated from the others 
due to the mobile phone mainly being used from 00:00 AM until 6:00 AM, whereas 
the majority of participants used their mobile phones from 8:00 AM to 10:00 PM. 
On the other hand, four participants (42, 47, 53, and 68) show identical usage 
compared with the population. 
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Figure 5.3: Histogram for population compared with partipents 
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Figure 5-4 demonstrates the dataset for the sample after applying the risk model 
to the original dataset for a very short period. As shown in the figure, user activity 
and interaction are shown with the risk levels for the different types of applications. 
For instance, the WhatsApp application has different processes, which has an 
impact on the data and involves different levels of risk. There is no single risk 
involved when using the WhatsApp application. For instance, sending a message 
on WhatsApp does not have the same risk when compared with receiving a free 
call on the same application. This suggests that different levels of security 
controls should be applied to data based on the risk level in order to deny 
unauthorised access to the content of the application. This system would, in turn, 
facilitate control of the overall authentication process, thereby enabling a 
continuous and non-intrusive authentication approach. This method could also be 
applied continuously and transparently without impeding the user’s actions. 
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Figure 5-4: User actions with risk level timeline 
It would be useful to better assess the performance of this research under 
different scenarios, to improve the acquired results and determine whether a 
particular grouping of time windows would perform more effectively with a 
particular type of usage. For this purpose, the participants were divided based on 
the average number of actions per hour, as shown in Table 5-3. The diversity of 
users’ interactions is clear from this table. Based on this dataset, average actions 
per hour was calculated and find 5 actions and more consider high usage. For 
instance, participant 4 seems to have been a very active user due to undertaking 
22 actions per hour during 737 days of 391,479 actions, while participant 25 
achieved only one action per hour during 131 days of 4,226 actions. Based on 
the information shown in Table 5-3, the users were classified into three groups: 
low usage, medium usage, and high usage, as follows: 
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 If (Actions per hour) > 5, then High Usage  
 Elseif (Actions per hour) > 2, then Medium Usage 
 Elseif Low Usage 
 
Table 5-7 shows the usage type for all the participants. 
 
Usage Type 
 
 
User ID 
 
 
High Usage  
 
 
3,4,9,11,15,26,28,34,36,39,42,43,45,47,48,52,53,56
,57,60,63,64,67,68,71,74,76 
 
 
Medium Usage 
  
1,2,6,7,10,12,13,14,20,24,27,30,31,32,41,49,51,54,
62,65,69,70,73,75 
 
 
Low Usage  
 
 
5,8,16,17,18,19,21,22,23,25,29,33,35,37,38,40,44,4
6,50,55,58,59,61,66,72 
 
Table 5-7: Usage type for each user 
Figures 5-6 and 5-7 demonstrate examples of action requests for user 47 (high 
usage user) and user 72 (low usage user) throughout one day, respectively, 
associated with the action risk after applying the risk model. As illustrated in 
Figure 5-6, it appears that there is no single risk to using a given application, since 
the risk changes within the application from one process to another. Therefore, 
there is a clear need to define a suitable level of security by enabling intra-process 
security, as this would permit a far more robust approach to confirming the 
authenticity of the user. The two figures indicate that it would be useful to move 
an access control system from being on an application to within the application 
based on the risk level for each process and to establish appropriate levels of 
security. Another observation relating to the same figures is that the vast majority 
of the actions were considered to have a high or medium risk, which, in turn, 
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suggests it is important to apply appropriate protection to data by understanding 
the nature of the risk involved. 
 
Figure 5-6: Action requests for user 47 throughout one day (high usage user)  
 
Figure 5-7: Action requests for user 72 throughout one day (low usage user)  
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5.3.1 Experiment 1: Biometric TAS for Intra- and Inter-process Access 
The main aim of this experiment was to test the inter- and intra-process impact 
on the overall transparent user authentication approach to mobile applications by 
comparing access with other actions within the application for the 76 participants. 
To do this, the average intrusive authentication requests were computed and 
demonstrated for both the intra-process (within the application) and inter-process 
(application access only) levels in this experiment. Based on the methodology, as 
shown in Figure 5-2, the 76 users were then classified into three groups of usage 
(low, medium and high). The code was run with the participants’ data. The 
experimental results and analysis were shown and used to investigate the effect 
of classifying the 76 participants into three groups of usage on the different time 
windows for each level and the potential for applying the transparent 
authentication system to intra- and inter-process security. Figure 5.8 shows the 
confidence level with intrusive authentication time line for the user after matching 
two files: the actions file and the confidence file at a specific point in time.  
The following figures provide examples of the relation between identity 
confidence and intrusive authentication requests on a timeline for high user usage, 
low user usage and medium user usage. In Figure 5.8, the user confidence level 
fluctuates continuously based on the biometric samples captured, as does the 
risk level for the user action. Although there is high fluctuation over this period, 
only one intrusive authentication request was triggered due to the biometric 
samples captured, thereby raising the identity confidence level for participant 57. 
In contrast, three intrusive authentication requests were made in relation to the 
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low usage of user 8. As shown in Figure 5.9, the participant did not use his/her 
mobile between 12:21 PM and 14:16 PM and no biometric sample could be 
captured. For this reason, the confidence level was equal to zero and, therefore, 
the user was asked to enter a password or fingerprint for the authentication 
process. Similarly, no biometric samples could be captured between 11:46 AM 
and 12:17 PM for participant 7, as shown in Figure 5-10 and, as a result, the 
identity verification level decreased. However, the user’s confidence was very 
high after 14:16 PM, which suggests that the mobile user might be able to make 
a high-risk action. As a consequence, the more time between two consecutive 
actions, the higher the intrusive authentication requests.  
 
 Figure 5-8: Confidence with intrusive timeline for participant 57 (high user 
usage)  
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Figure 5-9: Confidence with intrusive timeline for participant 8 (low user usage)       
 
 Figure 5-10: Confidence with intrusive timeline for participant 7 (medium user 
usage) 
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Figure 5-11 shows the average user intrusive requests distribution for intra-
process (within the application) and inter-process (application access only) based 
on the minimum, median and maximum values over the various time windows. 
As depicted in Figure 5-11, the largest time window (AL = 20 min / IL = 20 min)  
achieved better results due to the majority of the average users’ intrusive requests 
distribution being less than 10% of the total average users’ intrusive requests. For 
instance, participant 35 achieved 13% intrusive authentication requests. In 
contrast, the shortest time window (AL = 2 min / IL = 5 min) achieved the worst 
result due to the majority of the average users’ intrusive requests distribution 
among the total requests being about 20%. For instance, the average intrusive 
requests for three participants (2, 29, and 46) were 37%, 36% and 38%, 
respectively. Interestingly, when the AL was the same value (i.e., AL = 10 min / 
IL = 10 min and AL = 10 min / IL = 20 min), the average users’ intrusive requests 
distribution was still the same and the majority were less than 9%. Similarly, the 
AL = 5 min / IL = 5 min and AL = 5 min / IL = 10 min time windows were the same 
but the majority were close to 15%. 
 
Figure 5-11: Average user intrusive requests distribution 
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To summarise, the experimental results for the percentages of intrusive 
authentication requests for the six time windows for intra-process (within the 
application) and inter-process (application access only) were calculated and are 
shown in Table 5-8, together with the numbers of intrusive users. In this table, it 
is clear that the average intrusive requests decreased, ranging from 18% to 6%. 
In general, the larger the AL/IL, the fewer the number of intrusive authentication 
requests. This could be because there is a high probability of capturing many of 
the biometric samples required when users interact with their mobile device for 
long intervals and the degradation function is not recalled to reduce the identity 
confidence when the device is inactive. However, this was not the case for short 
intervals and suggests that this does not allow the mobile user to increase his/her 
identity confidence level if there is a low number of actions. In this context, the 
longest time window (AL= 20 min / IL= 20 min) attained the lowest percentage of 
average intrusive requests (6%), which might favour usability but not security. 
This could be due to there not being any samples taken while the degradation 
function is inactive during a short interval. More specifically, for the time window 
AL = 2 min / IL = 5 min, six participants (2, 12, 29, 46, 55, 58) achieved more than 
30% of the intrusive requests due to the total number of actions being very small 
compared with the total usage days and the actions per day. For instance, 27,576 
actions were collected from user 46 over 592 days, which represents about 46 
actions per day. This low number of actions during the course of a day led to the 
highest percentage of intrusive requests for all the users (38%) and might affect 
the total average authentication requests (18%), as shown in Table 5-8.  
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Time Window 
 
 
Al = 2 
 
 
Al = 5 
 
Al = 5 
 
Al = 10 
 
Al = 10 
 
Al = 20 
 
 
IL = 5 
 
IL= 5 
 
IL= 10 
 
IL= 10 
 
IL= 20 
 
IL= 20 
 
In
tr
a
 +
 I
n
te
r 
 
% Average Intrusive 
Requests 
  
 
18 
 
13 
 
 
13 
 
9 
 
9 
 
6 
 
Total Requests 
 
 
3,006 k 
 
Intrusive ≤ 10% (# 
users) 
 
 
16 
 
29 
 
27 
 
45 
 
46 
 
67 
 
10% < Intrusive ≤ 15% 
 
 
10 
 
24 
 
28 
 
24 
 
23 
 
9 
 
15% < Intrusive ≤ 20% 
 
 
21 
 
9 
 
14 
 
6 
 
6 
 
0 
 
Intrusive > 20% 
 
 
29 
 
14 
 
7 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
Table 5-8: Average percentages of intrusive authentication requests 
One possible reason is that, in the data collection stage, 47 actions were collected 
with the following distribution of risk types: 36% were high risk, 47% were medium 
risk, 13% were low risk, and 4% were no risk. As a result, the majority of these 
actions were considered high and medium risk (83%). Figures 5-12 and 5-13 
show the intrusive/non-intrusive request results for the types of risk for all time 
windows. 
In Figure 5-12, it is apparent that the majority of intrusive requests were the result 
of a high-risk action, a few from a medium-risk action and none from low-risk 
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actions. For instance, in the AL = 2 min / IL = 5 min time window, 16% of the total 
average intrusive requests (18%) were triggered by high-risk actions and only 2% 
of the total average intrusive requests came from medium-risk actions.   
Similarly, it is clear from Figure 5-13 that the majority of intrusive/non-intrusive 
request results came from low-risk actions (AL = 10 min / IL = 10 min, AL = 20 
min / IL = 20 min and AL = 10 min / IL = 20 min); only 1% came from medium-risk 
actions and 8% from high-risk actions in comparison with the total average 
intrusive requests for the other time windows (AL = 2 min / IL = 5 min, AL = 5 min 
/ IL = 5 min, and AL = 5 min / IL = 10 min). 
 
 
Figure 5-12: Intrusive/non-intrusive requests for intra/inter-process, AL= 2 min / IL= 5 m 
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Figure 5-13: Intrusive/non-intrusive request results for intra-/inter-process at AL= 10 
min / IL = 10 min 
To gain greater insight into how low usage might affect the total average intrusive 
authentication requests for the entire dataset, the participants were categorised 
into three levels of group usage and the total average intrusive authentication 
requests were re-computed for each group. To do this, the time window AL = 10 
min / IL = 10 min was selected in order to demonstrate the effect of changing the 
time window on each group of usage, as shown in Figure 5-14. It is clear that the 
time window AL = 10 min / IL = 10 min achieved better results among the high 
usage group as 95% of users’ intrusive authentication requests being under 8%. 
Similarly, for the medium usage group, 77% of users’ intrusive authentication 
requests were under 12%, although half the users’ intrusive authentication 
requests were more than 14% for the low usage group. As a result, these 
experimental results suggest that a time window of AL = 10 min / IL = 10 min 
could be used effectively with high and medium usage groups.   
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Figure 5-14: Average intrusive authentication requests at the intra- and inter-process 
levels (AL = 10 min / IL = 10 min) 
Based on the above analysis of the experimental results for the percentage of 
intra- and inter-process intrusive authentication requests, the total requests for 
the six time windows were calculated and are summarised in Table 5-9. In this 
table, it is clear that this approach achieved the best results following the 
classification of the participants into three groups of usage to identify the most 
suitable time window for each group. The table also shows that the larger the 
AL/IL, the fewer the number of intrusive authentication requests due to the high 
probability of being able to gather biometric samples when users interact with 
their mobile device and the degradation function is not recalled to reduce the 
identity confidence when the device is inactive. In Table 5-9, the percentages of 
intrusive authentication requests achieved were improved when compared with 
those previously reported in the first experiment for all the AL/IL timings. For 
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instance, for the same time window (AL = 5 min / IL = 5 min), the percentage of 
average intrusive authentication requests for all users was 13% but this was 
reduced to 7% for the high usage group. On the other hand, the percentage of 
average intrusive increased to 21% after grouping the users. 
Furthermore, the number of participants whose percentage of intrusive 
authentication requests was less than 10% sharply increased and represent the 
majority of participants for all the AL/IL timings. Interestingly, only one participant 
(58) achieved a percentage of intrusive authentication requests of about 16% for 
the AL = 20 min / IL = 20 min time window. As can be seen in Table 5-9, the 
change in the average intrusive authentication requests between time windows 
was clear at the action level when compared with the application level. 
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Al = 10 
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IL = 5 
 
IL= 5 
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% Average Intrusive 
Requests 
12 7 7 5 5 3 
Total Requests 2,045 k 
Intrusive ≤ 10% (# users) 6 21 21 27 27 27 
10% < Intrusive ≤ 15% 14 6 6 0 0 0 
15% < Intrusive ≤ 20% 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Intrusive > 20% 2 0 0 0 0 0 
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 % Average Intrusive 
Requests 
21 15 15 10 10 7 
Total Requests 464,869 
Intrusive ≤ 10% (# users) 1 2 2 13 13 24 
10% < Intrusive ≤ 15% 2 14 14 11 11 0 
15% < Intrusive ≤ 20% 10 7 7 0 0 0 
Intrusive > 20% 11 1 1 0 0 0 
L
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% Average Intrusive 
Requests 
 
22 16 16 13 13 9 
Total Requests  496,096 
Intrusive ≤ 10% (# users) 1 4 4 6 6 16 
10% < Intrusive ≤ 15% 3 7 7 12 12 9 
15% < Intrusive ≤ 20% 7 8 8 7 7 0 
Intrusive > 20% 14 6 6 0 0 0 
Table 5-9: Average percentages of intrusive authentication requests for usage  
It appears that the largest time window achieved a good result and reduced the 
number of intrusive authentication requests. For instance, the average intrusive 
authentication requests for AL = 10 min / IL = 10 min were fewer than the AL = 5 
min / IL = 5 min time window by 2% at the action level, while there was no change 
at the application level of 4%. The change was clear for participants 28 and 48 by 
5% and 2%, respectively. Interestingly, the experiment results for participant 71 
for both time windows was the same for intrusive authentication requests at 3%. 
Furthermore, intrusive authentication requests changed very slightly (by 1%) for 
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some participants, such as 3, 4, 11, 53, 60 and 64. On the other hand, there was 
a large difference at the action level between two time windows (AL = 5 min / IL 
= 5 min and AL = 10 min / IL = 10 min) for participants 15, 48, and 67, as the 
intrusive authentication requests were reduced by 5% at the action level. 
It also seems that, for the medium usage group, the longer time windows 
achieved equally good results and the intrusive authentication requests were 
reduced. Participants 2 and 12 achieved better results regarding intrusive 
authentication requests at the action level (ranging from 14% to 7% and from 12% 
to 6%, respectively). Similarly, for the low usage group, the longer time windows 
achieved better results (ranging from 9% to 7% at the action level). Interestingly, 
the intrusive authentication requests changed very slightly (by 1%) for some 
participants, such as 5, 22, and 72. There was a significant difference at the action 
level for participants 29 and 46, as their intrusive authentication requests reduced 
by 3% (participant 29 ranging from 14% to 11%). It appears that the majority of 
users achieved intrusive requests of less than 10%. 
5.3.2 Experiment 2: Biometric TAS for Intra-process Access 
To provide further insight into whether applying a transparent authentication 
system at the action level would enhance security and usability, this experiment 
was applied to each user file to compute the average intrusive authentication 
requests for all 76 users. This second experiment differs from the first by focusing 
on user action access only (intra-process access) and not application access 
(inter-process access). To do this, after applying the risk model, the code was run 
with the participants’ data to generate biometric samples (based on Al 
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Abdulwahid, 2017) and then calculate the confidence level and intrusive 
authentication requests for each user for each user action by utilising NICA 
across various ALs and ILs with the actions (within application only). The reason 
for trying different combinations of time windows was to investigate their effect on 
the system performance. As demonstrated in Figure 5-15, the distribution of user 
intrusive requests for 76 participants on an intra-process level based on minimum, 
median, and maximum values over the different time windows was considered. 
In this figure, and as mentioned in Table 5-10, the majority of user intrusive 
requests for the AL = 2 min / IL = 5 min time window were between 15% and 20% 
for 26 users. For instance, participant 46 had the highest intrusive requests at 
33%, whereas participant 71 had 4% intrusive requests. It can be interpreted from 
these results that the total usage of these participants played a significant role. In 
this context, the total usage for participant 46 was 27,576 over 592 days, which, 
in turn, means one action per hour approximately. This low usage could have led 
to the poor performance and is likely to lead to a large number of intrusive 
requests. 
On the other hand, the highest usage might be the cause of the fewest intrusive 
requests, such as participant 71 with a usage of 13,702 over 51 days, which, in 
turn, means three actions per hour approximately. In contrast, the vast majority 
of user intrusive requests for the AL = 20 min / IL = 20 min time window were less 
than 10% (73 participants) which was envisaged to be the case given the longer 
length of time to collect biometric samples or a longer time in which to recall the 
degradation function to reduce the user identity level. Another observation 
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regarding this figure is that the result was mostly identical if there was no change 
in the AL value, such as AL = 5 min / IL = 5 min and AL = 5 min / IL = 10 min, 
which could suggest that AL is important. 
 
Figure 5-15: Average user intrusive requests distribution for intra-process access 
As depicted in Table 5-10, the performance results for experiment 2 across 
various ALs and ILs were promising for the intra-process level (actions within 
application only). The experimental results range from 15% average intrusive 
authentication requests at AL = 2 min / IL = 5 min to 5% at AL = 20 min / IL = 20 
min for the same total of requests (2,561k). Accordingly, it is clear from Table 5-
10 that the more substantial the AL and IL values, the fewer intrusive 
authentication requests. This is logical, as in cases in which the biometric 
samples were insufficient or not available for capture, the user identity was 
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reduced by the degradation function and resulted in a high FRR for the smaller 
time windows. For instance, the percentage of average intrusive authentication 
requests gradually reduced by approximately 50% for the AL = 10 min / IL = 10 
min window to 7% from 15% for AL = 2 min / IL = 5 min. As a result, the shorter 
time windows could have the effect of raising the security level in relation to users’ 
convenience, which was the opposite case for the larger time windows. The larger 
time windows might also lead to preserving a high level of identity confidence 
even though no biometric samples could be captured, which means there is an 
opportunity for misuse of the mobile device by an unauthorised user.  
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Table 5-10: Percentages of intrusive authentication requests for intra-process access 
As previously mentioned, in the data collection stage, 47 actions were collected 
with the following distribution of risk types: 36% were high risk, 47% were medium 
risk, 13% were low risk, and 4% were no risk. One possible reason for the high 
percentage of intrusive authentication requests for some participants is that the 
majority of these actions are considered high and medium risk (83%), so the 
threshold (i.e., risk level) would require a greater confidence value to access the 
service.  
In this context, Figures 5-16 and 5-17 show the intrusive/non-intrusive request 
results for the types of risk for the AL = 2 min / IL = 5 min and AL = 10 min / IL = 
10 min time windows, respectively, for intra-process access. In both figures, the 
majority of intrusive requests come from high-risk actions, leading to an increase 
in the average intrusive authentication requests. Only 3% of the total requests 
come from medium-risk actions for the AL = 2 min / IL = 5 min time window. 
Figure 5-16: Intrusive/mon-intrusive request results for intra-process access at AL = 2 
min / IL = 5 min 
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Figure 5-17: Intrusive/non-intrusive results for intra-process access at AL = 10 min / IL 
= 10 min 
The experimental results clearly demonstrate that the proposed framework is able 
to provide a transparent authentication system for intra-process security. In 
addition, paying closer attention to the intrusive request results for different types 
of usage might lead to reducing the total average intrusive requests. For instance, 
participants 46, 71 and 57 received intrusive requests of 33%, 4% and 6%, 
respectively, for the shortest time window (AL = 2 min / IL = 5 min). To assess 
this, the 76 participants were categorised into three usage groups based on the 
user actions per hour, as previously mentioned in Table 5-4. The primary aim of 
the participant categories was to gain greater insight into how low usage would 
affect the total average intrusive authentication requests for the entire dataset. 
The categorisation was also aimed at testing whether all the time windows 
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considered were reasonable and would tend to be more suitable for different 
types of users and thereby affect the intrusive authentication requests. 
As previously mentioned in Table 5-7, the experimental results for the 76 
participants were categorised into three groups of usage (27 users had high 
usage, 24 users had medium usage, and 25 users had low usage), as shown in 
Table 5-8. Accordingly, it can be seen that the results significantly improved 
following this classification and could lead to gradually reduced intrusive 
authentication requests. For instance, participants 36, 67, and 15 attained the 
highest average intrusive authentication requests at 18%, 17%, and 15%, 
respectively, for the shortest time window (AL = 2 min / IL = 5 min), whereas they 
achieved 4%, 2%, and 3%, respectively, with the largest time window (AL = 20 
min / IL = 20 min). A possible reason for this is that there is sufficient time to find 
and capture biometric samples, thereby raising the user identity level with enough 
time to reduce the confidence level (IL = 20 min).  
For the same group of usage, however, participants 71, 4, and 60 obtained the 
lowest average intrusive authentication requests of 4%, 5%, and 5%, respectively, 
with the shortest time window (AL = 2 min / IL = 5 min). Similarly, they achieved 
3%, 2%, and 3%, respectively, with the largest time window (AL = 20 min / IL = 
20 min), which was expected to have fewer intrusive authentication requests. 
What can also be noticed in Table 5-11 is that the vast majority of participants 
achieved less than 10% intrusive authentication requests across all the different 
time windows (ranging from 15 participants at AL = 2 min / IL = 5 min to 27 
participants at AL = 10 min / IL = 10 min).  
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18 12 13 9 9 6 
Total Requests 396,640 
Intrusive ≤ 10% (# users) 1 5 5 19 19 24 
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15% < Intrusive ≤ 20% 12 2 4 0 0 0 
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% Average Intrusive 
Requests 
18 13 13 10 10 8 
Total Requests 392,795 
Intrusive ≤ 10% (# users) 4 7 7 13 13 23 
10% < Intrusive ≤ 15% 6 15 15 11 11 2 
15% < Intrusive ≤ 20% 9 2 2 1 1 0 
Intrusive > 20% 6 1 1 0 0 0 
Table 5-11: Average percentages of intrusive authentication requests for intra-process 
(usage) 
On the other hand, for the medium and low usage groups, a further interesting 
point to be noticed in these results is that the average intrusive authentication 
requests increased compared with the entire dataset for the same time windows 
(15% vs 18%). In addition, the vast majority of participants achieved around 15% 
intrusive authentication requests across the shorter time windows. For instance, 
at medium usage, participant 21 has the highest percentage of intrusive requests 
(25%) due to 21,880 actions being produced over 443 days, which means two 
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actions per hour. In contrast, participant 65 has the lowest intrusive requests of 
6%. These results support the conclusion that a short time window might mean 
the required service is protected by intrusive requests if no interaction is 
performed between the mobile user and his/her device and biometric samples are 
not available. Although the short time windows prompted a high degree of 
protection and intrusive authentication, this intrusiveness might lead to 
exaggerated re-authentication of the original user. As a result, short time windows 
appear to work well for security but are not quite sufficient for usability. 
With regard to the low usage group results, approximately 56% of user intrusive 
requests were more than 15% for the shortest time window. For instance, 
participants 46 and 58 achieved 33% and 28%, respectively, which are the 
highest percentages of intrusive requests, whereas participant 44 achieved a 
much lower rate of intrusive requests (6%). In addition, the intrusive requests for 
this participant improved to 2% for the longest time window (AL = 20 min / IL = 20 
min). One of the reasons for this could be that the degradation function was 
recalled very few times due to the AL taking a long time to collect biometric 
samples, thereby increasing the probability of raising the user identity level. 
Therefore, a larger time window can be considered to perform well with the 
majority of low user usage. 
5.3.3 Experiment 3: Biometric TAS for Inter-process Access  
The main aim of the third experiment was evaluation and to gain insight into how 
useful this approach may be. The methodology for this experiment was to 
compute the inter-process (application only) access for the same six time 
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windows for the 76 participants. All the participants were then classified into three 
groups of usage (low, medium and high) to study the differences between the 
participants’ usage and the potential impact on overall performance. To do this, 
the code was run to calculate only the average intrusive authentication requests 
for inter-process (application only) access.  
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Table 5-12: Average percentages of intrusive authentication requests for inter-process 
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Table 5-12 presents the performance results for experiment 3 across various ALs 
and ILs for the inter-process level (actions within application only). As seen in the 
table, the experimental results for all the time windows achieved a high 
percentage of intrusive authentication requests, ranging from 56% to 31%. In 
addition, there were a total of 104,245 application requests, which was very low 
compared with the intra-process and inter-/intra-process results of 2,561k and 
3,006k, respectively. The results of classifying all the participants into three 
groups of usage (low, medium and high) still achieved a high percentage of 
intrusive authentication requests. More specifically, these range from 44% to 19% 
for the high usage group, from 66% to 38% for the medium usage group, and  
from 59% to 39% for the low usage group. In general, the inter-process results 
indicated that this did not perform very well in comparison with the two previous 
experiments (i.e., experiment 1: intra- and inter-process; experiment 2: intra-
process). The high percentage of intrusive authentication requests could be due 
to the low level of confidence as the confidence decreased according to the AL 
interval if no biometric samples could be captured. In this case, there is a clear 
need to force the user to raise his/her biometric confidence level, either by the 
use of a password or by providing valid biometric modalities.  
To address this problem, the median is suggested, thereby offsetting the 
shortcoming. The difference in time between two consecutive app access 
requests is calculated and, if the resulting value is greater than the median, a new 
app request is generated. Table 5-13 shows the lower intrusive rate achieved 
compared with the previous experiment and the performance results of the 
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experiment above across various ALs and ILs for the inter-process level. There 
were a total of 1,364k application requests, which is more logical compared with 
the intra-process and inter-/intra-process results (2,561k and 3,006k, 
respectively). In addition, the experimental results range from 27% (the shortest 
time window) to 13% (the largest time window). 
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Table 5-13: Average percentages of intrusive authentication requests for inter-process 
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On the other hand, Table 5-13 clearly shows the majority of the average users’ 
intrusive requests distribution was more than 20% of the total average users’ 
intrusive requests for the first three time windows. In contrast, the shortest time 
window (AL = 2 min / IL = 5 min) achieved the worst result due to the majority of 
the average users’ intrusive requests being 27%. Furthermore, it is worth noting 
that participant 35 achieved 50% intrusive authentication requests for the shortest 
time window (AL = 2 min / IL = 5 min) and is considered an outlier when compared 
with the other participants. Conversely, participants 47, 75, 11, and 4 achieved 
9%, 9%, 10%, and 10% intrusive authentication requests, respectively. Those 
participants achieved 50%, 71%, 40%, and 100% intrusive authentication 
requests, respectively, without applying the median concept to save the number 
of application access. One of the reasons for this result could be that WhatsApp 
was the most-used application for these participants, which means the users 
made a number of interactions within the WhatsApp application for a long time 
with access to only one application. Interestingly, these participants (4, 11, 47, 
and 75) achieved better results for intra-process access at 5%, 5%, 10%, and 17% 
and 5%, 6%, 9%, and 16% at the intra-/inter-process level, respectively. 
Table 5-14 demonstrates the results of grouping the participants under the 
different time windows for high, medium and low usage. It is apparent from Table 
5-14 that the approach of categorising the users into three groups of usage led to 
better performance and the percentage of intrusive authentication requests 
decreased remarkably, from 27% to 22% for the shortest time window (AL = 2 
min / IL= 5 min). The number of intrusive requests was also reduced to half or 
Chapter 5-Investigation of Transparent User Authentication for Mobile 
Applications 
 
151 
 
more for each time window for the high usage group. In general, very little 
enhancement is noticed for the high usage group compared with the medium and 
low usage groups. 
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Table 5-14: Average percentages of intrusive authentication requests for inter-process 
5.4 Discussion  
In this study, only 11 applications were selected for consideration with a limited 
number of user actions, which would be highly likely to lose interactions, causing 
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the loss of many biometric samples. In addition, 47 actions were collected and 
categorised as high risk (35%), medium risk (47%), low risk (13%) and no risk 
(4%). With this in mind, the majority of these actions were considered high and 
medium risk (83%), which, in turn, means identity confidence should be higher in 
order to exceed the threshold and access the required service. In addition, the 
experimental results showed that the majority of intrusive requests came from 
high-risk actions.  Despite previous challenges, the experimental results for the 
intra-/inter-process and intra-process only for the 76 participants were promising 
across the various ALs and ILs considered, as demonstrated in Table 5-15, 
together with the worst and best performing time windows for each access level. 
It is clear from the table that the larger AL/IL time windows led to fewer intrusive 
authentication requests. The reason for the larger time windows outperforming 
the shorter time windows could be that a high number of user interactions with a 
mobile phone leads to the collection of many more biometric samples, thereby 
raising the identity confidence level.  
Furthermore, this study highlights the clear effect of AL value on the average 
intrusive authentication. Likewise, the degradation function was significantly 
affected in terms of the total confidence level, as this automatically dropped. This 
is logical if there were no biometric samples collected or the quality of the modality 
was poor, especially with the shorter time windows. A further point to be noticed 
in these results is that the vast majority of intrusive requests came from high-risk 
actions and very few from medium-risk actions, while there was full transparency 
for low-risk actions. With regard to the system’s robustness and users’ 
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convenience, a short time window is likely to lead to a large percentage of 
intrusive authentication requests, which could become a problem, thereby 
disturbing legitimate mobile users. As a result, short time windows would lower 
the security of the system, which might, in turn, allow an imposter to access a 
service.  
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Table 5-15: Average percentages of intrusive authentication requests for inter-process 
To consider this in more detail, further investigation was undertaken in order to 
explore how low usage would affect the total percentage of users’ intrusive 
authentication requests. This was achieved by classifying the 76 participants into 
different types of users to gain greater insight into optimising the performance 
results and determining whether a particular grouping of time windows would 
perform better with a particular type of usage. Classifying participants into three 
groups of usage indicated a notable improvement and achieved promising 
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experimental results with regard to intrusive authentication requests compared 
with those previously reported in the first experiment for all differing AL/IL timings, 
from the shortest time window (AL = 2 min / IL = 5 min) to the longest time window 
(AL = 20 min / IL = 20 min). As shown in Table 5-16, the results for the three 
usage groups underline the evidence for the effect of low user usage on the total 
average intrusive authentication requests for the time window selected. One 
possible reason for this could be that there is a suitable time window for each 
group of usage and, therefore, a high probability of gathering biometric samples 
when the user interacts with his/her mobile device and the degradation function 
is not recalled to reduce the identity confidence level when the device is inactive 
for very short intervals. 
To conclude, the experimental results highlight that the proposed approach 
achieved a desirable level in terms of applying a transparent authentication 
system to intra-process security. As a result, this system would, in turn, enable 
control of the overall authentication process, thereby enabling a continuous and 
non-intrusive authentication approach.  
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Usage 
Type 
 
Comparison Intra + 
Inter 
Intra Inter   
Least Effective 
Time Window 
AL = 2 min 
/ IL = 5 min 
AL= 2 min / 
IL = 5 min 
AL = 2 min / 
IL = 5 min 
% Intrusive 21 18 29 
Most Effective 
Time Window 
AL = 20 
min / 
IL = 20 min 
AL = 20 min 
/ IL = 20 min 
AL = 20 min / 
IL = 20 min 
% Intrusive 7 6 12 
L
o
w
 
Total Requests 496,096 392,795 270,532 
Least Effective 
Time Window 
AL = 2 min 
/ IL = 5 min 
AL = 2 min /  
IL = 5 min 
AL = 2 min / 
IL = 5 min 
% Intrusive 22 18 31 
Most Effective 
Time Window 
AL = 20 
min / IL = 
20 min 
AL = 20 min 
/ IL = 20 min 
AL = 20 min / 
IL = 20 min 
% Intrusive 9 8 15 
Table 5-4: Average percentages of intrusive authentication requests for inter-process  
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6 Investigation of the Impact of Modalities on the System 
6.1 Methodology of Experiment 4 
The main aim of the fourth experiment was to investigate the impact of each 
modality on overall system performance. A wide range of biometrics were used 
in this research: facial, fingerprint, voice and iris recognition and keystroke, 
behavioural and linguistic profiling. Time windows of AL = 5 min / IL = 5 min and 
AL = 10 min / IL = 10 min were selected at the intra- and inter-process access 
levels in order to test the effects and examine the impact of the biometric 
simulation scenarios on the performance of the proposed approach. The reason 
for choosing the aforementioned authentication time windows was based on the 
notion that smaller time windows might achieve a balance between security 
requirements and participants’ convenience. Although larger verification time 
windows could lead to more security threats and misuse when there is a large 
amount of time in which to check the identity confidence level and the user’s 
biometric samples, these time windows would enhance usability. 
In order to examine the impact of each modality, three types of experiment were 
conducted; the code was run without the selected modality and the total intrusive 
authentication requests were calculated and compared with the overall system 
performance each time. Based on the experimental results for an individual 
modality, a combination of the single modality with the greatest impact was 
selected to test the effect of two modalities on the overall system. Finally, a 
combination of three modalities was selected to test their combined effect on the 
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overall system based on the previous experiment. This chapter then continues by 
discussing the impact of individual biometrics on overall performance system. 
6.2 Experiment 4: Impact of Biometric Modalities on Overall System 
Performance 
6.2.1 Introduction  
In this experiment, further investigation was required to test the effect of a single 
biometric modality on overall system performance. As previously mentioned, a 
simulated scenario in this research has been applied for generating biometric 
samples with a wide range of biometrics were used in this research: facial, 
fingerprint, voice and iris recognition, as well as keystroke, behavioural and 
linguistic profiling. Table 6.1 conducted based on which biometric might be able 
to capture when the mobile user interact with his/her mobile. For instance, if a 
user uses a mobile phone to write a message or email, the biometric might be 
able to capture keystroke samples. Table 6.1 displays further details with regard 
to the 47 user actions collected and matched with a simulated biometric technique. 
As presented in this table, the vast majority of user interactions were associated 
with face and iris recognition techniques: nearly 81% (39 user actions from a total 
of 47). For this reason, this was the main effect on overall system performance.  
No. Action Name Face  Iris Keystroke Linguistic Voice 
1 Make a call      
2 Receive a call      
3 Read an SMS message      
4 Send an SMS message      
5 Download a file      
6 Search on YouTube      
7 Receive a text message      
8 Receive an image message      
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No. Action Name Face  Iris Keystroke Linguistic Voice 
9 Receive an audio message      
10 Receive a video message      
11 Receive a contact card      
12 Receive a location       
13 Receive a free call (voice/ 
video) 
     
14 Receive a PDF file      
15 Send a text message      
16 Send an image message      
17 Send an audio message      
18 Send a video message      
19 Send a contact card      
20 Send a location      
21 Make a free call (voice/video)      
22 Send a PDF file      
23 Search      
24 Watch a video      
25 Download an app       
26 Update an app      
27 Send an email      
28 Read an email      
29 Make a free voice call      
30 Make a free video call      
31 Receive a free voice call      
32 Receive a free video call      
33 Receive a text message      
34 Receive an image message      
35 Receive a sound message      
36 Receive a location      
37 Send a free text message      
38 Send a free image message      
39 Send a free sound message      
40 Send a location      
41 Delete a message      
42 Upload an image      
43 Upload a video      
44 Take a photo      
45 Record a video      
46 Save a photo      
47 Save a video      
Table 6-1: User actions matched with a biometric technique 
As depicted in Figure 6-1, the majority of biometric samples generated were from 
facial recognition and iris recognition (81%) and the remainder were divided 
between the other modalities. Two time windows (AL = 5 min / IL = 5 min and AL 
= 10 min / IL = 10 min) were selected at the intra- and inter-process access levels 
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in order to test the effect and provide further understanding of whether this would 
affect overall system performance. 
 
           Figure 6-1: Biometric distribution by action risk 
6.2.2 Absence of a Single Modality   
Table 6-2 presents the experimental results for the total intrusive authentication 
requests when testing the absence of a single modality in addition to the previous 
experiments regarding all modalities across two different time windows: AL = 5 
min / IL = 5 min and AL = 5 min / IL = 10 min. In this table, it is clear that there is 
no effect when finger, keystroke, linguistic, or voice is removed from the total 
biometric calculation. This was as expected and was accepted, as only 20% of 
the collected user actions were related to these modalities across all the 
participants, as previously mentioned in section 6.2.1. The most surprising aspect 
of this experiment was the significant positive difference in the absence of 
Iris and Face
81%
Keystroke
5%
Voice 
11%
Linguistic 
4%
Biometric distribution by action risk
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behavioural profiling compared with all the biometrics in the experiment (by 1%, 
ranging from 13% to 12%). Turning now to the experimental evidence for the 
effect of the absence of iris or face recognition, there was a notable increase in 
the total intrusive authentication requests of 2% and 3% at AL = 5 min / IL = 5 min 
and AL = 5 min / IL = 10 min, respectively; this was envisaged to be the case, 
given that the majority of the user actions collected were through face and iris 
recognition (nearly 80%).   
In terms of group usage, the results were in line with the other experiments and 
showed a substantial improvement in decreasing the number of intrusive 
authentication requests, as apparent in Table 6-2. For the high usage group, the 
effect of the absence of iris or face recognition showed the same results but a 
further point to be noticed is that the results for the absence of behavioural 
profiling were not affected. However, the change was clear for the medium and 
low usage groups, which showed a reduction of 1%. The reasons for that might 
be the high number of user actions for both modalities (39 actions), which 
suggests that facial and iris recognition might affect the total intrusive 
authentication requests. 
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Table 6-2: Total intrusive authentication requests – absence of a single modality   
Figure 6-2 shows the user intrusive request distribution regarding the impact of 
the absence of a single modality, in addition to the previous experiments for all 
the modalities across the different time windows: AL= 5 min / IL = 5 min and AL = 
5 min / IL = 10 min. It is clear that, when removing iris and face recognition, 
respectively, the total intrusive requests increased from 2% to 3%. For instance, 
nine participants (3, 4, 16, 28, 43, 47, 53, 65 and 71) achieved a high intrusive 
requests percentage, ranging from 5% to 9%, compared with the experiment for 
all the biometrics at AL = 5 min / IL = 5 min. Interestingly, three participants (26, 
58 and 69) were not affected by the removal of iris or face recognition and 
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achieved the same results. At the behavioural profiling stage, the results were 
very close and sometimes achieved better outcomes, as the median for all the 
participants was 12% and 13% for total intrusive requests at the stage of using all 
the biometrics, whereas the median was 15% at the iris and face recognition 
stage. For instance, 19 participants (13, 15, 23, 25, 30, 31, 33, 36, 38, 43, 44, 46, 
51, 54, 58, 61, 66, 69 and 70) achieved a 1% reduction in their total intrusive 
authentication requests when testing the absence of the behavioural proofing 
modality. 
 
Figure 6-2: User intrusive requests distribution – impact of the absence of a single 
modality 
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On the other hand, at AL = 5 min / IL = 10 min, the experimental results were 
almost identical but with some slight changes, such as to the median. The median 
ranged from 12% at the behavioural profiling stage to 16% at the face and iris 
recognition stages, respectively. In this case, the large time window for updating 
the confidence level did not have a positive effect, as the results have shown. 
In this context, participant 4 (a high active user) was selected to examine the 
difference between the impact of the absence of a single modality and all the 
biometrics for a series of user actions during a specific time of day. It is apparent 
from Figure 6-3 that there is a slight difference when removing iris or face 
recognition and a decrease by almost 10%. It could be the case that this 
participant benefited from performing lots of actions which related to face or iris 
biometrics. For instance, the identity confidence level plummeted when there was 
no user interaction with his/her mobile device at action number 46. This is 
followed by a sharp rise as a result of the user entering his/her password. 
However, without the behavioural profiling modality, the result achieved was 
slightly better and identical.  
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Figure 6-3: User 4 – impact of the absence of a single modality 
6.2.3 Absence of Two Modalities  
In this experiment, two modalities were selected to test the impact of their 
absence on overall system performance, as summarised and presented in Table 
6-3. The experimental results for the total intrusive authentication requests were 
considered to investigate the impact of the absence of two modalities, in addition 
to the previous experiments regarding all modalities across the different time 
windows: AL = 5 min / IL = 5 min and AL = 5 min / IL = 10 min.  As seen in Table 
6-3, there is a sharp rise in total intrusive authentication requests in the absence 
of both iris and face recognition by more than half the original number (i.e., in the 
all-biometrics case), which was expected to have been more. A possible 
explanation for these results may be the lack of adequate biometric samples due 
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to the majority of the collected user actions being face and iris recognition (nearly 
80%).  
Despite the improvement in the average for all biometrics and a reduction from 
13% to 7% for the high usage group, the total intrusive authentication requests 
diminished slightly across the different time windows. Interestingly, this was 
different from the medium and low usage groups, whose rates increased. On the 
other hand, there was only a 1% increase in the total intrusive authentication 
requests when removing both the iris recognition and behavioural profiling 
modalities. This result may be explained by iris recognition only as a single 
modality increasing the total intrusive authentication requests by nearly 3% and 
behavioural profiling reducing it by 1%, as shown in Table 6-2. In this case, the 
findings were to be expected. Interestingly, although face and iris recognition 
represented the same proportion of user actions collected (nearly 80%), when 
removing both the face recognition and behavioural profiling modalities, nothing 
changed with regard to the total intrusive authentication requests.  
Chapter 6-Investigation of the Impact of Modalities on the System 
 
167 
 
 
T
im
e
 W
in
d
o
w
 
O
v
e
ra
ll 
W
it
h
o
u
t 
Ir
is
 a
n
d
 F
a
c
e
 
W
it
h
o
u
t 
Ir
is
+
 
B
e
h
a
v
io
u
ra
l 
W
it
h
o
u
t 
F
a
c
e
 +
 
B
e
h
a
v
io
u
ra
l 
A
ll 
5/5 13 29 15 13 
5/10 13 29 14 13 
G
ro
u
p
 U
s
a
g
e
 
H
ig
h
 5/5 7 28 10 7 
5/10 7 28 11 7 
M
e
d
iu
m
 5/5 15 31 16 15 
5/10 15 31 17 15 
L
o
w
 
5/5 17 30 18 17 
5/10 17 30 18 17 
Table 6-3: Total intrusive authentication requests in the absence of two modalities   
Figure 6-4 shows the impact on user intrusive requests distribution of the absence 
of two modalities, in addition to the previous experiments for all modalities across 
the different time windows: AL = 5 min / IL = 5 min and AL = 5 min / IL = 10 min. 
In this figure, it appears that there is a notable effect of the absence of both iris 
and face recognition for both time windows. For instance, the median for the total 
intrusive authentication requests was 28% in the case of the absence of both iris 
and face recognition with a wide gap in relation to other combinations of 
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biometrics collected, which did not exceed 15%. In addition, nearly 75% of the 
participants show significantly higher total intrusive authentication requests by at 
least double when compared with the original. For instance, participants 3, 4, 35 
and 42 range from 3% to 39%, 2% to 30%, 20% to 48%, and 7% to 34%, 
respectively. Interestingly, four participants (2, 17, 58 and 59) show a slight 
increase in the total intrusive authentication requests, ranging from 23% to 29%, 
16% to 19%, 24% to 27%, and 14% to 20%, respectively. One possible reason is 
that these participants were already classified as low active users. 
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Figure 6-4: User intrusive requests distribution – impact of the absence of two 
modalities 
On the other hand, in the case of iris and behavioural profiling, there was a clear 
trend showing an increase in total intrusive authentication requests. For instance, 
six participants (3, 4, 28, 47, 57 and 71) show intrusive authentication requests of 
almost 5% to 11%, whereas eight participants (2, 17, 23, 26, 30, 36, 46 and 58) 
show no effect from this change. In addition, it was noticeable that participant 69 
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changed from 19% to 18%. The reason for this was not clear but this user may 
not depend on iris or face biometric capturing. 
Participant 65 (a medium active user) was then selected to examine the 
difference between the impact of the absence of two modalities and all biometrics 
for a series of user actions during a specific time of day. It is apparent from Figure 
6-5 that the absence of both iris and face recognition caused fluctuation, resulting 
in a high percentage of intrusive authentication requests and the most negative 
result. It may be that this participant benefited from lots of actions related to face 
or iris biometrics. On the other hand, without iris and behavioural profiling 
modalities set between without iris and face recognition and the all modalities due 
to the impact of iris recognition as shown in the previous figures. For instance, at 
action 41, the identity confidence level decreases because the user has not used 
his/her mobile for a while and the degradation function was recalled. It is clear 
that there is a gap between the all-biometrics scenario and iris and face 
recognition of at least 35%. However, a slight change occurred when removing 
iris recognition and behavioural profiling. Another observation relating to Figure 
6-5 is that there might be times when the identity confidence level does not need 
intrusive requests due to the action being low or no risk. 
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Figure 6-5: User 65 – impact of the absence of two modalities 
6.2.4 Absence of Three Modalities  
The experimental results for the total intrusive authentication requests used to 
investigate the impact of the absence of three modalities in addition to the 
previous experiments involving all modalities across different time windows (AL 
= 5 min / IL = 5 min and AL = 5 min / IL = 10 min) are summarised and presented 
in Table 6-4. As shown in the table, the impact of the absence of iris and face 
recognition is clear, as their effect progressively increases with both behavioural 
profiling and voice recognition. For instance, in the absence of iris, face and 
behavioural profiling, the total intrusive authentication requests increase by more 
than half of those for the all-biometrics experiment (ranging from 13% to 29% at 
AL = 5 min / IL = 5 min, and to 34% at AL = 5 min / IL = 10 min). This result was 
expected and accepted due to face and iris recognition, when combined together, 
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achieving the worst result for the total intrusive authentication requests, as shown 
in the previous experiment. Interestingly, the total intrusive authentication 
requests show a slight decrease for the high usage group, which demonstrates a 
notable improvement compared with the medium and low usage groups.  
 Time Window  Overall Without Iris and 
Face+ 
Behavioural 
Without Iris 
and 
Face+Voice 
A
ll 
5/5 13 29 29 
5/10 13 34 29 
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5/5 7 28 28 
5/10 7 34 28 
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 5/5 15 30 31 
5/10 15 35 31 
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5/5 17 30 30 
5/10 17 34 30 
Table 6-4: Total intrusive authentication requests – impact of the absence of three 
modalities   
Figure 6-6 shows the user intrusive requests distribution for the impact of the 
absence of three modalities, in addition to the previous experiments involving all 
modalities across two different time windows: AL = 5 min / IL = 5 min and AL = 5 
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min / IL = 10 min. The figure shows that the effect becomes more noticeable with 
the absence of iris and face recognition and that they play an important role in 
raising the total intrusive authentication requests across the different time 
windows (AL = 5 min / IL = 5 min and AL = 5 min / IL = 10 min). For instance, the 
median for the total intrusive authentication requests was 28% in the case of iris 
and face recognition and there is a wide gap in relation to the other types of 
biometrics collected, which did not exceed 14%.  
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Figure 6-6: User intrusive requests distribution – impact of the absence of three 
modalities  
In addition, nearly 75% of the participants show significantly higher total intrusive 
authentication requests by at least twofold in comparison with the original results. 
For instance, participants 3, 4, 35 and 42 range from 3% to 39%, 2% to 30%, 20% 
to 48%, and 7% to 34%, respectively, which were the same results as those 
relating to the absence of two modalities (i.e., iris and face recognition). Likewise, 
four participants (2, 17, 58 and 59) show a slight increase in the total intrusive 
authentication requests, ranging from 23% to 29%, 16% to 19%, 24% to 27%, 
and 14% to 20%, respectively. These individuals were classified as low active 
users and this may have resulted in a large number of intrusive authentication 
requests. 
Figure 6-7 presents the impact of the absence of three modalities for user 47 (a 
high usage user). The graph shows that the results for the absence of iris and 
face recognition modalities continues to lower the user confidence level, which 
results in a high percentage of intrusive requests. More specifically, the removal 
of behavioural and voice modalities did not make a difference to the overall results. 
For the 59 user actions plotted, only one identity verification was required (at user 
action number 17) when all the biometrics techniques were applied in the case 
that there was no user interaction with his/her mobile. However, there were 10 
intrusive authentication requests when the iris and face recognition modalities 
were removed. To conclude, the greater the number of modalities removed, the 
lower the user confidence level, which results in a higher percentage of intrusive 
authentication requests. 
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Figure 6-7: User 47 – impact of the absence of three modalities 
To conclude, the impact of iris and face recognition on the overall system is clear 
for all three types of absence (single modality, two modalities, and three 
modalities). As previously mentioned, the vast majority of user interactions were 
associated with face and iris recognition techniques (nearly 81%; that is, 39 user 
actions from the total of 47). For this reason, this was the main effect on overall 
system performance.   
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7 Conclusions and Future Work 
User authentication on mobile devices has become an increasingly important 
consideration. After the point-of-entry authentication stage at the beginning of a 
session, using modalities such as a PIN or password, the user of the device can 
perform almost all tasks, with different risk levels, without having to re-
authenticate periodically to re-validate the user’s identity. Furthermore, the 
current point-of-entry authentication mechanisms consider all applications on a 
mobile device to have the same level of importance and maintain a single level of 
security for all applications, thus not applying any further access control rules. As 
a result, with the rapid growth of mobile devices for use in our daily lives, securing 
the sensitive data stored upon them makes authentication of paramount 
importance.    
The main objective of this research was to propose and develop an intelligent 
transparent authentication framework for intra-process security for mobile 
applications that both fulfils security obligations and provides continuous 
protection to ensure the validity of the current user. This objective was achieved 
by first presenting a comprehensive review and analysis of the literature on 
transparent authentication systems for mobile device security. This research then 
presented a taxonomy of mobile applications data with justifications and 
introduced an innovative mobile applications data risk assessment model, called 
MORI (Mobile Risk), which determines the risk level for each process on a single 
application. Finally, this approach was implemented to perform authentication 
continuously and conveniently for mobile applications. 
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This final chapter summarises and concludes the work of this thesis by outlining 
the research contributions and the main achievements of the research project. 
The chapter then discusses the shortcomings of the research, its limitations and 
the obstacles encountered for further investigation and research. Finally, the 
chapter identifies several potential research directions and considers future work 
within the mobile device security field and how the research could proceed from 
this point. 
7.1 Contributions and Achievements of the Research 
As originally outlined in chapter one, the research aims and objectives have been 
achieved with a series of experimental studies. These studies have led to the 
introduction of a framework for a transparent, intra-process authentication 
approach for mobile applications. In addition, a number of peer-reviewed papers 
have been produced and presented at conferences and published in 
internationally recognised journals during the course of this research, which 
suggests that the research is deemed to have made positive contributions to the 
field of user authentication and specifically to the biometric identity verification 
domain.  
The following key contributions have been made by this research by meeting the 
following objectives of this study project: 
 Objective 1: To review the importance of mobile devices and the evolution 
of mobile applications and fully investigate the leading current 
authentication approaches. The research project established, by reviewing 
the popularity of mobile devices, our increasing reliance upon them and 
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the importance of the security of these devices. The work then provided an 
overview of some of the currently provided authentication technologies 
and reviewed biometric authentication from a number of perspectives, 
including its system components, requirements, techniques, performance 
measures and fusion. The relevant chapter ended with the current 
authentication mechanisms for mobile devices and the security issues 
involved (chapter two). 
 
 Objective 2: To investigate the current state-of-the-art literature on 
transparent and continuous authentication for mobile device security. This 
study briefly outlined the concept of a transparent authentication system 
and the need for it. This was followed by an exhaustive literature review of 
the existing research in this domain on continuous and transparent 
authentication systems for mobile devices and a comparative summary of 
each category was provided. Building upon this, the discussion ended by 
identifying the gap that exists in the literature by highlighting the security 
issues and authentication alternatives for modern mobile devices and the 
need for a new security mechanism which can provide continuous and 
transparent protection for better securing mobile devices (chapter three). 
 
 Objective 3: To produce a novel mobile applications data taxonomy by 
investigating and studying the risk for each process within an application 
in order to explore the level of user action risk. This research project drew 
attention to the need to study the risk relating to each process within an 
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application and explained the need for intra-process security for mobile 
devices through examples of different types of applications. The research 
project then introduced a novel mobile applications data risk assessment 
model. A taxonomy of mobile applications data was then presented, with 
justifications, by studying the risk for each process within 10 of the most 
popular mobile categories, which were analysed to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of the various risk levels associated with the user actions 
on those applications. This research shows that there is sensitive 
information beyond the point of entry and that the risks change within 
applications (chapter four). 
 
 Objective 4: To propose an innovative risk assessment model for mobile 
applications data, called MORI (Mobile Risk), which can be used to 
determine the risk level for each process on a single application. This 
research presented a generic risk assessment model for mobile 
applications data with a particular focus on analysing and producing a risk 
matrix that might help move the access control system from the application 
level to the intra-process application level, based on the risk relating to the 
user action being performed as part of the processes (chapter four). 
 
 Objective 5: To develop user action determination software in order to 
create a real dataset to utilise in the study experiments. In order to 
investigate the feasibility of building a transparent and continuous 
biometric-based system, it was necessary to collect samples of genuine 
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user interactions with their mobile devices/apps based upon a substantive 
period of real-world use (noting that such samples would be based upon 
data that are naturally logged by apps on the devices anyway, and so the 
research would not be gathering information that is not already collected; 
it would, however, be applying it for an additional purpose). As such, it was 
proposed to enlist participants and collect log data from them after one 
month of normal device usage. It should be noted that these data are 
anonymous and that participation did not require the participants to do 
anything other than use their devices as normal. This experiment collected 
the sort of data that are logged routinely, such as a time stamp of the 
application used by the participant and the name of the user action (read, 
send, etc.), but this experiment did not collect such information as 
passwords, messages, etc. As a result, a significant number of real 
participants (76) in completely uncontrolled conditions were assembled 
and 47 user actions were gathered from 12 selected applications during at 
least one month of normal device usage (chapter five). 
 
 Objective 6: To conduct a series of experiments aimed at investigating the 
feasibility of the proposed system. This study conducted the following set 
of experiments: a biometric transparent authentication system on intra- 
and inter-process, intra-process (i.e., within app) only and inter-process 
(i.e., only app) only access across different time windows. For each 
experiment, all participants were classified into three usage levels (low, 
medium and high) due to the observation that some users performed an 
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insufficient number of activities on their device and, therefore, showed a 
high level of intrusive authentication requests. As a result, there was a 
need to investigate whether a specific combination of time windows would 
perform better with a specific type of user, an approach which was shown 
to achieve better results compared with the first experiment (chapter five). 
 
 Objective 7: To investigate the impact of specific biometric modalities on 
overall system performance in terms of three types of modality: single, two, 
and multimodalities. In this research study, a wide range of biometrics 
were simulated and further investigation was required to test the effect of 
a single biometric modality on overall system performance (chapter six). 
7.2 Limitations of the Research Project  
Although the research programme objectives have been met, a number of 
limitations and issues have been identified as being linked to the work progress 
and findings and need to be considered. The key limitations of this study are 
briefly listed below. 
1. This research study collected 47 user actions from only 12 selected 
applications, in order to protect the users’ privacy and not ask participants 
to root their device. The data collected for analysis might be insufficient 
and collecting data on more user actions from more applications would 
have provided a richer and more comprehensive set of user interactions 
from the extracted log files for each participant, which might have lost 
biometric samples. Therefore, the experimental results might have been 
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further improved if many more user actions had been collected from a 
greater number of applications. 
2. EERs previously published in the literature were utilised as simulative 
biometric scenarios and input in all the experiments. This was due to the 
difficulty of finding applicable open source biometric classifiers, as this 
research study was managed and performed by a PhD researcher and 
was limited in terms of duration, timeframe and resources. As a result, this 
did not enable the presentation of real-time mobile usage and 
consideration needs to be given to this issue. 
3. The proposed risk assessment model for mobile applications data was not 
tested and evaluated across different types of participants in a real 
environment through surveys, focus groups or interviews. As a result, 
there is a need for further analysis to be pursued to appreciate the 
practical usefulness of the proposed risk assessment model and to gain 
greater insight into the effectiveness of this model. 
4. The user actions determination technique used in this study relied upon 
data collected from databases by utilising SQLite from each selected 
application.  
7.3 Suggestions and Scope for Future Work 
Despite the limitations of the research project presented in the previous section, 
this research project has advanced and improved the field of user authentication 
for smartphones in general and mobile application security and usability in 
particular. As with any research, there are a number of opportunities for future 
work and enhancement in further investigation within the area of user 
Chapter 7-Conclusions and Future Work 
 
183 
 
authentication on mobile applications. This presents a significant opportunity to 
take the proposed research to the next level and further substantiate intra-
process security as an improvement upon traditional methods of mobile device 
security. 
The details of these research opportunities are highlighted below: 
1. Studying the risk relating to each process within an application has not 
been investigated apart from this research, which has a solid foundation in 
this area of study. Therefore, consideration should be paid to this area of 
research in order to enhance and improve the security of mobile 
applications data and user convenience. 
2. There is a clear need for additional investigation into techniques of user 
action determination that would lead to providing more insight into system 
performance. 
 
7.4 Future of User Authentication on Mobile Devices 
With the rapid growth in the use of smartphones in our daily lives, securing the 
sensitive data stored upon them makes authentication of paramount importance. 
In particular, smartphones are used to perform activities which are considered 
sensitive and confidential, and the risks are high in the event of the loss of 
sensitive data or privacy breaches. In addition, after the point of entry, by using 
techniques such as a PIN or password, the user of a device can perform almost 
all tasks, with different risk levels, without having to re-authenticate periodically 
to re-validate the user’s identity. Furthermore, the current point-of-entry 
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authentication mechanisms consider all applications on a mobile device to have 
the same level of importance and thus do not apply any further access control 
rules. Unlike previous work, this research argues that within a single mobile 
application there are different processes operating on the same data but with 
differing risks attached. The unauthorised disclosure or modification of mobile 
data has the potential to lead to a number of undesirable consequences for the 
user. Thus, there is no single level of risk associated with a given application and 
the risk level instead changes during use. Accordingly, there is a need to suggest 
a method that can be applied continuously and transparently (i.e., without 
obstructing the user’s activities) to authenticate legitimate users, which is 
maintained beyond the point of entry, without the explicit involvement of the user.  
To this end, this research project has suggested a new mechanism to address 
this problem by utilising a transparent and continuous authentication system. This 
transparent and continuous authentication mechanism provides a basis for the 
convenient and secure re-authentication of the user and gathers user data in the 
background without requiring any dedicated activity by regularly and periodically 
checking user behaviour in order to monitor the protection of the smartphone 
continuously. Finally, this study has introduced a transparent, intra-process user 
authentication approach for mobile applications in order to verify whether the 
authenticated user is the legitimate owner of the mobile device. 
This work would help shape the future mobile application security field by 
ensuring that the right person is allowed to access the right information at the right 
time. Furthermore, this research study could, in the future, assist research 
activities to investigate the risks within the application. In addition, a further aspect 
Chapter 7-Conclusions and Future Work 
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that needs to be considered is to understand the nature of the risk to which the 
data are exposed in order to apply the appropriate protection to those data 
thereby improving user authentication security. Likewise, this work would help 
mobile developer to protect mobile and this approach would achieve good levels 
of usability by utilizing a combination of the device owner’s biometrics. 
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